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1 INTRODUCTION  
This doctoral dissertation examines the differences between the behavior of male 
and female executives and experts and the possible impact on corporate govern-
ance and financial reporting practices. The research focuses particularly on execu-
tives and experts involved in their firms’ corporate governance systems and aims 
to investigate whether the gender of a firm’s executives and experts influences its 
corporate governance policies, financial reporting, or auditing practices. In partic-
ular, the research aims to extend the existing literature by addressing whether and 
how female chief executive officers (CEOs), chief financial officers (CFOs), 
board chairs, and external auditors influence the governance practices, financial 
reporting, and external control within a firm. 
Psychology and management literature acknowledge the existence of significant 
gender-based differences in various areas, such as communicative abilities, con-
servatism, leadership styles, risk aversion, and cognitive functioning. Given these 
well-documented differences and their possible impact, for example, on financial 
reporting and governance practices, gender diversity at executive level has re-
ceived increased attention in recent corporate finance literature, perhaps due to 
legislative requirements enacted in many countries for a minimum number or 
proportion of female board members. Nevertheless, important questions related to 
the impact of gender diversity and, especially, to the possible role of the gender of 
individual executive or expert have largely been overlooked in the existing corpo-
rate governance and financial accounting literature.  
Overall, the estimation results reported in this dissertation imply that gender-
based differences have an impact on executive behavior, and the dissertation’s 
constituent essays shed light on important questions concerning women’s profi-
ciency  and  performance  at  work.  The  potential  of  women is  still  commonly  un-
der-utilized at the executive level and this research may also promote the business 
case for involving women to a greater extent than happens currently.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion  briefly  describes  the  evolution  of  gender  roles  and  their  possible  impact  on  
working life. Part 3 discusses society’s effect on gender roles and the gender poli-
cies and regimes employed in various countries.  Next,  the position of women at  
work is described. Part 5 summarizes the gender-based differences in behavior 
and characteristics that may have an impact on an executive’s decision-making 
and, consequently, the financial performance and governance practices of the 
firm. The next section briefly describes the earlier literature on the relationship 
between the gender of an executive, director, or expert, and firm performance and 
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governance mechanisms. Finally, Part 7 summarizes the five essays that comprise 
this dissertation.  
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2 GENDER EVOLUTION AND WORKING LIFE 
Evolutionary biology literature indicates that women and men have specialized in 
different  tasks  as  a  result  of  the  requirements  of  nature.  Women gave  birth  and  
nurtured the children, while the man’s task was to provide food for the whole 
family  or  earn  a  living  to  do  so.  As  Geary  (1998)  argues,  women  in  all  known  
societies have been found to exhibit more nurturing behavior than men. In fact, 
research suggests that women of all ages tend to be “person-oriented”, whereas 
men are more “object-oriented”, a gender-based difference observable from early 
infancy (Goodenough 1957).  
Due to this ancient division of tasks men were, and often still are, considered the 
heads of the household. On the other hand, women are expected to take care of 
tasks such as cleaning and cooking. This division would encourage women to 
learn domestic skills from childhood, whereas men tend to focus on learning 
skills that are marketable in the paid economy (Carli & Eagly 1999). Although 
modern Western societies are slowly breaking down these age-old task divisions, 
and  traditional  roles  both  at  home  and  at  work  are  being  reformed,  even  today  
some people see women as subordinate to their husbands and not as individuals 
capable of independent decision-making. Prejudices found at work may mean 
women are not taken as seriously as their male counterparts and are instead 
thought of as secretaries assisting men in doing their important work. Women are 
not expected to understand anything finance-related, let alone actually have some-
thing valuable to add to a discussion or to decision-making.  
The belief that women and men should occupy different roles in society arises 
from the fact that women’s lives were dominated by the capacity to bear children. 
The technological development of the 20th century, however, freed women from 
the reproductive constraints of the past (Hunter College 1983). Simultaneously, 
the work environment was restructured so it became less dependent on the physi-
cal strength that men often excel at (Cook 1985). Today, almost all labor market 
positions in Western societies are formally open to both men and women. How-
ever, a significant segregation prevails so that, in practice, there is still “men’s 
work” and “women’s work”. Moreover, even in the occupations that are largely 
integrated, the highest occupational positions are more likely to be held by men 
than by women, suggesting that hidden gender discrimination is still present in 
the workplace (Browne 2002: 5).  
Writing about gender equality, Sümer (2009: 1) states: “I conceptualize gender 
equality as a situation in which women have a fair deal concerning their life 
changes; a social condition in which women and men are not constrained by ex-
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pectations and structures assuming a certain biological trait.” The statement 
indicates that, regardless of recent development, gender equality is today still a 
rather distant concept in many respects. For example, even though women work 
outside their homes more often than they did in the past, and men tend to be more 
involved  in  the  family,  women  still  carry  most  of  the  domestic  burden  (Major,  
1993; Lewis, Smithson, Brannen, Das Dores Guerreiro, Kugelberg, Nilsen & 
Connor 1998).  
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3 SOCIETY’S EFFECT ON GENDER ROLES 
“The world we have created is a product of our way of thinking. It  cannot 
be changed without changing the way we think.” (Einstein) 
As Einstein suggested, society cannot renew itself unless there is a change in the 
way people think. Despite the attempts to establish gender equality, the world is 
still very different for men and women. As Bryson (2007: 37) writes: “Although 
women in many nations now have more or less the same legal rights as men, 
women and men in general continue to play different roles and to receive differ-
ent rewards – and in general this works to the disadvantage of women.” Howev-
er, promoting and examining gender equality is a very controversial topic, since 
highlighting women’s rights can be considered inequitable and even sexist (Grif-
fin 2009: 16).  
Many countries and companies have realized the importance of gender equality in 
working life, and have introduced policies and laws promoting equal rights and 
responsibilities for men and women (De Anca 2008; Hoel 2008). People, in gen-
eral, believe that female-friendly countries (e.g. where women have equal rights) 
and companies tend to select more female leaders; however, rather surprisingly, 
this does not seem to be the case (Adler 1999). 
3.1 Gender policies and regimes 
Earlier literature suggests that gender roles do not necessarily generalize across 
different cultures, and, for example, the tasks and responsibilities of women may 
vary significantly between cultures. Despite these significant cultural differences, 
however, women are underrepresented in the business world’s top positions 
throughout the world (Adler & Izraeli 1994; EU 2011b), which means that the 
gender inequality problem has gained global attention. 
The Western economies have for long valued gender equality highly, whereas, for 
example, in Africa and the Middle East men strictly remain the breadwinners and 
heads of households, and a woman’s job is to serve the husband. Europe is often 
seen as a pioneer in matters related to gender equality, and traditional European 
gender roles have experienced significant changes during the past few decades. 
Housewives are a diminishing group in Europe, while the dual-earner family 
model is becoming increasingly common. This trend is also supported, for exam-
ple, by the European Union (EU) and various country-level policies promoting 
women’s advancement in business; for instance, supporting parents in reconciling 
their work and family commitments is a major goal on the European social agen-
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da (Sümer 2009: 1). Scandinavian women have achieved a high level of equality 
with men compared to the majority of other European countries, and this is main-
ly due to the Nordic welfare model (Sümer 2009: 39).  
In general, gender equality is highly valued and promoted in the Nordic countries, 
and their national policies are planned with gender equality in mind. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that all the Nordic countries are highly ranked in the 
gender-related  development  indices  of  the  United  Nations  (UN)  Human  Devel-
opment  Report.  For  example,  the  UN’s  Gender  Inequality  Index  ranks  all  the  
Nordic countries among the top-20 in the world in their latest index report in 2008 
(1. Norway, 9. Sweden, 16. Finland, 17. Iceland, 19. Denmark) (HDR 2008). The 
United States of America (U.S.A.) is ranked number four in the list. This suggests 
that, since this dissertation uses data from the Nordic countries and the U.S.A, the 
results are based on countries with extremely high gender equality.  
International comparisons such as the Legatum Prosperity Index (Legatum 2010) 
commonly list the Nordic countries as among the best places to live. This is partly 
because of the high level of gender equality and, for example, good social bene-
fits that support motherhood. For instance, the national legislations of all the Nor-
dic countries accept the provision and funding of children’s daycare as a task of 
the state (Leira 2006). This principle increases equality and provides all mothers 
with equal opportunities to work outside the homes. 
In line with the literature suggesting that females may have a positive impact, for 
example, on firm performance and market value (see e.g. Farrell & Hersch 2005; 
Campbell & Mingues-Vera 2008; Adams & Ferreira 2009), legislators have no-
ticed the importance of encouraging firms to promote gender equality, and get 
more women working at the executive level. For example, in Norway, the board 
of directors of a firm must now be at least 40 % female (Hoel 2008). In a similar 
vein, in Finland, publically listed firms are required to have at least one female 
board member or they must account for why they have not met this requirement 
in their annual reports. It seems reasonable to assume that the Nordic states’ pio-
neering legislative activity on gender equality will become more common global-
ly.  
The trend towards gender equality has also been promoted recently by the EU 
through its Women’s Charter enacted in March 2010, which aims to achieve 
equality in decision-making. Following the charter, the European Commission 
adopted a Gender Equality Strategy in September 2010 (EU 2010; 2011b). This 
strategy includes a goal of getting more women into senior positions in business 
life. Moreover, in March 2011, the EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding 
asked publically listed European firms to sign the “Women on the Board Pledge 
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for Europe”, and her initiative was supported by the European Parliament in July 
2011 (EU 2011a; 2011c). The pledge urges firms to increase the proportion of 
females on their corporate boards to 30 % by 2015 and to 40 % by 2020. Com-
missioner Reding has also stated that, unless the aim of the pledge has made cred-
ible progress by March 2012, legislative action will be prepared at the EU level 
(EU 2011c). These recent initiatives indicate that the gender inequality problem is 
widely acknowledged and significant attempts towards solving the issue are being 
made. 
3.2 Gender and cultural differences 
In Western societies, women are now more highly educated than men. For in-
stance, in the United States, 57.4 % of Bachelor’s degrees were awarded to wom-
en in 2008, whereas when statistics were first compiled in 1960 the women’s 
share was only 35.2 % (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2011). In a similar vein, in 
2008 women received 60.4 % of the Master’s degrees (32.0 % in 1960) and 50.8 
% of the Doctoral degrees (10.0 % in 1960). However, despite women’s high lev-
el of education, they continue to experience workplace discrimination. For exam-
ple, women are severely underrepresented in senior management. Women ac-
count for about a third of Master of Business Administration (MBA) course 
members (Rhode & Kellerman 2007: 2), but hold only two to three percent of 
CEO positions of the S&P 500 firms (see essay II,  Peni & Vähämaa 2010).  The 
situation is similar in Europe, since only five percent of the top executives of the 
200 largest European firms are female (International Labor Organization 2004). 
The situation is significantly worse in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 
where in many nations women are restricted, for instance, from walking alone and 
working outside their homes (Hayward 2005: 151). If women attain executive 
positions despite the odds, they still tend to face lower levels of compensation, 
mobility, and authority (Lyness & Thompson 1997). 
According to status characteristics theory, gender is a diffuse status characteristic, 
since more honor, respect, and importance are attached to men than women (Ber-
ger, Fisek, Norman & Zelditch 1977; Ridgeway & Diekema 1992; Wagner & 
Berger 1997). Thus, men are thought to be more competent than women in many 
aspects, and because people are generally more influential when they are per-
ceived to be competent, the assumption of men’s superior competence makes it 
difficult for women to demonstrate their competence (Carli & Eagly 1999). 
It has been documented that a double standard exists when estimating compe-
tence, in that what constitutes a high level of competence is higher for women 
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than men (Carli & Eagly 1999). This double standard also creates a disadvantage 
for women in hiring and promotion. For example, Foschi, Lai, and Sigerson 
(1994) document that a majority of men would prefer to hire a man or not to hire 
anyone than hire a woman whose performance was superior to that of the best 
male candidate. 
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4 WOMEN AND WORKING LIFE 
“To take from any community its male workers would paralyze it economi-
cally to a far greater degree than to remove its female workers. The labor 
now performed by the women could be performed by the men, requiring on-
ly the setting back of many advanced workers into earlier forms of industry; 
but  the  labor  now  performed  by  the  men  could  not  be  performed  by  the  
women without generations of effort and adaptation. Men can cook, clean, 
and sew as well as women; but the making and managing of the great en-
gines of modern industry, the threading of earth and sea in our vast systems 
of  transportation,  the  handling  of  our  elaborate  machinery  of  trade,  com-
merce, government – these things could not be done so well by women in 
their present degree of economic development.” (Perkins Gilman 1898: 8–
9). 
Despite being well over a hundred years old, the above quote still seems to de-
scribe the attitudes of many. Both domestic and work-related tasks are often di-
vided into feminine and masculine, and, commonly, the masculine tasks are the 
ones that are considered important from the point of view of a well-functioning 
society. Perkins Gilman’s (1898: 9) argument from the 1800s summarizes the 
public opinion that had prevailed for centuries: “The male human being is thou-
sands of years in advance of the female in economic status.” Attempts to attain 
gender equality have been successful to the extent that it is now commonly rec-
ognized that females may also have a lot to offer at the executive level. As Sharpe 
(2000) claims, “After years of analyzing what makes leaders most effective and 
figuring out who’s got the Right Stuff, management gurus now know how to boost 
the odds of getting a great executive: Hire a female.  
Despite promoting gender equality, the power relations resulting from gender 
hierarchy still tend to be unequal. Labor markets are segregated on the basis of 
gender, that is, there are women’s and men’s jobs. Women are over-represented 
in the public sector, health care, and education fields (Barth, Røed, and Torp 
2002: 9). Women also tend to have lower employment rates than males (see e.g. 
Eurostat 2010), which may expose women to higher levels of poverty and social 
exclusion. Men have traditionally been preferred as executives, since an ideal 
employee is considered to be one who works continuously from the end of educa-
tion until retirement, without letting family or other obligations interfere (Cook 
1992; Pleck 1977). It has been suggested that this male model of work needs to be 
challenged in order to promote gender equality (Cook 1992; Lewis & Cooper 
1996). The current competitive and quickly changing economic conditions seem 
to be slowly changing these traditions (Cooper & Lewis 1999), which may work 
to the advantage of the more adaptable females. Moreover, as Evers (2003: 4) 
10      Acta Wasaensia 
notes, gender inequality is not only bad for women, but also harms development 
and economic growth generally.   
Previous literature indicates that reputation concerns are efficient in shaping the 
governance practices of firms (Wu 2004). Since gender equality is commonly 
seen as a desirable feature, women may be appointed to managerial positions in 
order to please the public and, therefore, their opportunities to influence decision-
making may be limited. Interestingly, since gender equality has become a public 
issue, many companies have been making it extremely difficult to identify the 
people occupying the executive seats. For example, there seems to be a tendency 
to  remove  photographs  of  executives  from  web  sites  and  annual  reports  and  to  
indicate the first name only with an initial. An alternative method involves listing 
dozens of people as the “leadership team” or all the affiliate companies’ execu-
tives may be listed as well (Womenomics 2010).  
4.1 Being a role model 
Female leaders are considered to symbolize change. If, for example, a female 
CEO, president, or chairperson is nominated, it raises the possibility of other so-
cietal and organizational changes (Adler 1999). Chesterman, Ross-Smith, and 
Peters (2004) conducted a study of women’s advancement opportunities finding 
that  having  female  executives  as  role  models  tends  to  attract  other  women  to  
managerial positions. Moreover, they report that the most important issue in in-
creasing women’s share of managerial positions is getting explicit support from 
the senior executive, which highlights the responsibility that corporate executives 
have for promoting gender equality, and just how important that responsibility is.  
The majority of current female leaders are the first females to hold their particular 
position, so they have no female predecessors or role models. These females rely 
heavily on public support, instead of a traditional corporate support system (Adler 
1999). Kramer, Konrad, and Erkut (2006) suggest that one woman cannot neces-
sarily precipitate a change in the corporate board operations and, therefore, hav-
ing role models and peers is extremely important. They further argue that the 
presence of three or more women causes a shift in the board dynamics and, after 
reaching that critical limit, the female presence on the board becomes the norm 
and gender ceases to be an issue. It follows that in order to promote women’s ad-
vancement in business, a safety net and support system needs to be created for 
female candidates targeting executive positions. 
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4.2 Gender wage gap 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that for as long as there have been paid jobs, 
women have consistently earned less than men. For example, in 1313 the taxable 
wealth  of  Parisian  women was  about  two thirds  that  of  men (Reskin  & Padavic  
1994: 101), and in 1850, women working in manufacturing earned less than half 
of what men earned (Goldin 1990). Therefore, the gender wage gap phenomenon 
is by no means new, and despite the movement toward equal pay for similar 
work, the gender wage gap still exists around the world. For example, in Europe 
men generally earn 15–20 % more than women (Plantega and Remery 2006: 4–
5). Women also more commonly work part-time (Eurostat, 2006: 4), which de-
creases their social security benefits and pension payments. The gender difference 
in pay does not seem to be explained by the different fields of work, since men 
are reported to earn more than women in jobs where men are the majority or the 
minority, as well as in gender-neutral jobs (Lorber 2005: 79–80). Mothers are 
reported to earn substantially less than other women during their lifetime (Davies, 
Joshi, & Peronaci 2000; Budig & England 2001). 
Various explanations have been offered for the persistence of the gender wage 
gap. It has been documented that women who do not have children still earn less 
than men in comparable positions (Stroh, Brett & Reilly, 1992; Schneer & Reit-
man, 1995), which indicates that the pay gap is not explained by career breaks 
due to maternity leave. Moreover, it has been argued that women tend to earn less 
than men because their attitudes, preferences, or qualifications make them less 
competitive (Roos & Gatta 1999); therefore, the gender wage gap simply reflects 
the gender differences in the human capital offered to the employer. This explana-
tion seems rather implausible considering the evidence presented in Chapter 1.4 
indicating that many of the typical female characteristics, as well as their higher 
level of education, may give females a competitive advantage in the labor market. 
An alternative explanation is that the people whose top priority is to achieve high 
status positions tend to be among the highest paid (Browne 2002: 33). Therefore, 
the continued existence of the gender wage gap could be seen more as a reflection 
of interests and priorities rather than as proof of gender discrimination in the work 
place.  
4.3 Gender and careers 
Given that the labor market is extremely competitive, one might expect that indi-
vidual talent and experience determine who climbs in the corporate ladders. How-
ever, apparently there is still prejudice against aspiring female executives, and 
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“old boys’ networks” can efficiently block the progress of talented female appli-
cants. Cronin and Fine (2010: 13) suggest that the traditional ways of working in 
the world of business tend to work against female executive candidates: “The 
corporate system – the way the business world operates – generates rules of be-
havior that create common guidelines for what is acceptable and what is not. 
These basic, respected rules of business work well for men but can inadvertently 
create paradoxes that put women in no-win situations and limit their opportunity 
to succeed in a manner comparable to men.”  
Traditionally, the position of women in business has been challenging. In the 
1930s, many American firms and schools introduced marriage bars denying work 
and education to married women (Nickless 1999: 270). For women, the biggest 
change in the labor market was the entry of married women into the work force, 
which has transformed society (Goldin 1990). Women have come a long way 
since those times, but even today they often face different challenges during 
working life than men do. For instance, many women working in male-dominated 
organizations may be described as “outsiders within” (Lorber 2005: 84), and, in 
consequence, they may have limited opportunities for career development. It has 
also been suggested that women face additional barriers in accessing executive 
positions as a result of social exclusion or discrimination (Singh & Vinnicombe 
2004; Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno & Escot 2011). For example, it has been argued 
that different hiring practices are used when assessing female and male candidates 
(Woodhams & Lupton 2006). The literature has also documented that executives 
tend to hire subordinates like themselves (Anderson-Gough, Grey & Robson 
2005), which is likely to hinder women’s advancement in business.  
The career paths of women are affected by gender stereotypes, gender differences 
in family obligations, gender bias in evaluation and mentoring, and deficient pub-
lic policies (Rhode & Kellerman 2007: 6). It is not surprising that the career paths 
of men and women tend to differ. Women’s careers have been shown to typically 
follow a pattern where a period of employment is followed by a multiyear career 
interruption, and then a return to employment (Stroh & Reilly 1999). This pattern 
is mainly result of childbearing and social reasons.  
It is clear that attaining a senior level position not only requires the right personal-
ity, knowledge, and experience, but also a devotion to one’s career spanning dec-
ades. Therefore, one’s attitudes towards work and career development have an 
impact on the outcome. Schwartz (1989) suggests that women are, in general, less 
involved in developing their careers due to family constraints. It has been pro-
posed that women opt out of full-time professional work in order to accommodate 
domestic obligations (Belkin 2003: 42). These types of explanations are worth 
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considering, since women tend to make different choices than men. For example, 
more women opt out of business life for at  least  some period, and more women 
who stay in the game tend to remain childless (Rhode & Kellerman 2007: 4). In-
terestingly, close to 20 % of women holding graduate or professional degrees do 
not work outside their homes, while the same is true for only five percent of men 
(Wallis 2004: 51).  
The statistics indicate that combining professional and family lives is more diffi-
cult for women than for men. For example, only 46 % of female executives in the 
U.S.A. are married, compared to over 94 % of male executives (Catalyst). In a 
similar vein, 27 % of female senior executives have no children, while the same is 
true for only 3 % of the men (Rhode & Kellerman 2007: 5–6). These figures sug-
gest that, in general, the women who make it to the executive level are required to 
opt out of domestic distractions. As Lorber (2005: 71) claims, “The heart of the 
difference is that women workers have families and men workers have wives.” 
International surveys indicate that the highest percentage of dual-earner couples is 
in Sweden (85.1 %), followed by Finland (80.6 %). In the U.S.A., both parents in 
72.3 % of families work outside their homes (Jacobs & Gerson 2004: 119–147, 
216). 
The widely used term glass ceiling refers to the invisible barriers that women face 
when aiming for the top rungs of the corporate ladder. The first female CEO was 
appointed to a Fortune 500 company as late as 1999 (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia & 
Vanneman 2001), which clearly indicates that women face a disadvantage when 
applying for the most senior positions. Evidently, despite the vast amount of at-
tention that the glass ceiling phenomenon has attracted, the solution is yet to be 
found.  
What leads those rare female executives to the senior leadership positions? Ac-
cording to Adler (1999), the majority of female leaders are driven by a vision, 
mission, or cause. They have personal goals, and holding a top position simply 
offers the means to achieve these goals. Women have also been reported to meas-
ure successful career advancement less on remuneration and more on how the 
work allows them to balance their personal and professional lives (Stroh & Reilly 
1999). 
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5 GENDER-BASED DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR 
AND CHARACTERISTICS  
“It seemed clear to me that any between-sex differences in thinking abilities 
were due to socialization practices, artifacts and mistakes in the research, 
and bias and prejudice. After receiving a pile of journal articles that stood 
several feet high and numerous books and book chapters that dwarfed the 
stack of journal articles, I changed my mind.” (Halpern 2000.) 
A significant stream of management and psychology literature argues that gender-
based differences exist in various aspects. It has been suggested that the differ-
ences between men and women may vanish at the executive level and that women 
in senior positions in fact resemble men in their behavior. However, Adams and 
Funk (2010) report findings indicating that, even at the director level, fundamen-
tal differences exist between men and women. They further suggest that those 
differences persist even within firms so that there is a difference in the behavior 
of a man and a woman working in a similar position in the same firm. The gender 
differences in characteristics that may have an impact on executive and expert 
behavior are discussed below. 
5.1 Cognitive abilities 
Browne (2002: 33) suggests that gender differences in temperament, cognitive 
abilities, and occupational preferences are at least to some extent responsible for 
the commonly acknowledged problems in business, namely the glass ceiling phe-
nomenon, the gender wage gap, and occupational segregation. He also proposes 
that people who regard status as a high priority also tend to achieve high status, as 
they are more willing to invest  in earning it.  Similarly,  people who value a high 
salary make sacrifices and, therefore, also end up earning well. 
Prior literature suggests that women and men execute work tasks differently. An 
explanation provided by evolutionary theory is that females and males have very 
different perspectives on time. Women carry babies and raise them to adulthood; 
definitely a long-term commitment measured in terms of slow but steady pro-
gress. In contrast, male hunters had to move fast in order to be able to hunt game. 
Researchers have proposed that this difference in perspectives also influences the 
way women and men operate at work. Women are perhaps able to see the whole 
picture better and are able to make long-term plans for improving things, while 
men want to see the change as soon as possible,  without considering that wom-
en’s style could actually be more efficient in the long run. Moreover, it is also 
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suggested that women are more flexible and able to adapt relatively effortlessly 
(Katz 1997), which should be valued by employers. 
5.2 Risk aversion and conservatism 
The  risk  aversion  levels  of  women  and  men  differ.  It  is  widely  reported  that  
women are more conservative and risk averse than men (see e.g. Levin, Snyder & 
Chapman 1988; Johnson & Powell 1994; Powell & Ansic 1997; Jianakoplos & 
Bernasek 1998; Byrnes, Miller & Schafer 1999). The difference between genders 
in risk-taking behavior is said to be evident even in childhood. Boys are thought 
to be exposed to greater risks both because of being more likely to engage in risky 
behavior, but also because when engaging in the same activity as girls, boys are 
more likely to perform it in a risky manner (Browne 2002: 19). The gender-based 
differences identified are reported to widen further in adolescence (Schrader & 
Wann 1999). 
Reporting on performance at work, Schubert (2006) argues that women try harder 
to avoid losses and so their risk-taking is more moderate than that of males. Ac-
cording to the empirical findings of Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009), the 
market is aware of the gender-based differences in risk tolerance, since their esti-
mation results indicate that changes in risk following CEO appointments are sig-
nificantly lower when the incoming CEO is female.  
Sturdivant, Ginter, and Sawyer (1985) suggest that executive conservatism has a 
significant impact on firm performance. Interestingly, they claim that conserva-
tism is negatively associated with the firm’s social responsiveness and some as-
pects of financial performance. However, it is not clear whether these results 
would hold true in today’s financial market. Due to the reported gender-based 
differences in risk aversion and conservatism, Stendardi, Graham and O’Reilly 
(2006) even suggest that the financial advisors should tailor their financial plan-
ning process based on the client gender. Overall, the widely reported gender-
based differences in risk tolerance and conservatism may have a significant im-
pact on the firm’s financial performance and reporting practices 
5.3 Overconfidence 
Psychology literature indicates that, in general, people are prone to overestimate 
their  skills  and  knowledge  and  are  overconfident  of  their  own  relative  abilities  
(Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein 1977; Weinstein 1980; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff 
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& Phillips 1982; Taylor & Brown 1988; Camerer & Lovallo 1999). Bonner 
(2008) suggests that men tend to be more overconfident than women, especially 
in domains traditionally considered masculine, such as business life. Moreover, 
the level of overconfidence apparently increases with more difficult tasks (Klay-
man, Soll, González-Vallejo & Barlas 1999). 
Barber and Odean (2001) argue that the excessive overconfidence of men can be 
seen in their trading behavior on stock exchanges. Their results indicate that men 
trade an average of 45 % more than women, which reduces their net returns by 
2.65 percentage points annually, compared to the 1.72 percentage point reduction 
of females’ returns caused by trading. Interestingly, single men are reported to 
trade 67 % more than single women, which causes their returns to decrease by 
1.44 percentage points more annually than the returns of single women. Thus, it 
can be concluded that men’s overconfidence may reduce their potential financial 
wealth. 
It has been suggested that managerial overconfidence may account for corporate 
investment distortions (Malmendier & Tate 2005). In particular, overconfident 
CEO’s investment decisions are more responsive to cash flow; that is, they tend to 
overinvest when they have abundant funds. Malmendier and Tate (2008) also 
argue that overconfident CEOs are prone to overestimate their income-generating 
ability and, as a consequence, they overpay for target companies in mergers. In 
general, the differences in overconfidence levels may be seen in the executive’s 
behavior and actions at work, which may lead to differences in the performance 
of firms led by females from those led by males. 
5.4 Ethical behavior and diligence 
Research suggests that female executives and directors have higher moral stand-
ards than males (Bernardi & Arnold 1997; Borkowski & Urgas 1998; Roxas & 
Stoneback 2004; Peterson, Albaum, Merunka, Munuera & Smith 2010). Moreo-
ver, according to MacLeod Heminway (2006), women are more trustworthy than 
men, and may therefore be less likely to manipulate corporate financial reporting. 
Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) find that the greater the female representation in 
the United States House of Representatives, the lower the level of corruption, 
which also suggests that women at the top level positions may be more trustwor-
thy and honest than men. In a similar vein, Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard (1989) 
state that men are more than twice as likely to engage in unethical actions – for 
example to purchase stocks using insider information – than women.  
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Earlier literature has documented differences in the level of diligence of male and 
female executives. Huse and Solberg (2006) argue that women at the executive 
and director level tend to be better prepared for meetings than men. Women are 
also reported to have higher expectations regarding their responsibilities (see e.g. 
Fondas & Sassalos 2000), which is likely to have an impact on their performance 
at work. 
5.5 Communicative skills and leadership style 
Scholars have argued that women have better communication skills (see e.g. 
Wood, Polek & Aiken 1985; Fondas 1997; Schubert 2006). Robinson and 
Dechant (1997) and Dallas (2002) suggest that women perform better in group 
problem-solving and decision-making tasks. Females are also reported to be more 
comfortable in addressing tough issues facing the firm (Kramer et al. 2006; 
McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria & Salipante 2008) 
Prior research also supports the related finding that the leadership styles of males 
and females differ. It is suggested that women in the executive positions are less 
directive and autocratic than men, and more democratic, cooperative, and partici-
pative than male executives (Eagly & Johnson 1990, Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt 
& van Engen 2003). Eagly and Carli (2003) report that the leadership style of 
women may be more efficient in the contemporary business environment. Women 
also take their executive roles very seriously, which may improve their leadership 
skills (Fondas & Sassalos 2000). Interestingly, female subordinates have been 
reported to give higher performance ratings to female leaders than males do (Lu-
thar 1996). 
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6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF GENDER-BASED 
DIFFERENCES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
As described above, men and women are reported to differ in many respects that 
may have an impact on decision-making and work performance. In general, it is 
suggested that gender-diversity has a positive impact on firm performance and 
market valuation (see e.g. Carter, Simkins & Simpson 2003; Erhardt, Werber & 
Shrader 2003; Farrell & Hersch 2005; Krishnan and Park 2005). Importantly, by 
considering women when appointing senior level directors will make it possible 
for the firms to draw from a broader pool of talent.  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the impact that women on corporate boards 
may have on firm governance and performance, and find that gender-diverse 
boards generally put more effort into monitoring. Their results also suggest that 
female board members are more diligent in attending board meetings than men. 
Adams and Funk (2010) report that gender-based differences even persist at di-
rector level within firms, suggesting that the behavioral differences between men 
and women may play a role in the executive level too. Their results further indi-
cate that firms with female directors may act in a more stakeholder friendly way.  
Market is reported to value the presence of females in corporate boards and senior 
management. For example, Keys, Turner, and Friday (2002) document that firms 
that promote director diversity add more shareholder value than the nondiversity 
promoters do. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2010) study the appointments of 
female board members and find evidence indicating that a firm’s stock price tends 
to increase when a female appointment is announced. Moreover, they argue that 
the appointments of female board members are positively related to the longer-
term valuation of the firm. Related to corporate acquisitions, Levi, Li, and Zhang 
(2008) report that the bid premia in acquisitions is affected by the number of fe-
male board members in both the acquiring and the target firm.  
Corporate diversity provides the firms with a better understanding of the market. 
Moreover, diversity also increases creativity and innovation (Robinson & 
Dechant 1997). Therefore, women may simply have a positive impact on corpo-
rate governance and firm performance since people with different backgrounds 
may have different viewpoints, which may be especially precious during times of 
economic crisis (Kirk & Gwin 2009). Considering the current financial turmoil, 
the possible effects of gender diversity and the presence of female in senior man-
agement on corporate governance and firm performance are intriguing. 
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7 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of female experts on 
corporate governance, financial reporting, and external control. The financial data 
used in the thesis comprises published figures from publically listed firms in 
U.S.A. and Nordic countries – more specifically, the firms listed on the NASDAQ 
OMX exchanges and the firms included in the Standard & Poor’s 1500 Compo-
site Index (S&P 1500).  
This dissertation consists of the five essays that are described briefly below. The 
overarching purpose of the dissertation is to examine whether and how the corpo-
rate governance and financial reporting practices of firms led by females differ 
from those in firms led by men. As described above, earlier management and psy-
chology literature documents significant gender-based differences. Therefore, it is 
of interest to examine how these differences between male and female executives 
and experts can affect the financial performance and reporting practices of a firm. 
7.1 Female executives, chairwomen, and corporate 
governance 
The first essay of this dissertation examines whether the gender of the firm’s top 
executives (CEO and CFO) and board chairpersons is associated with the corpo-
rate governance practices within the firm. The purpose of this essay is to give an 
overview of the impact made on the governance practices of the firm by female 
executives and chairwomen, whereas the second, third, and fifth essays in this 
dissertation examine the effect of executive and chairperson gender on firm per-
formance and financial reporting.  
The definition of corporate governance tends to vary based on discipline but, in 
general, corporate governance can be viewed as the set of practices and norms 
that influence corporate decision-making and power relations (Blair 1995; 
Aguilera & Jackson 2010). Corporate governance practices have been a focus of 
interest as a result of the high-profile collapses of large U.S. firms such as Enron 
and WorldCom. Since the earlier literature plausibly documents that women are 
more conservative, risk averse, and ethical, it is of interest to examine whether the 
gender of the firms’ executives and board chairpersons has an impact on the cor-
porate governance practices. 
Previous literature has examined various matters influencing corporate govern-
ance practices, but the possible impact of characteristics specific to executives has 
20      Acta Wasaensia 
not been previously covered. Earlier studies suggest that the gender of a firm’s 
executives and directors may affect corporate decision-making and, therefore, 
affect the firm’s financial performance, market valuation, and financial reporting 
procedures (see e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003; Campbell & Minguez-Vera 2008; Barua, 
Davidson, Rama & Thiruvadi 2010).  
The motivation for conducting this study is based on the indication from earlier 
literature that significant gender-based differences exist between men and women 
and that those differences may also have a role in working life. This essay con-
tributes to the existing literature by assessing whether and how the quality of cor-
porate governance is related to the gender of the firm’s executives and board 
chairs. 
This  essay  uses  the  Corporate  Governance  Quotient  (CGQ)  of  RiskMetrics  to  
measure the overall strength of the firm’s governance practices. The sample used 
in the analysis covers the S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2008. The report-
ed findings indicate that female CEOs and board chairs have a positive impact on 
the overall quality of corporate governance, whereas CFO gender does not influ-
ence the general governance practices of the firm. Several areas of governance are 
then assessed to investigate whether the impact of the gender of the executives 
and chair varies between governance areas. These results suggest that female 
CEOs and chairwomen have the largest influence on the governance attributes 
that are related to the board of directors. Overall, the findings reported in this es-
say suggest that the gender of the executive and chairperson may have important 
implications for the quality of corporate governance. Moreover, the findings may 
provide important information for legislators and policy makers in relation to 
gender equality programs and regulations. 
7.2 Female executives and earnings management 
The second essay in this dissertation examines the relationship between the gen-
der of executives and earnings management. Earlier literature indicates that earn-
ings management practices may depend on managerial motives and characteris-
tics and, consequently, it is of interest to examine whether firms’ earnings report-
ing practices vary based on the executive gender.  
Accounting earnings are a widely used measure of firm performance. However, 
the regulation and guidelines concerning accounting practices leave firms’ man-
agement with some discretion over earnings management. It is widely reported 
that firms’ executives may have personal incentives to manipulate earnings re-
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porting and, consequently, the quality of financial reporting may suffer based on 
management’s agendas. 
This essay studies the association between earnings management and the gender 
of the firm’s executives. In particular, the CEO and CFO of the firms are focused 
on. The underlying assumption in this essay is that the widely documented gen-
der-based differences may affect the work performance and decision-making of 
male and female executives and, consequently, influence the firm’s financial re-
porting practices. Consequently, this study contributes to the existing literature by 
examining the potential impact of female executives on the financial reporting 
practices of a firm. 
The work of Cheng and Warfield (2005), Geiger and North (2006), and Matsuna-
ga and Yeung (2008) investigating the effects of executive characteristics and 
incentives on financial reporting practices is important to this study. In general, 
prior literature indicates that the quality of financial reporting depends on mana-
gerial motives and the opportunism of the firm’s executives. Accordingly, this 
research hypothesizes that firms with female executives are associated with more 
conservative financial reporting practices. 
The sample examined in this essay covers the S&P 500 firms in the fiscal years 
2003–2007. The findings reported in this essay suggest that firms with female 
CFOs are associated with income-decreasing earnings management practices, 
implying that they tend to follow more conservative financial reporting strategies. 
However, there is no relationship between the CEO gender and earnings man-
agement of the firm.  
Given the gender-based differences in, for example, conservatism and risk-
aversion, it can be argued that female executives may inherently be more prone to 
avoiding opportunistic income-increasing financial reporting practices. Therefore, 
the reported findings are in line with the documented gender-based differences 
and, in general, the results demonstrate that the gender of the executives may 
have important implications for the quality of financial reporting.  
7.3 Executive turnover, gender, and earnings 
management 
The third essay continues the earnings management theme and examines whether 
personnel changes at the executive level influence the reported relationship be-
tween executive gender and earnings management. Recent accounting scandals 
have highlighted the need for reliable, accurate, and timely financial information, 
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the provision of which is commonly a responsibility of the CFO. The legislation 
also  highlights  this  task;  for  example,  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  (SOX  
2002) states that both the CEO and CFO be held personally responsible for the 
accuracy and completeness of the company’s financial reporting.  
Earlier literature focused mainly on examining the impact the CEO has on firm 
performance and financial reporting, often at the cost of ignoring the influence of 
other key executives. However, as the study described above in section 7.2 sug-
gests,  the  role  of  the  CFO  in  a  firm’s  financial  management  is  also  very  im-
portant. Therefore, this essay focuses on examining the effects of CFO turnover 
on earnings management. In particular, given the literature on gender-based dif-
ferences, it is of interest to examine whether the genders of incoming and out-
going CFOs influence the financial reporting practices of the firm. 
The importance of the CFO’s role is supported by the few studies that have exam-
ined this aspect. For example, Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2008) suggest that CFOs 
are in fact the executives with the most influence on the company’s financial re-
porting practices. Therefore, the impact of CFOs on the reported financial infor-
mation should be thoroughly examined. The global financial turmoil of recent 
years has led to a dramatic increase in executive turnover. It is therefore of inter-
est to examine the financial consequences of a CFO turnover within a firm. This 
essay contributes to the existing literature by assessing whether and how a change 
of CFO and the genders of incoming and outgoing executives affect the firm’s 
financial reporting practices. Overall, this study provides new and important in-
formation about the effects of executive-specific characteristics on earnings man-
agement. 
This essay uses a three-year sample of CFO changes in S&P 1500 firms, exclud-
ing financial firms and firms with multiple CFO turnovers during the fiscal year, 
as this would make it impossible to estimate the impact of a specific executive 
change on earnings management. The reported results suggest that, in general, 
CFO turnover decreases earnings management, which is in line with Geiger and 
North (2006), for example, who report that firms tend to have lower levels of dis-
cretionary accruals after a CFO change. However, if a CFO does change, the in-
coming and outgoing CFO genders seem to have an influence on the firm’s earn-
ings management practices. In particular, if a male CFO is replaced by a female, 
the discretionary accruals are negatively influenced. In contrast, earnings man-
agement increases if a male CFO replaces either a female or a male. Overall, the 
results indicate that the firms which change from a male CFO to a female one 
tend to move towards higher quality financial reporting practices.  
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The reported results are in line with earlier literature documenting a decrease in 
discretionary accruals following a CFO change (see e.g. Geiger & North 2006) 
and with the second essay reporting that firms with female CFOs follow less ag-
gressive earnings management strategies. The results are also in line with the psy-
chology literature on gender-based differences such as risk-taking preferences, 
conservatism, and ethical behavior. 
7.4 Auditor’s gender and audit fees 
The fourth essay in the dissertation focuses on examining the impact an external 
expert’s gender may have on the firm. In particular, this essay examines the asso-
ciation between auditor gender and audit fees paid by the client firm. The audit 
fee literature assumes that audit pricing may be affected, for example, by the 
characteristics of the audit firm or office. Given that psychology literature docu-
ments significant gender-based differences at the executive and expert level, it is 
of  interest  to  examine  whether  the  gender  of  an  individual  audit  partner  has  an  
impact on audit pricing. 
Prior literature indicates that audit fees are a function of audit team labor hours, 
labor costs per hour, and a risk component. Therefore, the characteristics of a re-
sponsible audit partner may affect both the audit investment and the risk compo-
nent, thereby influencing the audit fees paid by the client. As the International 
Standards of Auditing (IAASB, 2009) state, the audit partner is responsible for 
ensuring the overall quality of the audit. Therefore, it is conceivable that as a re-
sult of well-documented gender-based differences, female auditors may require a 
more thorough and costly audit. Consequently, the examined hypothesis states 
that there is a relationship between the gender of the audit engagement partner 
and the audit fees. 
The data used in this study consist of the publicly listed firms in Denmark, Fin-
land, and Sweden. These particular countries are selected because their legislation 
requires the responsible audit partners to be named in the audit reports. This is a 
requirement not found in the legislation of many other countries, including the 
U.S.A. and the United Kingdom, where only the responsible audit firm’s name is 
included in the audit reports. Interestingly, publishing the responsible audit part-
ner’s name is on the agenda of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB)  and,  consequently,  the  U.S.A.  may  soon  follow  the  example  of  the  
Nordic countries and require the signatures of the responsible audit partners on 
the audit reports (PCAOB 2009). 
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The examined data period covers the fiscal years 2005–2006. The data on audit 
partner gender are manually gathered from the firms’ audit reports. The reported 
results indicate that, after controlling for client attributes, female auditors are as-
sociated with higher audit fees. This finding is particularly interesting considering 
the well-documented gender wage gap and the glass ceiling phenomenon, encap-
sulating the difficulty females have in reaching top executive and expert level 
positions, such as a partnership in an audit firm. 
Various possible explanations for the findings are discussed in the essay. In gen-
eral, the reported results are in line with the earlier literature reporting that fe-
males are more risk averse, ethical, and diligent and less overconfident than men, 
which may lead to higher audit fees. For example, female audit partners may in-
vest more time in planning audit engagements, which would increase the audit 
effort and, consequently, the audit fees. Due to their higher risk-aversion, women 
may also estimate some client risk components higher than males, thereby influ-
encing the audit fees. 
7.5 CEO and chairperson characteristics and firm 
performance 
The fifth essay examines the relationship between executive and board chairper-
son characteristics and firm performance. Behavioral differences between humans 
can often easily be noted in everyday life. In the business world, decision-making 
power is often concentrated in a few, therefore it is of interest to study whether 
and how individual characteristics of an executive may affect firm performance. 
The essay focuses on CEOs and the board chairs. CEOs are included since they 
are usually the most visible and powerful executives in a firm. However, earlier 
literature often ignores chairpersons or, alternatively, they are considered in the 
same terms as other board members. In fact, board chairs are often very experi-
enced, highly educated long-term members of the company’s administration, and 
they may have vast authority within their firm. For example, Brickley, Linck, and 
Coles (1999) report that 16 % of the CEOs that retire continue their careers by 
serving  as  the  board  chairs  in  their  own companies,  which  supports  the  view of  
chairs having a high level of knowledge and authority within a firm. 
Earlier literature indicates that various executive-specific characteristics may in-
fluence their behavior at work. However, the great majority of studies concentrate 
on one specific characteristic of an executive at the cost of ignoring other charac-
teristics that may play a significant role in determining the firm performance. 
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Consequently, this essay contributes to the existing literature by assessing wheth-
er and how executive characteristics may affect firm performance. The executive 
attributes covered in this essay are age, experience, busyness, quality, and gender. 
The sample consists of the S&P 500 firms from 2006–2010. In general, the re-
ported results indicate that demographic and experience-related characteristics 
may be associated with the market valuation and financial performance of the 
firm. Interestingly, a positive relationship is documented between female execu-
tives, and Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Moreover, executive busyness seems to 
have a negative impact on firm performance, whereas results for executive age 
are mixed. The executive quality, experience, and duality are reported to be posi-
tively related to the financial performance of the firm. 
The reported results are in line with earlier literature documenting that female-
controlled firms tend to outperform male-controlled firms (see e.g. Krishnan & 
Park 2005; Smith, Smith & Verner 2006). In general the reported findings suggest 
that it is important to consider the characteristics of executives among the deter-
minants of firm performance.  
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FEMALE EXECUTIVES, CHAIRWOMEN, AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether the gender of top executives and board chairs is 
associated with the strength of corporate governance mechanisms within a firm. 
In particular, this paper focuses on the gender of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and chairperson of the board, and uses the 
Corporate Governance Quotient to measure the strength of governance. Based on 
a six-year sample of the S&P 500 firms, the following main results are reported: 
i) Female CEOs and chairwomen have a positive impact on firm’s overall corpo-
rate governance. ii) When the different governance attributes are examined indi-
vidually, the results indicate that female CEOs and chairwomen have the most 
significant influence on the governance attributes related to the board of directors. 
iii) Female CFOs have a negative impact on the overall compensation index and 
the industry-specific takeover defenses index. Overall, the findings of this paper 
indicate that the gender of the firm’s executives and chairs may have important 
implications for the strength of corporate governance. This study provides new 
empirical evidence on the relationship between female executives, chairwomen, 
and corporate governance. The results reported in this study may provide useful 
information for policy authorities in relation to gender quota discussions, pro-
posals, and regulations. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Executive Gender, Female Executives, Chair-
women 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines the association between the gender of the firm’s top execu-
tives and board chairs and the corporate governance practices within the firm. The 
definition of corporate governance tends to vary based on discipline, but it can be 
broadly defined as “the study of power and influence over decision making within 
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the corporation” (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Economists, for instance, tend to 
see corporate governance as a combination of contracts among owners, while 
legal scholars define corporate governance as the set of legal, cultural, and institu-
tional  aspects  that  determine  what  companies  can  do  and  who  controls  them  
(Blair, 1995; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). In addition, national practices, customs, 
laws, and policies influence the way a corporation is operated and governed.  
Over the past decade, corporate governance practices have been of increasing 
interest due to the collapse of large U.S. firms such as Enron, Tycon International, 
and WorldCom. Many of these recent problems were caused by accounting irreg-
ularities that, for instance, enabled excessive earnings management by the firm’s 
top executives. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) was created in response to 
the high-profile corporate failures in the hope of restoring market confidence in 
corporate governance. 
Earlier literature has examined various attributes influencing corporate govern-
ance, but the impact of executive-specific characteristics has so far attracted sur-
prisingly little attention from researchers. An executive may, for example, have a 
personal interest in reporting overly optimistic earnings, but the role of effective 
corporate governance practices is to ensure that reliable information is provided 
to the company’s stakeholders. Previous studies indicate that the gender of the 
firm’s executives and directors may affect corporate decision-making and, conse-
quently, have implications for the firm’s financial performance, market valuation, 
and financial reporting practices (see e.g., Barua, Davidson, Rama & Thiruvadi, 
2010; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Peni 
& Vähämaa, 2010). In relation to corporate boards, Kramer, Konrad, and Erkut 
(2006) suggest that increasing the representation of women on corporate boards 
may improve corporate governance practices. In general, prior literature indicates 
that the gender of the firm’s executives and/or directors may impact the effective-
ness of the firm’s governance structures.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the executive and board chair 
gender1 is associated with the strength of corporate governance mechanisms with-
in the firm. In particular, this paper focuses on the chairperson of the board and 
the two top executives of the firms, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), and examines whether their gender affects the quality of 
corporate governance structures. In order to study the issue more thoroughly, dif-
                                               
 
1  Following the common practice of earlier studies (see e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell 
& Minguez-Vera, 2008), the terms female vs. male and women vs. men are used interchangea-
bly in this study. 
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ferent areas of corporate governance are investigated, namely audit, board of di-
rectors, compensation, and takeover defenses.  
The motivation for this study is based on the prior literature that indicates signifi-
cant differences between males and females in working life and, additionally, 
suggests that executive’s personal values and roles may significantly influence 
their  decision-making  (Adams,  Licht  &  Sagiv,  2010).  This  paper  contributes  to  
the existing literature by assessing whether (and if so, how) the gender of the ex-
ecutive and chairperson and the quality of corporate governance are related. In 
addition, the results provide new evidence for understanding the potential effects 
of the recent national policies and regulations of various countries, for example 
Norway and Spain (De Anca, 2008; Hoel, 2008), on gender quotas in the execu-
tive level. These countries’ efforts are supported by earlier research, since for 
example Grosvold and Brammer (2011) document that country-level institutions 
have a significant role in increasing women’s share of board seats.  Attempts to 
instigate gender equality in the business world have also been made for instance 
by the European Commission, politicians, shareholders, Fortune and FTSE rank-
ings, and “best places for women to work” lists (see e.g., Terjesen, Sealy & 
Singh, 2009). The efforts of these groups and organizations further highlight the 
importance of promoting gender equality in business. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section briefly de-
scribes the related literature and presents the research hypothesis. Section 3 pre-
sents the data employed in the empirical analyses, while Section 4 introduces the 
methodology used to examine the association between females and corporate 
governance. The results of the analyses are described and discussed in Section 5. 
Finally, the last section provides concluding remarks.  
2 Related literature 
The existing literature indicates that corporate governance affects firm profitabil-
ity and market value (see e.g., Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004; Bebchuk, Cohen 
& Ferrell, 2009; Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; 
Renders, Gaeremynck & Sercu, 2010). The seminal study of the area by Gompers 
et al. (2003) reports findings indicating that firms with better governance mecha-
nisms tend to have higher firm value, profits, and sales growth, and lower capital 
expenditures. Moreover, Bauer, Frijns, Otten, and Tourani-Rad (2008) document 
that well-governed Japanese firms significantly outperform poorly governed firms 
by up to 15% a year. In a similar vein, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report findings 
indicating that strong corporate governance mechanisms are significantly posi-
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tively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating perfor-
mance. 
Related literature suggests that executive-specific characteristics may impact their 
performance in business life. Gender diversity theory indicates that women and 
men differ in numerous respects. Diversity among a firm’s employees and corpo-
rate boards is commonly considered a positive feature, since it enhances knowl-
edge, creativity, innovative capabilities, experience, effectiveness, and skills with-
in the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huse, Nielsen & Hagen, 2009; Østergaard, 
Timmermans & Kristinsson, 2011; Shumpeter, 1934; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 
2011; van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003; Wenger, 2000; Zahra & George, 2002). It is 
widely acknowledged in the psychology and management literature that signifi-
cant gender-based differences exist for example in risk aversion, ethical behavior, 
diligence, conservatism, leadership style, and information processing (see e.g., 
Byrnes, Miller & Schafer, 1999; Eagly & Carli, 2003; Eagly & Johnson, 1990, 
Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt & van Engen, 2003; Johnson & Powell, 1994; Nettle, 
2007; Peterson, Albaum, Merunka, Munuera & Smith, 2010; Pierce & Sweeney, 
2010; Roxas & Stoneback, 2004; Schmitt, Realo, Voracek & Allik, 2008; Schu-
bert, 2006).  
Earlier literature quite plausibly suggests that gender-based differences influence 
an individual’s performance at work. For example, Erhardt et al. (2003) examine 
a set of large U.S. firms and find that gender diversity on the board of directors is 
positively associated with firm profitability. In addition, Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) and Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) document that the gender 
diversity is related to an increase in firm performance and higher firm value. 
Kramer et al. (2006) suggest that the presence of three or more women seems to 
result in a shift in the board dynamics. After reaching that critical limit, having 
women on the board becomes normal and gender ceases to be a concern. Gul, 
Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) link gender diversity and corporate governance by sug-
gesting that gender diverse boards may act as a substitute mechanism for other-
wise weak corporate governance, whereas Nielsen and Huse (2010b) suggest that 
female directors’ contribution to board decision-making enhances board strategic 
involvement. Nielsen and Huse (2010b) further document that female directors 
reduce the level of conflict in corporate boards, and they use board development 
activities, such as work instructions, evaluations, and development programs to 
improve board effectiveness. In addition to gender diversity, an individual execu-
tive’s gender has been documented as having significant effects on the operations 
of the firm. For example, Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) study 
the relationship between executive gender and earnings management and find that 
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firms with female CFOs are associated with more conservative financial reporting 
practices.  
It is conceivable that the gender-based differences vanish at the top executive 
level  and  that  the  women  who  pursue  leadership  positions  are  rather  similar  to  
men. Adams and Funk (2010) survey the directors and CEOs of the Swedish pub-
licly-listed firms to examine whether the executives exhibit gender-based differ-
ences, or if the women who have made it to senior positions in fact resemble men. 
Their findings indicate that, even at the director level, there are fundamental dif-
ferences between women and men, which may lead to differences in priorities. 
They also report that gender-based differences persist even within firms, in that 
there is a difference between a male and a female working in a similar position 
within the same firm. Adams and Funk (2010) and Schwartz and Rubel (2005) 
further report that, consistent with findings for the general population, female 
directors are more universally orientated and benevolent, but less power-oriented 
than men. Interestingly, in the Scandinavian countries the women in executive 
positions have been suggested to have more masculine values than men in similar 
top positions (Antal & Izraeli, 1993). 
Women may have to work harder and demonstrate superior competence in order 
to  be  nominated  to  a  top  position  (see  e.g.,  Eagly  & Carli,  2003)  and,  thus,  the  
female executives and chairs are likely to be highly competent and diligent. 
Women may also face extra barriers in achieving top positions due to social  ex-
clusion or discrimination (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno & Escot, 2011; Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004). For instance, Woodhams and Lupton (2006) examine the 
hiring practices of firms in the United Kingdom and report that 44% of the inter-
viewers admitted asking different questions of male and female candidates, and 
almost a third revealed using different decision criteria based on the candidate 
gender. Moreover, Sheridan and Milgate (2005) suggest that, in general, women’s 
competence has to be established either in public or through family connections 
before a firm is willing to risk nominating a female onto its board of directors. 
Various reasons for the gender-based differences in work life have been suggest-
ed. Among the most popular explanations are females’ better understanding of 
consumer behavior (Brennan & McCafferty, 1997), differences in risk aversion, 
overconfidence, cautiousness, ethical behavior, and conservatism (Beu, Buckley 
& Harvey, 2003; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Johnson & Powell, 1994; Nettle, 
2007; Pierce & Sweeney, 2010; Schmitt et al., 2008; Schubert, 2006; Sunden & 
Surette, 1998), women’s more thorough preparation for work meetings (Huse & 
Solberg, 2006), and differences in leadership styles (Eagly & Carli, 2003). Fe-
male directors have been indicated to provide greater oversight and monitoring of 
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managers’ actions and reporting (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009). With respect to corporate governance, risk aversion and con-
servatism may be particularly important characteristics for an executive, since 
corporate governance is essentially a mechanism for controlling risk in a firm.  
2.1 Research Hypothesis  
Overall, earlier studies indicate that corporate governance is an important factor 
influencing the corporate performance (see e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; 2008; Beb-
chuk et al., 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Gompers 
et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010). Earlier literature suggests that executives’ per-
sonal values and roles have a significant impact on their decision-making (Adams 
et al., 2010; Pierce & Sweeney, 2010). Moreover, attitudes, cognitive functioning, 
and beliefs have been documented varying systematically with demographic vari-
ables, such as gender (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). In general, women are report-
ed to be more conservative, risk-averse, honest, and stricter in monitoring and to 
have a clearer overview, which may influence the executive’s or chairperson’s 
performance at work. Since corporate governance is closely related, for instance, 
to lower risk-taking and better ethical behavior, it is plausible to expect that fe-
male leaders may have a positive influence on the quality of corporate govern-
ance.  
The executives examined in this paper are the CEOs, CFOs, and board chairs. The 
CEOs and CFOs are included since they are the senior executives who are the 
most likely to impact the firm’s reporting and governance practices, and they are 
also the executives that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) requires to ascertain 
the accuracy and completeness of the firm’s financial reporting. Chairpersons 
typically have vast experience, knowledge, and power within the firm manage-
ment and, thus, could be expected to have a significant impact on governance-
related decisions within the firms. Female executives and chairwomen are ex-
pected to exert a positive influence on corporate governance, since women are in 
general reported to be more ethical, risk averse, and conservative. All these char-
acteristics are likely to increase the transparency and integrity of the firm’s gov-
ernance practices, such as compensation and ownership guidelines, the board’s 
operating principles, and progressive practices, which may lead to an increase in 
the overall quality of corporate governance. 
Many of the individual corporate governance components may be influenced by 
the gender of the executive or chairperson. For example, women may have fewer 
external board memberships (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004), they may be more 
diligent in attending the board meetings (see e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009), or 
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they may be more open and responsible, which may impact for example on pub-
lishing governance guidelines and taking action on shareholder proposals. Wom-
en’s higher moral standards (see e.g., Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Beu et al., 2003) 
may, for instance, decrease related-party transactions and restating financials due 
to options. In general, it is conceivable that gender-based differences in executive 
and chairperson characteristics influence the firm’s governance practices. Under-
standing the possible relation between executive and chair gender and corporate 
governance is important since, as Adams and Funk (2010) put it, “if women and 
men are intrinsically different, then the presence of women may have long-term 
effects on corporate decision-making”. Thus, based on the gender diversity theory 
and gender-based differences in managerial behavior, the following hypothesis is 
posited: 
Hypothesis 1. Female executives and chairwomen have a positive influence 
on the quality of corporate governance.  
3 Data 
The sample covers the S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2008. Firms with 
executive or chairperson changes during the fiscal year and firms with insufficient 
data have been excluded from the sample. In addition, financial firms are left out 
of the sample since, as noted for example by Adams and Mehran (2003), regula-
tion typically has more influence on the governance of financial institutions than 
on other firms. The final sample consists of 367 firms and 2202 firm-year obser-
vations. The strength of corporate governance is measured by the Corporate Gov-
ernance Quotient (CGQ), for which the data are obtained from RiskMetrics 
Group. The data on executive and chair gender are manually gathered from Au-
ditAnalytics database, and have been completed by using the firms’ annual re-
ports and press releases. Finally, Thomson Reuters Financial Worldscope pro-
vides the financial data. 
CGQ2 is a registered trademark of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), and is 
calculated based on 67 different variables in the following four categories: 1) 
board of directors, 2) audit, 3) antitakeover, and 4) compensation/ownership 
                                               
 
2  As of March 2010, the RiskMetrics Group replaced the CGQ by a new governance measure, 
Governance Risk Indicator (GRId). Essentially, the new governance measure is based on the 
same components than the CGQ used in this study, but GRId is presented as an absolute fig-
ure, instead of on percentile basis compared to the other firms. In June 2010, RiskMetrics was 
acquired by MSCI. 
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(CGQ, 2008). The components of the CGQ index are listed in Appendix 1. The 
governance data used to construct the index are from public filings, such as the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, company websites, and 
company surveys. Each company evaluated by RiskMetrics may verify the data 
concerning their firm before publication. Companies can change their governance 
ratings only by making and publicly disclosing changes in their governance prac-
tices.  
RiskMetrics changes the ratings model and the weights of each included compo-
nent over time in order to better reflect the market trends in corporate governance. 
CGQ scores are relative and expressed on a percentile basis. For example, a CGQ 
index rank of 95 means that the examined company outperformed 95 % of the 
companies within the same index, in this case the S&P 500, while the CGQ indus-
try ranking states the percentage of companies that the examined firm has outper-
formed within the same industry group. Thus, the higher the CGQ score assigned 
to a firm, the better the quality of its corporate governance mechanisms.  
Numerous previous studies have used the CGQ or its components as a measure of 
corporate governance (see e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz & Williamson, 2009; 
Beltratti & Stulz, 2009; Brown & Caylor, 2009; Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2007). 
In addition, the widely used governance measure Gov-Score of Brown and Caylor 
(2006) is based on CGQ, but it is presented in absolute numbers instead of on a 
percentile basis. Moreover, market analysts and shareholders are interested in 
these quotients and for example the Yahoo! Finance website lists the current 
CGQs for each firm as a measure of corporate governance. CGQ is selected as a 
governance measure in this study since it includes a covering set of corporate 
governance dimensions. The monitoring and controlling tasks of the corporate 
boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Huse et al., 2009) and the top executives cause 
the examined executives and chairs to potentially have an impact on the firm’s 
governance practices. In particular, it has been reported that the presence of fe-
male board members is positively related to strategic types of control and corpo-
rate social responsibility (Huse et al., 2009). Moreover, Tacheva and Huse (2006) 
suggest that women are more likely to contribute to qualitative than to quantita-
tive board tasks.   
Earlier literature indicates that the way governance is measured is important (see 
e.g., Black, Jang & Kim, 2006; Ertugrul & Hegde, 2009; Larcker, Richardson & 
Tuna, 2007). Moreover, Bohren and Odegaard (2004) suggest that governance 
mechanisms may be independent and, therefore, should be analyzed individually 
rather than as a bundle. Thus, in addition to the overall indices, specific areas of 
corporate governance are also examined, namely audit, board, executive and di-
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rector compensation and ownership, and takeover defenses. The examined sub-
scores rank companies into quintiles relative to a relevant index and industry 
group. Thus, the sub-scores get values from one to five, so that a company with a 
sub-score value of one is among the bottom quintile of the firms in the measured 
governance area, whereas a company with a sub-score value of five is in the top 
quintile in that specific governance area. Similar to the overall governance rank-
ings, the sub-scores are calculated based on both the index rank (S&P 500) and 
the industry rank. For example, the board of directors governance sub-score con-
siders the strength of governance in board related areas, such as board size, struc-
ture, and different committees, meeting frequency, and voting rules, whereas the 
audit sub-score considers the existence of an audit committee, presence of finan-
cial experts, and the amount of audit fees paid by the company. Thus, for instance 
a high board sub-score can be interpreted as a company having a good level of 
governance in matters within the remit of the board of directors. The components 
of each governance sub-score are presented in Appendix 1. The board sub-score 
contains items 1–20 of Appendix 1, audit sub-score items 21–26, takeover de-
fenses sub-score items 27–46, and executive and director compensation and own-
ership sub-score items 47–60. 
The sample is introduced by the executive and chairperson gender and industry in 
Table 1. As can be seen from the table, female leaders are a small minority in all 
the examined industries. Interestingly, the number of females has increased dur-
ing the sample period (CEOs from 1.63 % to 3.30 %, CFOs from 6.81 % to 9.54 
%, and chairs from 1.63 % to 2.45 %). However, it should be noted that while the 
numbers of female executives and chairs are low, the women included in the ex-
amined sample constitute the total population and, thus, their number cannot be 
increased.  
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4 Methodology 
The association between female executives and chairwomen and the quality of 
corporate governance is examined with the following cross-sectional, two-way 
fixed-effects panel regression: 
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where CGQj,t denotes the level of corporate governance quotient for firm j in year 
t.  In Model specifications 1,  3,  and 5 the dependent variable CGQj,t is  the  CGQ 
index, while in Models 2, 4, and 6 the dependent variable is the CGQ industry 
index (CGQ_industryj,t). Femalej,t is a binary variable indicating the gender of the 
examined director, that is the CEO (Models 1 and 2), CFO (Models 3 and 4), or 
chairperson of the board (Models 5 and 6). Femalej,t is assigned to one if the ex-
amined executive or chair is female. Growthj,t is the one-year sales growth rate, 
Leveragej,t is the leverage of the firm, measured as total liabilities divided by total 
assets, Market-to-bookj,t is the market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of mar-
ket value to the book value of equity, Return on assetsj,t is the return on assets, 
calculated as net income divided by total assets, Sizej,t is the logarithm of total 
assets, Industry dummy variables control for the industry-specific effects3, and 
Year are binary variables for the fiscal years. In order to account for contempora-
neous correlation, the White cross-section robust covariances are employed 
throughout the different model specifications. 
The control variables employed in Equation (1) are selected based on the earlier 
corporate governance literature on the underlying factors of corporate governance 
quality. The sales growth rate is suggested to be negatively related to corporate 
governance (Gompers et al., 2003), good governance is reported to decrease lev-
erage (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008; Arping & Sautner, 2010), stock market valua-
tion  (Market-to-book) is indicated to have a positive impact on the strength of 
corporate governance (Bruno & Claessens, 2010), good corporate governance is 
associated with higher operating performance (Return on assets) (Bhagat & Bol-
                                               
 
3  Industry 1 is a dummy variable for the mining and construction industry, Industry 2 is the 
manufacturing industry dummy, Industry 3 is a dummy variable for transportation, communi-
cations, electric, gas, and sanitary services, Industry 4 is a dummy variable for wholesale and 
retail trade, and Industry 5 is a dummy for services industry. 
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ton 2008), and  firm size has been generally suggested to have a positive and sig-
nificant relation to corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003: Brown & Caylor, 
2006). Moreover, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) argue 
that firm size may be a surrogate for numerous omitted variables. The industry 
dummies are employed in the regressions since the earlier literature has reported 
differences in corporate governance practices based on the industry the firm oper-
ates in (Giroud & Mueller, 2010), and the year dummies are included following 
the common practice of earlier studies (see e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
In addition to the overall governance indices, specific areas of corporate govern-
ance are examined. These sub-scores vary in different model specifications so that 
each of the following dependent variables is used in the regressions: audit sub-
score  –  index  (Audit),  audit  sub-score  –  industry  (Audit_industry), board subs-
core – index (Board), board sub-score – industry (Board_industry), compensation 
sub-score – index (Compensation), compensation sub-score – industry (Compen-
sation_industry),  takeover  defenses  sub-score  –  index  (Takeover), and takeover 
defenses sub-score – industry (Takeover_industry).  
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2. Overall, the average 
values of the alternative governance measures are relatively high, the mean values 
for CGQ and CGQ_industry being 53.50 and 83.43, respectively. The high 
CGQ_industry mean value  indicates that the sample firms have in the main real-
ized the importance of good corporate governance. Interestingly, the descriptive 
statistics indicate that the quality of corporate governance differs based on the 
executive and chair gender. In particular, firms with female CEOs and chairs have 
higher mean values of the corporate governance variables than firms with male 
leaders, which provides preliminary support for the research hypothesis. The min-
imum governance scores for firms with female CEOs and chairs are significantly 
higher than the minimum scores for male-led firms (e.g. the minimum CGQ for 
firms with female CEOs is 16.60 and for firms with male CEOs it is 0.20, while 
the minimum CGQ index scores for are 73.00 and 0.80 for firms with female and 
male CEOs, respectively). In contrast, the corporate governance measures do not 
seem to be affected by the CFO gender. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.  
Table reports the summary statistics for the sample firms in 2003–2008. Financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000–6900) and firms with inadequate data are excluded 
from the sample. In addition, the results for t-tests for differences in means of the 
governance scores in male- and female-led firms are reported. CGQ is  the CGQ 
index and CGQ_industry is the CGQ industry index, whereas Female and Male 
prefixes denote firms with female and male executives, respectively. n=2202. 
Variable Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
CGQ 53.50 55.10 28.57 99.80 0.20 
          Firms with female CEO 66.91 76.05 27.89 99.60 16.60 
          Firms with male CEO 52.47 53.40 28.59 99.80 0.20 
          Firms with female CFO 53.01 53.35 26.92 99.20 1.60 
          Firms with male CFO 53.01 54.60 28.81 99.80 0.20 
          Firms with female chair 62.47 69.60 28.92 99.60 15.50 
          Firms with male chair 52.28 53.25 28.61 99.80 0.20 
CGQ - industry 83.43 89.90 18.10 100.00 0.80 
          Firms with female CEO 92.33 95.15 7.46 100.00 73.00 
          Firms with male CEO 82.73 89.10 18.47 100.00 0.80 
          Firms with female CFO 83.32 89.30 17.52 100.00 27.70 
          Firms with male CFO 82.99 89.70 18.49 100.00 0.80 
          Firms with female chair 90.15 93.60 9.85 100.00 59.90 
          Firms with male chair 82.49 89.10 18.76 100.00 0.80 
Audit subscore 3.79 4.00 1.24 5.00 0.00 
Audit subscore - industry 4.28 5.00 1.81 5.00 1.00 
Board subscore 3.17 3.00 1.40 5.00 0.00 
Board subscore - industry 4.48 5.00 0.84 5.00 1.00 
Compensation subscore 3.16 3.00 1.45 5.00 0.00 
Compensation subscore - industry 4.17 5.00 1.14 5.00 1.00 
Takeover defense subscore 3.04 3.00 1.42 5.00 0.00 
Takeover defense subscore - industry 2.72 3.00 1.35 5.00 1.00 
            
CEO 0.03 0.00 0.16 1.00 0.00 
CFO 0.10 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.00 
Chair 0.02 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.00 
Sales growth 11.41 8.91 17.61 192.53 -60.20 
Leverage 0.24 0.23 0.16 1.42 0.00 
Market-to-book (MB) 4.18 2.85 14.30 359.61 -110.87 
Return on assets (ROA) 7.88 7.94 8.26 51.70 -68.06 
Size 9.22 9.16 1.13 13.59 5.89 
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Table 2 cont. Descriptive statistics. 
t-test for differences in means t-stat. p-value 
H0: CGQMaleCEO = CGQFemaleCEO  3.46 0.00 
H0: CGQ_industryMaleCEO = CGQ_industryFemaleCEO 3.59 0.00 
H0: CGQMaleCFO = CGQFemaleCFO 0.00 1.00 
H0: CGQ_industryMaleCFO = CGQ_industryFemaleCFO 0.23 0.82 
H0: CGQMaleChair = CGQFemaleChair 2.33 0.02 
H0: CGQ_industryMaleChair = CGQ_industryFemaleChair 2.70 0.01 
 
Table 2 indicates that firms with female CEOs and chairs have stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms. For example, the mean value of CGQ index for firms 
with female CEOs is 66.91 and for firms with male CEOs it is 52.47. In a similar 
vein, the mean CGQs for firms with female and male chairs are 62.47 and 52.28, 
respectively. The t-tests reported in Table 2 demonstrate that the difference in 
corporate governance quotients between the female-led and male-led firms is sta-
tistically highly significant when the CEOs and chairs are considered. Thus, con-
sistent with the research hypothesis, the univariate tests suggest that firms with 
female executives and chairwomen are associated with stronger corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of variables used in the regressions. Not 
surprisingly, the alternative CGQ indices are strongly positively correlated (0.74). 
In addition, the alternative sub-indices have high positive correlations (audit 0.88, 
board 0.65, compensation 0.77, and takeover defenses 0.92, respectively), which 
are to be expected due to the definition of these indices. The sub-indices also cor-
relate positively with the main CGQ indices, board indices having the highest 
correlation with the main indices. 
As Table 3 indicates, the CEO and Chair variables are strongly positively corre-
lated with each other (0.72). This is naturally partly caused by CEO duality, since 
in 65.34 % of the firms the CEO and chair positions are held by the same person. 
69.09% of firms with female CEOs have executive duality, while male CEOs also 
hold chair positions in 65.23% of the firms. This is a noteworthy characteristic of 
the  data,  since  CEO  duality  is  often  considered  to  be  harmful  for  the  firm  (see  
e.g., Cochran, Wood & Jones, 1985), though also controversial evidence in favor 
of executive duality has been presented (see e.g., Chanine & Tohmé, 2009; 
Elsayed, 2007). Kang and Zardkoohi (2005) provide a covering summary of the 
studies examining the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
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Additionally, if a firm has a positive attitude towards females they may be more 
likely to nominate females for more than one top position at a time. Interestingly, 
the CEO and Chair variables have a significant positive correlation with the over-
all governance indices CGQ and CGQ_industry, as well as with part of the gov-
ernance sub-indices. These significant positive correlations between the executive 
gender and governance variables may be incorporated to support the research hy-
pothesis. 
5.2 Regression Results 
The results of the alternative regression specifications are presented in Table 4. In 
general, the results indicate that executive and chair gender may influence the 
governance practices of the firm. As the table depicts, the explanatory power of 
the model specifications 1–6 varies from 4.70 % to 11.51 %. Overall, the models 
with CGQ industry index as the dependent variable have significantly higher R2s 
than the models with the CGQ index as the dependent variable. The relatively low 
R2s are in line with the previous literature examining the relationship between 
firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance indices (see e.g., 
Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009). 
As can be seen from Table 4, the control variables Growth and Size seem to have 
an important role in explaining the firm’s corporate governance, while Leverage, 
Market-to-book, and Return on assets are less important. Interestingly, the mining 
and construction industry (Industry 1) has a negative and significant impact on 
corporate governance practices. In particular, firms operating in the fields of min-
ing and construction have on average 12.33 % lower governance scores than the 
other sample firms. The other examined industries are negatively associated with 
the industry-specific corporate governance indices (Models 2, 4, and 6). All the 
year dummies are positively related to the corporate governance indices, indicat-
ing that the average corporate governance scores in the sample increase every 
year.  
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Table 4. Regression results. 
The table reports the results of alternative versions of the panel regression model. 
t-statistics  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  significance  at  the  
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
The variable of interest in the regressions is the executive and chair gender dum-
my (Female). Consistent with the research hypothesis, the estimation results indi-
Dependent 
variable CGQ CGQ_ind  CGQ CGQ_ind        CGQ  CGQ_ind 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5   Model 6     
Constant 10.93  *** 58.08 *** 12.20  *** 59.97 *** 11.12 ***  58.05   ***  
  (4.64)     (13.98)   (4.70)     (15.99)   (4.82)    (15.52)    
Female variables:                           
CEO 13.69  *** 6.08 ***                     
  (6.45)     (8.80)                       
CFO           0.07     0.44              
            (0.07)     (0.77)             
Chair                    11.08 **  6.04  ***  
                      (2.03)    (7.94)    
Control variables:                              
Growth  -0.09  *** -0.07 *** - 0.11  *** -0.09 *** -0.08 **  - 0.07  ***  
  ( -2.69)     (-3.09)    ( -3.36)     (-3.62)   ( -2.10)    ( - 3.75)    
Leverage  12.63  *** -1.17    13.69  *** 0.55    11.88 **  - 0.58    
  (2.61)     (-0.64)    (3.36)     (0.25)   (2.51)    ( - 0.26)    
MB  -0.03    0.02    0.01    0.03 *** 0.02    0.03  ***  
  ( -0.58)     (1.32)   (0.52)     (5.38)   (0.77)    (5.89)    
ROA 0.03     0.09 *  0.08     0.10 **  0.04    0.08  **  
  (0.43)     (1.82)   (1.32)     (2.25)   (0.60)    (1.99)    
Size  4.40  *** 3.33 *** 4.15  *** 3.03 *** 4.34 ***  3.31  ***  
  (13.63)    (6.37)   (10.02)     (6.56)   (11.30)    (6.96)    
Industry 1 -9.49  *** -13.37 *** - 7.37  **   -12.07 *** -8.75 ***  -12.78   ***  
  ( -3.20)    (-7.36)     ( -2.03)    (-6.49)    ( -2.80)    ( - 8.26)    
Industry 2 -0.34    -3.23 *** 0.27    -2.68 *** -1.13    - 4.02  ***  
  ( -0.38)    (-4.56)     (0.25)    (-4.50)    ( -1.09)    ( - 5.80)    
Industry 3 0.79    -14.34 *** 1.71    -13.83 *** 1.76    -15.11   ***  
  (0.20)    (-5.63)    (0.46)    (-6.01)    (0.43)    ( - 5.64)    
Industry 4 -0.55    -5.78 *** 0.58    -4.80 *** 0.14    - 5.35  ***  
  ( -0.15)    (-3.86)     (0.17)    (-3.29)    (0.04)    ( - 4.48)    
2004 1.90  *** 1.80 *** 1.25  *** 1.01 *** 1.89 ***  1.50  ***  
  (72.74)    (24.78)    (11.77)    (12.67)    (30.50)    (19.26)    
2005 2.62  *** 6.81 *** 1.92  *** 5.99 *** 2.78 ***  6.69  ***  
  (15.22)    (52.17)     (10.26)    (47.63)    (12.14)    (55.11)    
2006 1.78  *** 6.03 *** 2.59  *** 6.01 *** 3.30 ***  6.61  ***  
  (7.71)    (30.78)    (11.65)    (37.41)    (10.19)    (39.32)    
2007 1.64  *** 7.00 *** 1.99  *** 6.28 *** 2.76 ***  7.38  ***  
  (7.21)    (27.87)    (8.91)     (31.72)    (10.59)    (38.38)    
2008 1.84  *** 7.71 *** 2.23  *** 7.25 *** 3.27 ***  8.19  ***  
  (8.08)     (27.53)   (8.34)     (26.74)   (12.96)   (41.18)     
  
N   2161     2161    2164       2164    2202      2202     
Adjusted R
2 
 0.05     0.12   0.05     0.10   0.05    0.11    
F- stat.  7.86  *** 16.52 *** 6.90  *** 14.49 *** 7.64 ***  15.98   ***  
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cate that the gender of the firm’s executives and chairperson affects the quality of 
corporate governance. The estimated coefficients for the CEO and chairperson 
genders are positive and statistically highly significant. Thus, the results reported 
in Table 4 suggest that female CEOs and chairpersons may improve the quality of 
corporate governance measures, while the CFO gender does not have a significant 
role. In particular, the estimated coefficients indicate that, all control variables 
being equal, the firms with female CEOs have on average 20.29 % higher corpo-
rate governance scores than firms with male CEOs. Compared to the other firms 
operating in the same industry, the firms led by female CEOs have on average 
6.96  % higher  CGQs.  In  a  similar  vein,  for  an  average  company in  the  sample,  
changing from a chairman to a chairwoman, ceteris paribus, would increase the 
corporate governance quality by 15.97% (or by 6.89 % if compared to the other 
firms in the industry).   
Omitted variables test is conducted to examine whether the female dummies 
make a significant contribution beyond the control variables in explaining the 
variance in corporate governance. The incremental F-statistics (not tabulated) 
testing the restricted model without female dummies against the models reported 
in Table 4 suggest that the CEO and chair genders are important in explaining the 
variation of corporate governance. These results are significant at the 1 % level 
for models with CGQ index as a dependent variable and at the 5 % level for mod-
els with CGQ industry index as a dependent variable. In contrast, according to the 
incremental F-statistics the CFO gender does not have a statistically significant 
impact on corporate governance, as also suggested by the main results reported in 
Table 4. 
In addition to the overall indices, sub-indices of corporate governance are also 
examined. The results of these estimations generally indicate that the influence of 
executive and chair gender on corporate governance varies in different corporate 
governance areas. Table 5 presents the regression results for models with the in-
dex-specific governance sub-scores as a dependent variable. The results for mod-
els with the industry-specific sub-scores as a dependent variable are not tabulated, 
but they are very similar to the results reported in Table 5. The explanatory power 
of the models presented in Table 5 varies from 2.74 % to 6.40 %, except for the 
models with the compensation sub-index (Compensation) as a dependent variable. 
For those models (Models 13–15) the explanatory power varies from 1.01 % to 
1.50 %, thereby indicating that the dependent variable is not explained well by the 
control variables employed in this study. As the table suggests, the industry and 
year fixed effects tend to differ based on the governance area examined. Again, 
the mining and construction industry (Industry 1) tends generally to have a nega-
tive impact on corporate governance, except for the audit sub-index in Model 8 
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and the compensation sub-index in Model 14. Transportation, communications, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services (Industry 3) are negatively related to the audit 
sub-score and positively related to the takeover defenses sub-score. Wholesale 
and retail trade (Industry 4) has a negative relation to the board sub-score and a 
positive relation to the takeover defenses sub-score. The impact of year dummies 
seems to vary from one model to another. 
As Table 5 indicates, the overall audit sub-index (Audit) is positively affected by 
chairwomen (4.08 % increase in the index if the firm has a chairwoman instead of 
a chairman), while in the case of the board sub-indices, female CEOs and chair-
persons both have a positive and statistically highly significant influence on the 
quality of corporate governance (13.81 % index increase for female CEOs and 
13.81 % for chairwomen),  which is in line with the main CGQ index results re-
ported in Table 4, as well as with the earlier literature on positive effects of gen-
der diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010a).  
The female CEOs seem to have a positive relation with the compensation indices 
(Compensation and Compensation_industry). Interestingly, the overall compensa-
tion index (Compensation) and the industry-specific takeover defenses index 
(Takeover_industry) (not tabulated) are negatively influenced by female CFOs. 
For example, when a firm has a female CFO, its overall compensation index is 
3.37 % lower than in the firms with male CFOs. Since this index is a combination 
of incentive pay, transparency, and good compensation practices, the gender-
based differences in risk taking may explain the finding. Since women are docu-
mented to be more risk averse than men (see e.g., Jianakoplos & Bernasek; Byr-
nes et al., 1999), the incentive pay may be lower in the firms with female CFOs, 
which may have a negative impact on the compensation index. 
It is possible that despite controlling for many firm-specific factors, the executive 
and chair gender and the quality of governance may be endogenous. Due to the 
problems with finding an adequate instrument for the instrumental variable tech-
niques, the endogeneity issue is approached by using the matched pairs technique. 
In particular, the sample firms with female executives or chairs are matched with 
male-led firms based on industry, firm size, and performance. These regressions 
can only be conducted for the models with CGQ as a dependent variable (Models 
1, 3, and 5) since, as the sample is also matched by industry, the industry-specific 
governance scores (CGQ_industry) cannot be examined here. The results of these 
additional analyses (not tabulated) suggest that, even after employing the matched 
pairs technique, the female CEOs have a positive and significant effect on corpo-
rate governance.  
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Table 5. Regression results. 
The table reports the results of alternative versions of the panel regression model. 
t-statistics  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  significance  at  the  
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent 
variable  Audit   Audit  Audit  Board      Board       Board 
Variable  Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11  Model 12 
Constant   3.05  *** 2.88  *** 2.91 *** 1.64  ***  1.68  *** 1.79 ***  
   (11.72)    (9.23)     (10.48)    (6.64)     (7.19)    (8.73)    
Female variables:                            
CEO  0.22               0.46  ***            
   (1.44)              (5.36)               
CFO       0.02             0.02          
       (0.24)               (0.63)          
Chair           0.25 *            0.50 ***  
             1.68             (3.07)    
Control variables:                               
Growth 0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00  *  0.00    
   ( - 0.25)    (-0.05)     (- 0.02)   (-1.31)     ( - 1.72)    (-1.39)    
Leverage  0.39     0.48  * 0.42    0.11    0.03    0. 08 * 
   (1.38)    (1.69)     (1.57)   (0.99)     (0.38)    (1.68)    
MB  0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00  * 0.00  *** 0.00 **  
   (1.55)    (0.00)     (0.50)   (1.77)     (2.70)    (2.52)    
ROA  0.00    0.00     0.00   0.00    0.00    0.00    
   (0.12)    (1.24)     (0.15)   (-0.51)     ( - 0.33)    (-0.59)    
Size 0.08  *** 0.10  *** 0.10 *** 0.17  ***  0.17  *** 0.16 ***  
   (3.09)    (2.81)     (3.20)   (6.76)     (6.56)    (6.87)    
Industry 1 -0.68  *** 0.74  *** -0.62 *** - 0.42  ***  -0.45  *** - 0.42 ***  
   ( - 5.72)     (-7.79)    (- 4.59)    (-4.01)    ( - 4.02)     (-4.07)    
Industry 2 -0.13  *  -0.1    -0.15 *  - 0.04    -0.06    - 0.09    
   ( - 1.87)     (-1.26)    (- 1.88)    (-0.67)    ( - 0.93)    (-1.53)    
Industry 3 -0.27  *** - 0.31  **  -0.29 **  0.07    -0.01    0.05    
   ( - 3.00)    (-1.97)    (- 2.40)    (0.52)    ( - 0.09)    (0.33)    
Industry 4 -0.05     - 0.04    -0.06    - 0.24  **  -0.27  **  - 0.23 **  
   ( - 0.40)     (-0.33)    (- 0.58)    (-2.00)    ( - 2.15)    (-2.04)    
2004  0.50  *** 0.53  *** 0.49 *** 0.09  ***  0.09  *** 0.09 ***  
   (80.86)      (87.77)    (55.78)     (14.64)    (11.74)     (15.25)    
2005  0.68  *** 0.71  *** 0.65 *** 0.03  ***  0.00    0.05 ***  
   (59.24)      (93.24)    (52.96)     (4.55)    (0.22)    (5.00)    
2006  0.75  *** 0.80  *** 0.74 *** 0.04  ***  0.05  *** 0.10 ***  
   (57.04)      (91.92)    (63.30)     (4.62)    (5.79)    (9.16)    
2007  0.72  *** 0.78  *** 0.70 *** - 0.01    -0.02  *  0.04 ***  
   (48.47)      (69.47)    (61.46)     (-1.37)    ( - 1.85)    (3.20)    
2008  0.55  *** 0.61  *** 0.53 *** 0.16  ***  0.15  *** 0.21 ***  
   (21.79)      (32.13)    (26.18)     (9.74)    (8.53)    (14.06)    
                     N  2161    2163    2202   2161      2163       2202     
Adjusted R2 0.05    0.06     0.05   0.03     0.03    0.03    
F- stat.  7.93  *** 9.17  *** 7.58 *** 4.94  ***  4.37  *** 4.54 ***  
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Table 5 cont. Regression results. 
 
The control variables appear as in the models reported in Table 4, except for the 
firm size, which is now insignificant. This indicates a good fit of the matching, as 
the size effect does not distort the findings. Similar to the results reported in Table 
4, the CFO gender seems to have no impact on the strength of corporate govern-
ance. In contrast to the main results, the chairperson’s gender also appears insig-
nificant here, which may be caused by the small sample size. 
Dependent 
variable  Compensation  Compensation  Compensation   Takeover  Takeove r  Takeover  
Variable   Model 13   Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17   Model 18   
Constant  2.76  *** 2.77  ***  2.75  ***   1.04  ***  1.17 ***   0.99   *** 
  (8.75)    (9.01)   (9.35)     (5.55)   (6.46)    (6.15)    Female variables:                           CEO 0.33  *            0.19             
  (1.89)              (1.01)             CFO       - 0.14  **            -0.04        
        ( -2.10)              ( -0.66)        Chair             0.45               -0.24     
            (1.52)                (-1.37)     Control variables:                               Growth  0.00 *  0.00  ***  0.00    0.00  *   0.00 ** 0.00     
  ( -1.90)    ( -3.10)   (-1.43)      (- 1.74)    ( -1.99)    (-1.10)     Leverage   0.80  *** 0.83  ***  0.74  ** -0.97  ***  -1.03 ***   -0.89   *** 
  (2.70)    (3.08)   (2.39)     (- 6.10)    ( -7.07)    (-5.98)     MB 0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00  *   0.00 ***   0.00   *** 
  ( -0.68)    ( -0.35)   (0.03)     (1.78)   (3.26)    (4.39)    ROA  0.00  **  0.01  ***  0.01  ***   0.00  *   0.00    0.00   **  
  (2.31)    (3.52)   (3.57)     (- 1.90)    ( -0.44)    (-2.28)     Size  0.01    0.01     0.01    0.25  ***  0.24 ***   0.25   *** 
  (0.36)    (0.19)   (0.43)     (15.39)   (17.35)     (23.39)    Industry 1   -0.06    0.13  ** -0.09    -0.34  ***  -0.27 ***   -0.33   *** 
  ( -0.91)   (1.99)    (-0.95)     (- 4.69)    ( -3.91)    (-5.02)     Industry 2   0.03    0.07     0.01    -0.08  **   -0.09    -0.12   *** 
  (0.51)   (1.05)    (0.13)    (- 1.96)    ( -1.52)    (-2.70)     Industry 3   0.02    0.10     0.07    0.20  *   0.26 ** 0.18   **  
  (0.12)   (0.82)    (0.44)    (1.81)   (2.48)    (2.06)    Industry 4   0.19    0.25     0.20    0.27  **   0.27 ** 0.34   *** 
  (1.11)   (1.60)    (1.07)    (2.43)   (2.14)    (3.87)    2004 0.13  *** 0.12  ***  0.15  ***   -0.10  ***  -0.14 ***   -0.15   *** 
  (20.12)   (20.97)    (23.62)    (-26.52)    (- 18.93)    ( -31.45)    2005 0.21  *** 0.23  ***  0.22  ***   -0.25  ***  -0.29 ***   -0.29   *** 
  (18.94)   (22.05)    (14.77)    (-51.74)    (- 34.48)    (-111.33)    2006 0.23  *** 0.22  ***  0.25  ***   -0.25  ***  -0.27 ***   -0.26   *** 
  (17.71)   (20.66)    (12.25)    (-26.65)    (- 60.35)    ( -39.32)    2007 0.14  *** 0.11  ***  0.16  ***   -0.17  ***  -0.19 ***   -0.19   *** 
  (17.27)   (17.58)    (10.88)    (-14.38)    (- 45.63)    ( -19.55)    2008 0.30  *** 0.29  ***  0.33  ***   -0.10  ***  -0.13 ***   -0.11   *** 
  (26.76)   (40.77)    (20.54)    (- 6.73)    (- 13.72)    (-6.54)     
                  N  2161  2163  2202  2161  2163  2202   Adjusted R2  0.01     0.01   0.01     0.06    0.06   0.06    F - stat. 2.22  *** 2.82 ***  2.54  ***  8.48  ***  8.40 ***   9.00  *** 
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5.3 Discussion of the Findings 
The empirical findings reported above indicate that executive and chair genders 
are related to the quality of corporate governance mechanisms. The gender diver-
sity theory indicates significant gender-based differences in various aspects that 
may have an impact in the working life. For example, female leaders have been 
suggested to be more democratic, participative, and cooperative than men and 
also less autocratic and directive (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt & van Engen, 
2003; Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Women are more likely than male directors to 
serve on committees related to board monitoring, such as audit, nominating, and 
corporate governance committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). This indicates that 
women may be more interested in corporate governance related matters and, thus, 
also to invest in improving the company’s governance practices. Moreover, wom-
en are suggested to take their roles as directors very seriously, which may lead to 
open discussions and questioning and, consequently, to improved corporate gov-
ernance (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000).  
Earlier literature indicates that an executive’s personal values and roles signifi-
cantly influence the decisions that they make (Adams et al., 2010; Pierce & 
Sweeney, 2010). In addition, it has been documented that attitudes, cognitive 
functioning, and beliefs tend to vary systematically with demographic variables, 
such as gender (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Interestingly, it has been widely 
suggested that females have significantly higher ethical standards than males (see 
e.g., Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Borkowski & Ugras, 1998; Peterson et al., 2010; 
Roxas & Stoneback, 2004) and, in addition, females have been reported to be 
more risk averse than men (see e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 
1998; Schubert, 2006). Female directors are suggested to be more prone to ad-
dress tough issues facing the management of the firm (Kramer et al., 2006; McIn-
erney-Lacombe, Bilmoria & Salipante, 2008) which is likely to impact the firm’s 
governance practices. According to MacLeod Heminway (2007), women tend to 
be more trustworthy than men, and therefore less likely to manipulate corporate 
financial reporting.  
Since the quality of corporate governance is affected by the personal views and 
ethics of the executive and chairperson of the board, the decisions that males and 
females make at work are likely to differ. For example, a more conservative, risk 
averse and upright executive or chairperson may be more prone to follow guide-
lines and recommendations on corporate governance, which would cause the firm 
to have higher quality corporate governance.  
It is of interest why the female CFOs do not impact corporate governance in the 
same manner as the female CEOs and chairs. This finding may primarily be 
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caused by the different tasks of these executives. CEOs and chairs are often re-
sponsible for important decisions made within the firm and can influence the di-
rection the firm is heading in, whereas the CFOs main responsibility is operation-
al rather than strategic, as they are responsible for the financial reporting of the 
firm. This difference in responsibility may leave them with fewer opportunities to 
influence the firm’s internal corporate governance practices.  
In general, the reported findings support the current efforts of several countries 
(e.g.  Norway  and  Spain),  the  European  Commission,  companies,  and  stock  ex-
changes to introduce regulations and policies promoting the advancement of 
women to top executive positions and corporate boards. The findings suggest that 
the attempts toward gender equality are extremely important and should be adopt-
ed at the firm-level. The results are also likely to interest the decision-makers in 
companies and perhaps promote the advancement of women in business. Overall, 
this paper further increases the awareness of gender-based differences and their 
impact on working life.      
5.4 Robustness Checks  
Several additional tests have been performed to ensure the robustness of the em-
pirical findings. In order to ascertain that the reported findings are not caused by a 
few outlying observations, the data have been winsorized at the 0.5 % and 99.5 % 
levels. The results of these regressions (not tabulated) are in line with the results 
reported in Table 4, and have even higher statistical significance levels in sug-
gesting that female CEOs and chairs have a positive impact on corporate govern-
ance, while the CFO gender does not influence the governance practices. 
The previous literature has indicated that it is important to account for research 
and development expenses when considering the firm’s success by different 
measures. Thus, the original models were re-estimated by including the ratio of 
research and development expenses to sales (Research) in the equation. Research 
is not included into the original model because the data on the variable are not 
available for about a third of the sample companies and, thus, by including the 
variable, the sample size would diminish disproportionately. The results with re-
gressions including the Research variable (not tabulated) support the main find-
ings reported in Table 4, thus indicating that the executive and chair gender influ-
ence a firm’s corporate governance practices. 
In order to ascertain that the results using the industry-specific CGQs are not dis-
torted by the industry dummies included in the models, the Models 2, 4, and 6 of 
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Table 4 are re-estimated without the industry dummies. The results of these tests 
(not tabulated) are in line with the findings reported in Table 4.  
5.5 Limitations 
In interpreting the findings of this study, some limitations need to be considered. 
First, as can be noted from Table 1, the number of female observations is very 
low, which obviously may reduce the statistical power of the tests conducted. 
Moreover, due to the small number of female executives and chairwomen, the 
changes in values or behavior of one woman may impact the findings. It should 
also be noted that many of the female executives and chairs are newly appointed 
and, thus, their possibilities to influence the rather slowly changing corporate 
governance practices may be limited. 
It would be interesting to examine the non-CEO chairs separately to show that the 
CEO duality does not drive the results. Unfortunately, the small number of female 
observations constrains from examining the non-CEO chairs separately in this 
study, since it would cause the sample size to drop disproportionately. Thus, this 
interesting topic must be left for the future research to cover.  However, it should 
be acknowledged that the female executives and chairs included in the sample 
constitute the total population and, thus, their number could not have been in-
creased. 
Second, since the examined sample consists of the S&P 500 firms, the reported 
findings may not be applicable to smaller firms or to firms operating outside the 
United States. Moreover, the American mainly unitary board structure differs 
from the two-tier board structures found in many western economies and so the 
results may not be generalized to countries which do not commonly have unitary 
board structures. Additionally, the results may be distorted by the selection bias, 
that is, females may self-select into firms with better governance. On the other 
hand, it is possible that companies with good governance may opt to appoint more 
women onto their boards and executives. 
Naturally, public opinion is an important issue for the companies to consider 
when determining their governance practices. For example, Wu (2004) suggests 
that reputation concerns are effective in compelling companies to improve their 
corporate governance practices. Gender equality is usually seen as a desirable 
feature and many countries have even introduced laws, regulations, and guide-
lines promoting the advancement of women in business. Thus, women may be 
appointed to senior positions in an attempt to influence regulators and the public. 
As a consequence, their opportunities to shape governance practices may be lim-
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ited, which may decrease the explanatory power of the female dummies. For ex-
ample, it has been reported that female board members may not be listened to, or 
may be excluded from social events and even from some part of the decision-
making discussions, and they may be subject to inappropriate behavior (Kramer et 
al., 2006), all of which are likely to decrease their individual contribution.  
Finally, it should be noted that it is a challenging task to quantify the strength of 
corporate governance mechanisms within firms and, as indicated by for example 
Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) and Larcker et al. (2007), the way one measures gov-
ernance influences the outcome. Therefore, despite using several alternative gov-
ernance measures in the statistical analyses, it is conceivable that the measures 
employed do not adequately capture all dimensions of corporate governance. 
Moreover, the effects of executive and chair gender on individual corporate gov-
ernance components are not analyzed here beyond the sub-index level due to 
length of paper constraints. Thus, this interesting topic is left for future research 
to cover.  
6 Conclusions 
The importance of good corporate governance has been highlighted in the previ-
ous literature. Thus, it is essential to examine the underlying factors that influence 
corporate governance decisions. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
and how the gender of the firm’s CEO, CFO, and chairperson influence the cor-
porate governance practices within the firm. The sample consists of the S&P 500 
firms during the period 2003–2008. 
The findings reported in this paper suggest that  female CEOs and chairs tend to 
have a positive impact on the quality of corporate governance mechanisms. In 
contrast, the CFO gender seems to have no impact on the general corporate gov-
ernance indices. In order to gain more specific knowledge of the relation between 
the executive and chairperson gender and corporate governance, different sub-
indices of corporate governance are also examined. These are indices focusing on 
audit, board of the directors, compensation, and takeover defenses. The results of 
these additional analyses indicate that the impact of the executive and chair gen-
der varies in different areas of corporate governance. In examining the audit sub-
indices, chairwomen seem to have a positive impact on overall audit-related cor-
porate governance. For the board indices, the results are similar to those of the 
overall indices, that is, the female CEOs and chairpersons seem to improve corpo-
rate governance. In the case of the compensation index, the female CEO is sug-
gested to have a positive impact on the compensation indices. Interestingly, the 
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overall compensation index (Compensation) and the industry-specific takeover 
defenses index (Takeover_industry) are negatively influenced by female CFOs, 
while the CFOs were found to have no significant influence on the overall corpo-
rate governance indices. 
In general, the empirical findings reported in this paper suggest that gender-based 
differences, for instance, in leadership styles, conservatism, risk aversion, and 
trustworthiness may influence the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Finally, the findings provide further support for the existence of gender-based 
differences in the behavior and performance of the executive and chairperson, 
indicating the importance of the recent national policies in numerous countries on 
gender quotas at the executive level. 
This paper provides an overview of the relation between females in top corporate 
positions and corporate governance. The reported exploratory findings do raise 
many questions, which must be left to be answered by future research. For exam-
ple, since it has been suggested by previous studies that corporate governance 
practices vary between industries (see e.g., Giroud & Mueller, 2010), and that 
there is significant variation in the board gender diversity between industries 
(Brammer, Millington & Pavelin, 2007), it would be interesting to examine 
whether the female executives’ impact on corporate governance differs based on 
industry. The small sample size of this study unfortunately does not permit such 
an analysis. Other possible underlying factors affecting the corporate governance 
quality, such as executive and chairperson characteristics other than gender, are 
also an important topic for future research to cover. For example, it would be of 
interest to examine whether female influence on corporate governance differs for 
executive and non-executive chairwomen. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. CGQ ratings criteria.  
 
Board 
1. Board composition  
- At least a majority of the directors on board should be independent. 
2. Nominating committee composition  
- Should be composed solely of independent directors.  
3. Compensation committee composition 
- Should be composed solely of independent directors.  
4. Governance committee 
- The functions of a governance committee should be handled by a 
committee of a board. 
5. Board structure 
- Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an annual basis.  
6. Board size 
- Boards should have 6–15 members, a size of 9–12 members is consid-
ered optimal.   
7. Changes in board size 
- Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes on the board 
size. 
8. Cumulative voting 
- Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their votes for direc-
tors.  
9. Boards served on – CEO 
- The  CEO  should  not  serve  on  more  than  two  boards  of  other  public  
companies. 
10. Boards served on – other than CEO 
- Outside directorships should be limited to service on the boards of 
four or fewer public companies. 
11. Former CEOs on the board 
- Former CEO should not serve on the board. 
12. Chairman/CEO separation 
- The CEO and chair positions should be separated and the chairman 
should be an independent outsider. 
13. Governance (board) guidelines 
- Board guidelines should be published on the company website. 
14. Response to shareholder proposals 
- An action should be taken within 12 months on all shareholder pro-
posals supported by a majority vote. 
15. Board attendance 
- Directors should attend at least 75 % of the board meetings. 
16. Board vacancies 
- Shareholders  should  have  an  opportunity  to  vote  on  all  directors  se-
lected to fill vacancies. 
17. Related-party transactions – CEO 
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- CEO’s should not be the subject of transactions that create conflicts of 
interest. 
18. Related-party transactions – other than CEO 
- Officers and directors should not be the subject of transactions that 
create conflicts of interest. 
19. Majority voting  
- Ideally directors should be elected with an affirmative majority votes 
cast. 
20. ISS recommendation of withhold votes 
- ISS has not recommended a withhold vote from any directors. 
 
Audit 
21. Audit committee 
- Should be composed solely of independent directors. 
22. Audit fees 
- Consulting fees (audit related and other) should be less than audit fees. 
23. Auditor ratification 
- Shareholders should be permitted to ratify management’s selection of 
auditors each year. 
24. Financial experts 
- The entire audit committee should be comprised of financial experts. 
25. Financial restatements 
- The company should not have restated financials during any period 
during the past two years. 
26. Options backdating 
- The company has not restated financials due to options. 
 
Charter/Bylaws 
27. Poison pill adoption 
- The company should not have a poison pill in place. 
28. Poison pill – shareholder approval 
- Shareholders should be permitted to approve shareholder right plans 
(i.e. poison pills). 
29. Poison pill – TIDE provision 
- If a poison pill is adopted, it should include a three year independent 
director evaluation (TIDE) provision. 
30. Poison pill – sunset provision 
- If a poison pill is adopted, it should include a sunset provision. 
31. Poison pill – qualified offer clause 
- If a poison pill is adopted, it should include a qualified offer clause. 
32. Poison pill – trigger 
- If a poison pill is adopted, the trigger threshold should be 20 percent or 
higher. 
33. Vote requirements – charter/bylaw amendments 
- A simple majority vote should be required to amend the char-
ter/bylaws and to approve mergers or business combinations. 
34. Vote requirements – mergers 
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- A simple majority vote should be required to approve mergers or busi-
ness combinations. 
35. Written consent 
- Shareholders should be permitted to act by written consent. 
36. Special meetings 
- Shareholders should be permitted to call special meetings. 
37. Bylaw amendments 
- Management should not be permitted to amend the bylaws without 
shareholder approval. 
38. Capital structure – dual class 
- Common stock entitled to one vote per share is viewed favorably. 
39. Capital structure – blank check preferred 
- Declawed preferred stock is viewed favorably. 
 
State of incorporation 
40. State of incorporation antitakeover provisions 
- Incorporation in a state without anti-takeover provisions, or opting out 
of such protections is viewed favorably. 
41. Control share acquisition 
- Shares can be denied their voting rights when they contribute to own-
ership in excess of certain thresholds. 
42. Control share cashout 
- Dissident shareholders are given the right to “cash out” of their  posi-
tion in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a 
control position. 
43. Freezeout 
- Investors who surpass a certain ownership threshold in a company are 
forced to wait for a specified period of time before gaining control of 
the company. 
44. Fair price 
- A requirement that board and shareholder approval are obtained for all 
takeover bids that do not meet predetermined fair price standards. 
45. Stakeholder law 
- Directors are permitted, when taking action, to weigh the interests of 
constituents other than shareholders in the decision making process.  
46. State endorsement of poison pills 
- A seal of approval is lent to the use of poison pills should they be chal-
lenged in court. 
 
Ownership 
47. Director stock ownership 
- All directors with more than one year of service should own stock. 
48. Executive stock ownership guideline 
- Executives should be subject to stock ownership guidelines. 
49. Director stock ownership guidelines 
- Directors should be subject to stock ownership guidelines. 
50. Officer and director stock ownership levels 
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- Officers and directors should have a significant ownership position in 
their company’s stock. 
51. Mandatory holding period for stock options 
- Officers and directors should hold a meaningful portion of the shares 
acquired after exercise. 
52. Mandatory holding period for restricted stock 
- Officers and directors should hold a meaningful portion of the shares 
acquired after exercise. 
 
Executive and director compensation 
53. Cost of option plans 
- An option-pricing model is used to measure the cost of all new stock-
based incentive plans. The cost is compared to an allowable cap that is 
based upon company-specific factors including industry, market capi-
talization, performance, and levels of cash compensation. The estimat-
ed plan cost is compared to the allowable cap. 
54. Option repricing permitted 
- Plan documents should be written to expressively prohibit repricing 
without prior shareholder approval. 
55. Shareholder approval of option plans 
- All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to shareholders 
for approval. 
56. Compensation committee interlocks 
- No interlocking directors should serve on the compensation commit-
tee. 
57. Director compensation 
- Directors should receive a portion of their compensation in the form of 
stock. 
58. Option burn rate 
- Burn rates are considered excessive where average annual option 
grants exceed 2% of outstanding shares over the past three years or 
exceed one standard deviation from the industry mean. 
59. Performance-based compensation 
- Awards should be based upon transparent performance criteria. 
60. Option expensing 
- A review of whether companies have pro-actively adopted FAS 123, 
which is recommendable. 
 
Progressive practices 
61. Board performance reviews 
- A policy of conducting annual board performance reviews should be 
disclosed.  
62. Individual director performance reviews 
- A policy of conducting annual board performance reviews should be 
disclosed.  
63. Meetings of outside directors 
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- A policy specifying that directors should meet without the CEO should 
be disclosed. 
64. CEO succession plan 
- A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in place and evalu-
ated by the directors periodically. 
65. Board can hire outside advisors 
- A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors should be dis-
closed. 
66. Directors resign upon job changes 
- A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in job status 
should be disclosed. 
 
Director education 
67. Directors participating in director education programs 
- All board members should participate in director education programs 
that fulfill criteria accepted by the RiskMetrics. 
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FEMALE EXECUTIVES AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT?
This essay is joint work with Sami Vähämaa and it has been published in 
Managerial Finance, Vol. 35, No. 7, pp. 629–645. 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between 
earnings management and the gender of the firm’s executives. 
Design/methodology/approach – Panel regressions of discretionary accruals 
on a set of female executive dummies and firm-specific controls.  
Findings – The results provide considerable evidence to suggest that firms 
with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing discretionary accru-
als, thereby implying that female CFOs are following more conservative earn-
ings management strategies.  
Research limitations/implications – In general, the findings indicate that 
gender-based differences in conservatism, risk-aversion, and managerial op-
portunism may have important implications for financial reporting and corpo-
rate governance.  
Originality/value – This paper extends prior research by addressing the poten-
tial effects of female executives on earnings management. The findings report-
ed in this paper provide novel insights to the empirical financial accounting 
literature.  
Keywords Earnings management, Discretionary accruals, Female executives, 
Female CEOs, Female CFOs  
Paper type Research paper 
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1 Introduction 
Accounting earnings are perhaps the most widely used measure of firm perfor-
mance. Given that accounting rules and financial reporting standards provide the 
executives of a firm with considerable opportunities for earnings management, it 
is not surprising that increasing attention in financial accounting literature has 
been devoted to the analysis of earnings management. It has been long acknowl-
edged that firm’s executives may have incentives to manipulate earnings in order 
to maximize firm value and/or their own wealth at the expense of shareholders 
(see e.g., Holthausen, 1990; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Beneish, 2001). 
Thus, it is widely recognized that the quality of financial reporting may depend on 
managerial motives and characteristics, and moreover, that the opportunism of the 
firm’s executives tends to reduce earnings quality.  
In this paper, we examine the association between earnings management and the 
gender of the firm’s executives. In particular, we focus on the gender of the firm’s 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and attempt to 
assess whether and how these female executives affect the quality of reported 
financial information. The underlying assumption in our empirical analysis is that 
women and men may act and behave somewhat differently, and that the gender-
based differences, for instance, in cognitive functioning, decision-making, and 
conservatism may have important implications for the quality of financial report-
ing.  
This paper builds upon three distinct lines of research. First, a vast body of ac-
counting literature indicates that earnings management is affected by the charac-
teristics and incentives of the firm’s executives (see e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Davidson et al., 2007; Meek et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Matsunaga and 
Yeung, 2008). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the role of executive 
gender has so far been ignored in this context. Our analysis is further motivated 
by the recent corporate finance literature that examines how the gender of the 
firm’s executives and directors affects corporate governance and the firm’s finan-
cial  performance  (see  e.g.,  Carter  et  al.,  2003;  Erhardt  et  al.,  2003;  Farrell  and  
Hersch, 2005; Rose, 2007; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Adams and Fer-
reira, 2009). In brief, these studies suggest that female representation may en-
hance the functioning and efficiency of corporate boards and committees and, 
more generally, that executive gender may affect managerial behavior. We aim to 
extend this strand of literature by addressing the potential effects of female execu-
tives on financial reporting. Finally, it has been long acknowledged in cognitive 
psychology and management literature that significant gender differences exist 
e.g. in conservatism, risk averseness, and ethical behavior (see e.g., Powell and 
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Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Byrnes et al. 1999; Schubert, 
2006). In this paper, we presume that the documented behavioral differences be-
tween women and men may influence the firm’s financial reporting practices.  
The results of our empirical analysis indicate that the gender of the firm’s execu-
tives may affect the quality of financial reporting. In particular, using a sample of 
S&P 500 firms with 1955 firm-year observations, we run several alternative panel 
regressions of earnings quality on a set of female executive dummies and firm-
specific control variables. These regressions provide considerable evidence to 
suggest that firms with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing dis-
cretionary accruals. These more negative accruals imply that female CFOs are 
following more conservative financial reporting strategies. This finding is broadly 
consistent with the literature on gender differences in conservatism and risk-
aversion. We find, however, no relationship between earnings management and 
the  gender  of  the  firm’s  CEO.  Thus,  consistent  with  prior  research  (Geiger  and  
North, 2006; Jiang et al., 2008; Matsunaga and Yeung, 2008), our results provide 
evidence about the significant influence of CFOs on the quality of accounting 
information.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on female executives and earnings management, and introduces our re-
search hypothesis. Section 3 represents the methodology used in the analysis, 
while Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical tests. Our empirical find-
ings regarding the effects of executive gender on earnings management are re-
ported in Section 5. Finally, the last section provides concluding remarks. 
2 Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1 Female executives, corporate governance, and firm performance 
Psychology and management literature have long acknowledged that significant 
gender-based differences exist, for instance, in leadership styles, communicative 
skills, conservatism, risk averseness, and decision-making. Given these differ-
ences and their potential implications for corporate governance, the issue of gen-
der diversity has begun to receive increasing attention in corporate finance and 
corporate governance literature over the past few years. Several studies have re-
cently focused on the effects that female executives and directors may potentially 
have on the firm’s financial performance and market value. In this paper, we at-
tempt to extend this literature by addressing the effects of female executives on 
the quality of accounting information.  
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Carter et al. (2003), Erhardt et al. (2003), Farrell and Hersch (2005), Rose (2007), 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), and Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the 
effects of female executives and directors on the firm’s financial performance and 
market  value.  Erhardt  et  al.  (2003)  use  a  sample  of  large  U.S.  firms  to  examine  
the relationship between board diversity and financial performance, and document 
that the diversity of the board is positively associated with profitability. They ar-
gue that gender diversity may lead to a wider knowledge base, which may create 
a competitive advantage compared to companies with non-diversified boards. In a 
similar  vein,  Carter  et  al.  (2003),  Farrell  and  Hersch  (2005),  and  Campbell  and  
Minguez-Vera (2008) document that gender diversity is associated with improved 
financial performance and higher firm value.  
Some studies, however, suggest that gender diversity does not necessarily im-
prove firm performance. Watson (2002) shows that after controlling for the indus-
try and age of the firm, there are no significant differences between male- and 
female-controlled firms. Nevertheless, he also finds some evidence to suggest that 
female-controlled firms may outperform male-controlled firms. Using Danish 
data, Rose (2007) reports that there is no significant link between firm perfor-
mance and female board representation. Adams and Ferreira (2009) document 
that the average effect of female directors on firm performance is negative. Their 
findings, however, also indicate that gender diversity may improve financial per-
formance in companies with weak corporate governance.  
Wolfers (2006) examines the stock market performance of large female-headed 
U.S. firms. Using data on S&P 1500 firms, he finds no systematic differences in 
stock returns for firms with female or male CEOs. Francoeur et al. (2008), in con-
trast, document that firms with female executives may generate positive abnormal 
stock  returns  when  they  are  operating  in  complex  environments.  Adams  et  al.  
(2009) focus on the stock market performance of firms with newly appointed 
CEOs,  and  document  that  the  gender  of  the  CEO  does  not  affect  the  post-
appointment performance. Interestingly, their findings also suggest that the pre-
appointment stock returns are higher for the firms that appoint female CEOs, and 
thereby indicate that female executives do not appear to self-select into precarious 
positions.  
Brennan and McCafferty (1997), Fondas and Sassalos (2000), Eagly and Carli 
(2003), and Huse and Solberg (2006) attempt to explicate why female executives 
and directors may improve firm performance and corporate governance. Brennan 
and McCafferty (1997) suggest that females have a better understanding of con-
sumer behavior, the needs of the customers, and the opportunities for companies 
in meeting those needs. Fondas and Sassalos (2000) presume that diverse boards 
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are more effective than homogenous boards. They argue that women may im-
prove decision-making by bringing different perspectives and opinions into a dis-
cussion. Eagly and Carli (2003) suggest that the leadership style of women is 
more effective under contemporary business environment. Furthermore, they note 
that due to the glass ceiling phenomenon, women have to demonstrate extra com-
petence in order to reach managerial positions and corporate boards. Finally, ac-
cording to Huse and Solberg (2006), female representation may improve board 
behavior and effectiveness simply because the women on corporate boards tend to 
be better prepared for the board meetings than men.  
A considerable body of economic psychology literature suggests that females are 
more conservative and risk averse than men (see e.g., Johnson and Powell, 1994; 
Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Sunden and Surette, 
1998; Byrnes et al. 1999; Schubert, 2006). According to Bernardi and Arnold 
(1997), female executives and directors may have higher moral standards than 
their male counterparts. Moreover, MacLeod Heminway (2007) argues that wom-
en are more trustworthy than men, and are thereby less likely to manipulate cor-
porate  financial  and  other  disclosures.  In  this  paper,  we  postulate  that  the  docu-
mented gender differences especially in conservatism, risk averseness, and ethical 
behavior may influence the quality of financial reporting.   
2.2 Earnings management 
Given that accounting earnings are perhaps the most widely used measure of firm 
performance, it is not surprising that a vast body of empirical financial accounting 
literature has focused on factors that may potentially affect earnings management. 
In general, the existing literature has documented that financial reporting is of 
higher quality when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms or 
when there is a greater demand for high-quality financial reporting (see e.g., Ball 
et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Ebrahim, 2007; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2008).
The relationship between different corporate governance factors and earnings 
management has been recently examined e.g in Becker et al. (1998), Klein 
(2002), Balsam et al. (2003), Xie et al. (2003), Velury and Jenkins (2006), 
Ebrahim (2007), and Jenkins and Velury (2008). Becker et al. (1998) investigate 
whether auditor quality has an effect on earnings management, and find that the 
clients of the Big Six auditors have significantly lower discretionary accruals than 
the clients of non-Big Six auditors. Similar findings on the constraining effects of 
auditors on earnings management are documented e.g. in Balsam et al. (2003), 
and Jenkins and Velury (2008). Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) and Ebrahim 
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(2007) examine the relationship between earnings management and the character-
istics of the board of directors and audit committees. Their results consistently 
indicate that earnings management is negatively related to board and audit com-
mittee independence and meeting activity. Velury and Jenkins (2006) document 
that institutional ownership improves the quality of financial reporting.  
Perhaps most related to the current study, Cheng and Warfield (2005), Geiger and 
North (2006), Davidson et al. (2007), Meek et al. (2007), Matsunaga and Yeung 
(2008), and Jiang et al. (2008) focus on the effects of executive characteristics 
and incentives on earnings management. Cheng and Warfield (2005), Meek et al. 
(2007) and Jiang et al. (2008) examine the relation between managers’ stock-
based compensation and earnings management, and document that executives 
with high equity incentives are more likely to engage in earnings management. In 
addition, Jiang et al. (2008) also show that earnings management is more affected 
by the CFOs’ than the CEOs’ equity incentives, thus implying that the CFOs have 
more influence on earnings management. Davidson et al. (2007) examine whether 
the age and career horizon of the firm’s executives affect earnings management. 
Their findings suggest that firms with older CEOs, who are nearing the retirement 
age, are associated with aggressive income-increasing earnings management.  
Geiger and North (2006) examine the control of CFOs on the discretionary accru-
als in reported earnings by focusing on the appointments of new CFOs. Interest-
ingly, they find that discretionary accruals decrease significantly after the ap-
pointment of a new CFO, thereby providing empirical evidence on the influence 
of CFOs on earnings management. Finally, Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) investi-
gate whether the firm’s disclosure policies and financial reporting are different in 
firms that have a former CFO acting as the CEO, and document that the firms 
controlled by ex-CFOs are associated with income-decreasing discretionary ac-
cruals, or more conservative accounting practices.  
2.3 Hypothesis 
The existing accounting literature shows that the quality of financial reporting 
depends on managerial motives and incentives, and moreover, that the opportun-
ism of the firm’s executives affects earnings management. Therefore, managerial 
characteristics are acknowledged as important determinants of earnings quality. 
Further, recent corporate finance literature indicates that the gender of the firm’s 
executives and directors may affect corporate governance and the firm’s financial 
performance. These findings suggest that executive gender may affect managerial 
behavior. In this paper, we presume that the documented gender-based differences 
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in conservatism, risk averseness, and ethical behavior may have important impli-
cations for earnings management. Thus, we examine the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with female executives are associated with more conservative fi-
nancial reporting. 
3 Methodology 
The association between earnings management and the gender of the firm’s exec-
utives is examined with cross-sectional panel regressions. As the first step of the 
analysis, we need to estimate the quality of reported earnings. Following previous 
studies,  we  assess  the  extent  of  earnings  management  by  estimating  the  discre-
tionary accruals in reported earnings (see e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 
2003; Francis et al., 2005; Geiger and North, 2006; Davidson et al., 2007; Meek 
et al., 2007). Since the estimation of discretionary accruals is model-dependent, 
we employ two alternative models of expected accruals to quantify earnings man-
agement. The first model used in this study is the accruals measure proposed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) (DD model), and the second model is the modified 
version of the Dechow-Dichev model developed by McNichols (2002) (modified 
DD model). The difference between these two models is that the modified DD 
model includes two additional variables into the original DD equation in order to 
increase the explanatory power of the cross-sectional regression.  
 Accruals are usually considered as temporary adjustments that resolve timing 
problems in the underlying cash flows at the cost of making assumptions and es-
timates. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that the quality of accruals and earn-
ings is decreasing in the magnitude of estimation error in accruals. They derive an 
empirical measure of accruals quality as the residuals from regressions of changes 
in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows. Thus, the 
Dechow-Dichev model to estimate the extent of earnings management is given 
by: 
(1) tjtjtjtjtj CFCFCFACC ,1,3,21,1, ????? ????? ??
where ACCj,t denotes total current accruals for firm j at time t, and is calculated as 
[ACC = ?current assets – ?current liabilities – ?cash + ?debt in current  liabili-
ties], ? is the change in a given accounting figure from year t–1 to year t, CF de-
notes operating cash flow for firm j at time t, which is calculated as [CF =  net 
income before extraordinary items – total accruals], and total accruals is equal to 
total current accruals minus depreciation and amortization expense. The residual 
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term of the regression is, by definition, the difference between the amount ac-
crued and the amount realized. Dechow and Dichev (2002) define discretionary 
accruals as the magnitude of these estimation errors.  
McNichols’ (2002) modified version of the Dechow-Dichev model simply aug-
ments the original model with the change in sales revenue and property, plant, 
and equipment as additional independent variables. McNichols (2002) shows that 
by adding these two variables into the DD model, the explanatory power of the 
cross-sectional regression increases significantly, thereby reducing the measure-
ment error in discretionary accruals. The modified Dechow-Dichev equation to 
estimate discretionary accruals is given by: 
(2) 
tjtjtj
tjtjtjtj
PPESALES
CFCFCFACC
,,5,4
1,3,21,1,
???
????
????
???? ??
where ?SALES denotes change in sales from year t–1 to year t, and PPE is the 
gross value of property, plant, and equipment at the end of year t. Again, the re-
sidual term of Equation (2) is used to quantify the extent of earnings management. 
All the variables used in both accruals models are scaled by the average of total 
assets between year t–1 and t.
After the estimation of discretionary accruals, we examine the association be-
tween earnings management and the gender of the firm’s executives with the fol-
lowing cross-sectional panel regression: 
(3)
tj
y
j
y
y
k
j
n
k
ktjtj
tjtjtjtjtj
YEARSICSIZESGROWTH
MBLOSSLEVFEMALEDA
,
2006
2003
1
1
,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
?????
?????
?????
?????
??
?
?
?
where DAj,t denotes discretionary accruals for firm j in year t. The test variable in 
our regression specification is FEMALE, which is defined as one of the following 
alternative female executive dummies: FCEO equals one if the CEO of the firm is 
female, FCFO equals one if the firm has a female CFO, and FEXEC is set to one 
if  either the CEO or the CFO is female.  In addition to using the female dummy 
variables one by one, we also estimate a model in which the FCEO and FCFO 
dummies are used simultaneously. Thus, we estimate four different regression 
specifications, where the included female variables are: (i) FCEO, (ii) FCFO, (iii) 
FEXEC, and (iv) FCEO and FCFO.
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Following prior literature, we include several control variables in our model. 
LEVj,t in Equation (3) is financial leverage for firm j in year t, measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the net income in year t is negative, MBj,t is the market-to-book ratio, measured as 
the ratio of market value to book value of equity, SGROWTHj,t is the sales growth 
rate, and SIZEj,t is the natural logarithm of total assets.  
Previous studies indicate that the above firm characteristics are useful predictors 
of earnings management (see e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Francis et al., 2005; 
Geiger and North, 2006; Meek et al., 2007). LEV and LOSS are proxies for the 
financial condition of the firm. According to DeAngelo et al. (1994), troubled 
companies may have strong incentives to use income-decreasing, that is, more 
negative accruals. Moreover, accruals models may overestimate the accruals for 
poorly performing firms (see e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). Thus, we expect a nega-
tive association between these variables and discretionary accruals. MB and 
SGROWTH are proxies for growth. High-growth firms are typically less transpar-
ent and may have greater opportunities for opportunistic earnings management 
(see e.g., Geiger and North, 2006; Meek et al., 2007). Based on prior research, we 
expect a positive association between these variables and accruals. Finally, previ-
ous studies show that SIZE is negatively associated with earnings management. 
Larger firms may have stronger governance structures, lower information asym-
metries, and are generally subject to greater monitoring by auditors and financial 
analysts (see e.g., Meek et al., 2007). Moreover, Becker et al. (1998) argue that 
firm size may also surrogate for numerous omitted variables. 
Given that the extent of earnings management may differ over time and across 
industries, we control for the potential industry and time effects with dummy var-
iables. kjSIC  in Equation (3) is a dummy variable according to industry classifica-
tion (SIC) codes and kjYEAR  is a dummy variable that indicates fiscal years. 
Hence, throughout the panel regressions, we use a two-way fixed-effects specifi-
cation, which allows for a different intercept for each industry in the sample and 
also controls for the possible change in earnings management over time. Moreo-
ver, in order to account for contemporaneous correlation and different variances 
in the disturbances of each cross-section, we employ the White cross-section ro-
bust covariances in the regressions.   
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4 Data 
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of the S&P 500 firms as of 
July 2007. Following prior research, we exclude financial institutions (SIC codes 
6000–6999) from the sample due to their special regulatory environment. Firms 
with insufficient financial data are also excluded. This leaves us with a sample of 
391 firms, which are classified by industry in Table 1. The data used in our analy-
sis cover the fiscal years 2003-2007, and contain 1955 firm-year observations.   
Table 1.  Number of female executives by industries. 
The gender data used in the analysis are obtained from Audit Analytics database. 
Since the data available from the database were partly insufficient to identify the 
genders of executives for all firms, we have completed our gender data by gather-
ing information from the annual reports of the companies. For each firm, we de-
termine the gender of the firm’s CEO and CFO. As can be noted from Table 1,  
the number of female executives has slightly increased during the sample period. 
Despite the recent development, women are still relatively underrepresented in 
the top management. Only approximately 3 % of the sample firms have a female 
CEO, while about 8 % of the CFOs are female. This severe underrepresentation 
of women among top executives has been widely documented and analyzed in 
recent literature (see e.g., Adams et al., 2007; Wanzenried, 2008).  
As discussed in the previous section, we need several financial statement items to 
measure the discretionary accruals. In addition, following previous studies on 
earnings management, we employ financial leverage, the level of net income, 
market-to-book ratio, sales growth rate, and firm size as control variables in our 
empirical analysis. All these financial statement data are obtained from Thomson 
Financial Worldscope.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of S&P 500 firms. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics for all firms and Panel B for the firms with female 
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executives. As can be noted from Table 2, the firms with a female CEO seem to 
be smaller than the sample firms on average as measured by the log of total as-
sets,  whereas  the  firms  with  female  CFOs  seem  not  to  differ  in  size  from  the  
whole sample mean. Interestingly, the accruals based on the modified DD model 
suggest that firms with female executives are, on average, associated with nega-
tive, earnings-decreasing discretionary accruals. This would suggest that female 
executives are utilizing more conservative accounting practices.  
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the regression. 
As expected, the measures for discretionary accruals based on the DD model 
(DA1) and the modified DD model (DA2) are strongly positively correlated with 
each other. Among the control variables, the strongest correlations are observed 
between leverage and size (0.319), and between leverage and sales growth (-
0.206). Regarding the female executive variables, Table 3 shows that the FCEO
and FCFO dummies exhibit a modest positive correlation (0.014), and naturally, 
both of these dummies appear strongly positively correlated with the composite 
dummy FEXEC.
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics.  
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the sample of 1955 yearly observations 
for 391 S&P 500 firms. Financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–6900) and firms 
with inadequate data are excluded. Panel B reports the statistics for the firms with 
female executives. 
Panel A. Summary statistics for all firms (n=1955 observations) 
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. Max Min
DD model 0.004 0.002 0.034 0.294 -0.190
Modified DD model 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.246 -0.186
Leverage 0.550 0.562 0.194 1.591 0.012
Loss 0.075 0.000 0.264 1.000 0.000
Market-to-book 3.863 3.100 3.798 52.920 0.540
Sales growth 12.818 9.674 17.396 132.793 -56.583
Size 9.148 9.126 1.227 13.587 3.286
Panel B. Summary statistics for firms with female executives 
Variable
Firms with female CEO (n=52 observations)
DD model 0.000 -0.003 0.035 0.082 -0.136
Modified DD model -0.002 -0.005 0.034 0.072 -0.145
Leverage 0.540 0.599 0.237 0.862 0.039
Loss 0.116 0.000 0.324 1.000 0.000
Market-to-book 6.160 4.460 5.257 23.830 1.460
Sales growth 11.914 7.403 16.351 78.329 -15.199
Size 8.781 9.396 1.701 10.452 3.400
Firms with female CFO (n=163 observations)
DD model 0.001 0.000 0.036 0.125 -0.157
Modified DD model -0.003 -0.002 0.033 0.089 -0.145
Leverage 0.524 0.531 0.158 0.909 0.163
Loss 0.058 0.000 0.235 1.000 0.000
Market-to-book 3.693 2.760 3.529 31.400 0.600
Sales growth 13.208 8.384 21.809 119.957 -56.583
Size 9.127 9.171 1.193 12.148 6.773
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5 Results 
5.1 Regressions results 
The estimation results of our fixed-effects panel regressions are reported in Table 
4. The estimates are presented in two panels: Panel A reports the results for the 
regressions where the discretionary accruals are determined with the Dechow-
Dichev model, while the estimates in Panel B are based on the modified Dechow-
Dichev model. As can be noted from Table 4, the F-statistic is significant at the 1 
% level in each of our eight regression specifications, and the control variables 
are mostly statistically highly significant. The adjusted R2s of the estimated mod-
els are relatively low, varying between 8.8 % and 9.7 % for the DD model regres-
sions and between 13.0 % and 14.0 % for the modified DD model regressions. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that low R2s are typical in this type of accruals 
regressions (see e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Geiger and North, 2006; Davidson et al., 
2007; Meek et al., 2007; Jenkins and Velury, 2008). 
Table 4.  Regression results.  
The table reports the estimates of five alternative versions of the following two-
way fixed-effects regression model: 
tj
y
j
y
y
k
j
n
k
ktjtj
tjtjtjtjtj
YEARSICSIZESGROWTH
MBLOSSLEVFEMALEDA
,
2006
2003
1
1
,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
?????
?????
?????
?????
??
?
?
?
where DAj,t denotes the residual term from the employed accruals model for firm j
in year t, LEVj,t is financial leverage, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the net income of firm j during the fiscal year t is negative, MBj,t is market-to-
book ratio, SGROWTHj,t is the sales growth rate, SIZEj,t is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, kjSIC  is a dummy variable according to industry classification (SIC) 
codes, and kjYEAR  is a dummy variable that indicates fiscal years. The dummy 
variables for executive gender are defined as follows: FCEO is one if the CEO of 
the company is female, FCFO equals one if the firm has a female CFO, and 
FEXEC is  set  to  one  if  either  the  CEO or  the  CFO is  female.  t-statistics are re-
ported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Accruals based on the DD model  
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.035 *** 0.038 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 ***
(5.65) (9.01) (7.45) (6.19)
Female executive variables:
FCEO - -0.002 -0.002
(-0.47) (-0.50)
FCFO - -0.004 ** -0.007 ***
(-2.24) (-3.28)
FEXEC - -0.003 **
(-2.14)
Control variables:
LEV - -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.71) (-0.53) (-0.81) (-0.98)
LOSS - -0.033 *** -0.032 *** -0.032 *** -0.033 ***
(-7.25) (-8.06) (-7.46) (-7.06)
MB + 0.000 ** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(-2.35) (-8.52) (-4.93) (-3.69)
SGROWTH + 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(2.74) (4.80) (3.10) (3.16)
SIZE - -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(-3.93) (-6.23) (-4.72) (-3.96)
Industry and year effects:
SIC1 ? 0.011 0.013 * 0.011 0.011
(1.61) (1.75) (1.61) (1.54)
SIC2 ? 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.41) (-0.20)
SIC3 ? -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 ***
(-5.05) (-4.76) (-7.03) (-5.17)
YEAR03 ? 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(2.84) (5.48) (4.08) (3.86)
YEAR04 ? 0.001 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(2.18) (6.15) (5.34) (4.01)
YEAR05 ? -0.001 * 0.000 ** 0.000 -0.001 **
(-1.91) (-2.15) (-0.75) (-2.10)
YEAR06 ? -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ***
(-7.57) (-16.39) (-10.13) (-7.34)
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.097 0.088 0.095
F-stat. 13.424 *** 13.720 *** 11.820 *** 11.578 ***
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Table 4 cont. Regression results. 
Panel B. Accruals based on the modified DD model  
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.035 *** 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 0.038 ***
(6.33) (9.84) (7.45) (6.93)
Female executive variables:
FCEO - -0.001 -0.002
(-0.30) (-0.51)
FCFO - -0.004 ** -0.007 ***
(-2.37) (-3.78)
FEXEC - -0.003 **
(-2.09)
Control variables:
LEV - -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 ***
(-5.15) (-5.07) (-4.72) (-4.21)
LOSS - -0.040 *** -0.039 *** -0.038 *** -0.040 ***
(-8.85) (-10.57) (-9.56) (-8.84)
MB + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.67) (0.13) (0.54) (0.11)
SGROWTH + 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *
(-1.72) (-2.02) (-2.59) (-1.76)
SIZE - -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** 0.003 ***
(-4.18) (-5.90) (-4.48) (-3.71)
Industry and year effects:
SIC1 ? 0.013 ** 0.014 ** 0.013 ** 0.014 **
(2.12) (2.13) (2.02) (2.00)
SIC2 ? 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.09) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.35)
SIC3 ? -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.012 *** -0.100 ***
(-5.63) (-6.45) (-7.46) (-6.72)
YEAR03 ? 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***
(4.66) (5.84) (7.12) (4.38)
YEAR04 ? 0.000 0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.001
(-0.12) (1.81) (2.41) (1.51)
YEAR05 ? -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-2.05) (-0.33) (0.60) (-1.08)
YEAR06 ? -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(-5.51) (-7.79) (-7.48) (-4.05)
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.136 0.130 0.140
F-stat. 20.009 *** 19.525 *** 17.652 *** 17.195 ***
The variables of interest in our regressions are the female executive dummies. As 
can be seen from Table 4, the coefficient estimates for the female dummies are 
consistently negative in all eight regression specifications, thereby suggesting that 
firms with female executives may be associated with income-decreasing discre-
tionary accruals. However, we do not observe any significant association between 
the gender of the firm’s CEO and earnings management, as the estimated negative 
90      Acta Wasaensia
_______________
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to ap-
pear here (www.uwasa.fi). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/dis-
tributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
(www.emeraldinsight.com).
90  Acta Wasaensia
coefficients for the FCEO dummy appear statistically insignificant in the regres-
sions. Nonetheless, the lack of significance may simply be related to the extreme-
ly low number of female CEOs in our sample.  
The estimated coefficients for the FCFO and FEXEC dummy variables are statis-
tically highly significant in all regression specifications. In both panels, the coef-
ficients for the FCFO dummy are negative and statistically significant at the 5 % 
level in Model 2 and at the 1 % level in Model 4, while the estimated coefficients 
for the FEXEC dummy are  negative  and  significant  at  the  5  % level.  Thus,  our  
estimations provide considerable evidence to suggest that firms with female CFOs 
are following more conservative financial reporting strategies. In general, the re-
gression results in Panel A are largely consistent with the ones reported in Panel 
B, and thereby indicate that our findings are not dependent on the model used to 
measure discretionary accruals. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 provide support for our research hypoth-
esis by suggesting that the gender of the firm’s executives may affect the quality 
of financial reporting. In particular, our regression estimates indicate that the 
firms with female CFOs are following more conservative financial reporting poli-
cies than the firms with male CFOs. This finding is broadly consistent with the 
prior literature on gender differences in conservatism and risk aversion (e.g., 
Johnson and Powell, 1994; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 
1998; Byrnes et al., 1999; Schubert, 2006; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). Giv-
en these gender differences, it is reasonable to argue that female CFOs may inher-
ently be more prone to avoid opportunistic income-increasing earnings manage-
ment. Although the estimated coefficients for female CEOs are also consistently 
negative, the CEOs seem not to have any statistically significant effect on earn-
ings management. Thus, consistent with Geiger and North (2006) and Jiang et al. 
(2008), our findings provide further empirical evidence on the significant influ-
ence of CFOs on the quality of financial reporting.  
5.2 Robustness checks 
The regressions in the previous section indicate that firms with female CFOs are 
associated with conservative, income-decreasing financial reporting. In the fol-
lowing, we attempt to examine the robustness of our findings by conducting sev-
eral additional tests. First, in order to test that our results are not caused by a few 
outliers, we winsorize the discretionary accruals measures and the control varia-
bles at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels and then re-estimate all the models represented 
in  Table  4.  The  estimation  results  (not  tabulated)  are  mainly  consistent  with  the  
regression results based on the original data. Some of variables lose a part of their 
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explanatory power in comparison with the main results, but the signs of the esti-
mated coefficients remain the same. More importantly, consistent with Table 4, 
our estimations based on the winsorized data suggest that the gender of the CFO 
affects earnings quality. The estimated coefficients for the FCFO dummy  are  
negative and statistically highly significant in three regression specifications (M4 
with the DD model and M2 and M4 with the modified DD model). In general, the 
regressions with the winsorized data indicate that our findings are not driven by 
extreme observations or few outliers.  
Prior literature indicates that the characteristics of the board of directors and audit 
committees may affect earnings management. Therefore, in order to alleviate the 
correlated omitted variable problem, we introduce board size and independence 
and audit committee size and independence as additional control variables in the 
regressions. Again, the estimation results (not tabulated) are mainly consistent 
with Table 4. The coefficient estimates for the female executive dummies are 
consistently negative, and statistically highly significant for the FCFO dummy 
variable in all four regression specifications. Thus, these additional estimations 
provide further evidence to suggest that firms with female CFOs are associated 
with more conservative financial reporting strategies. 
Furthermore, we attempt to examine whether our empirical findings are induced 
by firm-size effects. We split the sample into small firms and large firms, and re-
estimate all the regressions (not tabulated). The results for large firms are in line 
with the estimates for the whole sample presented in Table 4. The estimates for 
the FCFO dummy are negative and statistically highly significant in all regression 
specifications. However, in the subsample of small firms, the coefficient for the 
female CFO dummy is statistically significant only in Model 4 with the discre-
tionary accruals based on the modified DD model. The amount of female CFOs in 
both groups is almost equivalent, so the difference in the number of female CFOs 
does not explain the mostly insignificant estimates in the small firm sample. 
However, given the rather small number of female observations in both sub-
groups, our regression results may lack significance simply because the sample 
size is insufficient for reliable estimations. Nevertheless, our main findings seem 
not to be particularly dependent on firm size.  
As discussed above, we have used two-way fixed-effects regression specifications 
with the White cross-section robust covariances. To examine whether our results 
depend on the panel estimation specifications, we also run the same regressions 
with the ordinary coefficient covariance method and with no fixed-effects specifi-
cations. With these settings, we get generally similar results (not tabulated) as 
presented in Table 4. The coefficients for the female CFO variable are negative 
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throughout the regressions, although statistically significant only in two out of 
four regressions (M4 with the DD model and M4 with the modified DD model). 
Finally, although we have used industry dummies in the regressions to control for 
potential industry effects, we attempt to further ensure that our empirical findings 
are not driven by industry-related factors. Therefore, we compare the average 
discretionary accruals for firms with female CFOs to average discretionary accru-
als for other firms within each industry. This comparison (not tabulated) indicates 
that the accruals for firms with female CFOs are consistently smaller in each in-
dustry group, thereby suggesting that our main findings are not induced by indus-
try effects. However, the differences in average accruals are statistically insignifi-
cant.  
5.3 Limitations
We acknowledge several limitations in our empirical analysis. First, our sample 
consists of the S&P 500 firms, and is thereby limited to very large publicly traded 
U.S. firms. Our empirical findings are not necessarily applicable to smaller firms, 
or to non-U.S. firms. Moreover, it should be noted that the low number of female 
executives in the S&P 500 firms may reduce the statistical power of our tests. 
Second, due to the fact that our executive gender data are hand-collected, we were 
forced to limit the sample to five fiscal years. Thus, we are unable to analyze the 
relation between executive gender and earnings management through time in dif-
ferent business cycles. Given that the sample period is characterized by the strong 
growth of the U.S. economy, it is possible that the income-decreasing accruals of 
firms with female executives are actually a reflection of “cookie-jar” reserve ac-
counting.  Third,  due  to  the  short  sample  period  and  the  low  number  of  female  
executives, we are unable to examine whether the appointment of female execu-
tives would improve earnings quality. Fourth, we recognize that the applied ac-
cruals models may not provide perfect estimates of the extent of earnings man-
agement. Finally, it should be noted that our findings may suffer from a self-
selection bias. Although we have attempted to control for industry and size ef-
fects, it is possible that we have omitted some correlated variables, or that certain 
firm characteristics simultaneously affect the choice of female executives and 
earnings management.  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the association between earnings management and the 
gender of the firm’s executives. We focus on the gender of the firm’s Chief Exec-
 Acta Wasaensia      93 
_______________
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to ap-
pear here (www.uwasa.fi). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/dis-
tributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
(www.emeraldinsight.com).
Acta Wasaensia     93 
utive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and attempt to assess 
whether and how these female executives affect the quality of financial reporting. 
Our empirical analysis is motivated by the documented gender differences in con-
servatism, risk averseness, and ethical behavior. Moreover, the existing corporate 
finance literature suggests that executive gender may affect managerial behavior, 
while a vast body of accounting literature shows that the quality of financial 
reporting depends on managerial motives and incentives. Thus, we hypothesize 
that  the  gender  of  the  firm’s  executives  may  potentially  have  implications  for  
earnings management. 
The results of our empirical analysis indicate that the gender of the firm’s execu-
tives may affect the quality of reported earnings. In particular, using a sample of 
S&P 500 firms with 1955 firm-year observations, we run several alternative panel 
regressions of earnings quality on a set of female executive dummies and firm-
specific control variables. These regressions provide considerable evidence to 
suggest that firms with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing dis-
cretionary accruals, thereby implying that female CFOs are following more con-
servative financial reporting strategies. This finding is broadly consistent with the 
existing literature on gender differences in conservatism and risk aversion. We 
find, however, no relationship between earnings management and the gender of 
the  firm’s  CEO.  Thus,  consistent  with  prior  research,  our  findings  provide  evi-
dence about the significant influence of CFOs on earnings management activities. 
In general, the empirical findings reported in this paper demonstrate that gender-
based differences, for instance, in conservatism, risk-aversion, and managerial 
opportunism may have important implications for the quality of reported financial 
information. 
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EXECUTIVE TURNOVER, GENDER, AND 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
turnover and earnings management. Based on cross-sectional panel regressions on 
a three-year sample of CFO changes in the S&P 1500 firms, the following find-
ings are reported: i) CFO turnover decreases earnings management. ii) Discre-
tionary accruals are negatively influenced when a male CFO is replaced by a fe-
male. iii) Earnings management becomes more income-increasing if the outgoing 
CFO is a female and the incoming male, and in the case of male-male CFO 
changes. Overall, these results indicate that the firms who hire a female CFO after 
a male tend to convert towards higher quality financial reporting practices.  
 
Keywords: earnings management, executive turnover, CFO turnover, gender-
based differences  
1 Introduction 
The importance of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in firm management has 
gained considerable attention in the recent corporate finance literature. The nu-
merous accounting scandals have increased the significance and demand of relia-
ble and accurate financial information, which often is mainly for the CFOs to 
provide. This is noted also in the legislation, as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
sets both the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and CFOs in a personal responsi-
bility on the accuracy and completeness of the financial information provided by 
the company (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). 
Majority of the earlier studies considering the executive’s influence on financial 
reporting focus on examining the CEOs. However, for example Jiang, Petroni, 
and Wang (2010) suggest that, in fact, the CFOs are the executives with the most 
control power on the company’s financial reporting and, therefore, their impact 
on the reported financial information should be more thoroughly examined. Thus, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of CFO replacements on earn-
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ings management. In particular, it is of interest to study whether the genders of 
the incoming and outgoing CFOs have an influence on financial reporting prac-
tices.  
This study contributes to the earlier literature in fields of corporate governance, 
earnings management, and executive gender by assessing whether and how the 
CFO change and incoming and outgoing executive genders influence the firm’s 
earnings reporting practices. Moreover, studying the impact of the CFO genders 
in executive turnovers provides new and important information about the execu-
tive-specific impact on earnings management. 
Based on a three-year sample of CFO changes in S&P 1500 firms, it is suggested 
that firms with CFO turnovers tend to convert towards more conservative finan-
cial reporting practices. However, in case a CFO change takes place, the incom-
ing and outgoing CFO genders seem to have an impact on the firm’s earnings 
management. In particular, if a female replaces a male as a CFO, the level of 
earnings management seems to be negatively  influenced. Conversely, if the out-
going CFO is female and the incoming male, the earnings management of the 
firm tends to become more income-increasing. Finally, in the case of a male-male 
CFO change, the firm’s discretionary accruals are also reported to increase fol-
lowing the appointment. 
The exploratory results reported in this paper are broadly consistent with Geiger 
and North (2006) documenting a decrease in firm’s discretionary accruals follow-
ing a CFO change, and also with Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi (2010) 
and  Peni  and  Vähämaa  (2010)  who  report  that  firms  with  female  CFOs  follow  
less aggressive financial reporting strategies. The findings are suggested to be 
caused by the well-documented gender-based differences, for example, in risk-
taking, decision-making, overconfidence, conservatism, information processing, 
and ethics (see e.g., Johnson and Powell, 1994; Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Byr-
nes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999; Dallas, 2002; Schubert, 2006; MacLeod 
Heminway, 2007; Bonner, 2008, Peterson, Albaum, Merunka, Munuera, and 
Smith, 2010, Pierce and Sweeney, 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the 
earlier streams of literature related to the executive gender, executive turnover, 
and earnings management. In addition, the research hypothesis is formed based 
on the prior literature. In the third part of the paper, the methodology is explained, 
while section four describes the data used in the empirical analyses. Section five 
summarizes the results of the empirical tests, and discusses possible explanations 
for the reported findings. Finally, the last section provides concluding remarks.  
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2 Related literature 
The executive changes have increased rapidly during the past couple of years due 
to the ongoing financial crisis, and the end for this trend is nowhere to be seen. 
For  example,  in  2006 nearly  one  in  seven  of  the  largest  U.S.  firms  lost  a  CFO,  
while in 2005 the firms changed their CFOs already three times more often than 
they did in 2002 (Prince, 2007). Thus, it is of interest to examine what are the 
financial consequences of the CFO turnover from the firm’s point of view. 
Mian (2001) studies the CFO turnovers and finds that they are preceded by nega-
tive excess returns and a decline in operating return on assets, thus suggesting that 
the CFO turnover is caused by a bad firm performance. Interestingly, the escalat-
ing CFO turnover has implications also, for example, for corporate investment 
decisions. In a survey 87.6 % of the CFOs stated that their companies have short-
ened the payoff horizons of their investment decisions due to the shorter tenure of 
executives (Williams, 2007).  
In general, it is widely accepted that the application of accounting standards al-
ways requires judgment (see e.g., Beechy, 2005; Cormier and Magnan, 2005). 
Thus, earlier studies have examined the impact of key executives on earnings 
management. Jiang et al. (2010) study the CEO and CFOs’ impact on manipulat-
ing the reported earnings, and their findings indicate that the firms’ likelihood of 
beating benchmarks and the magnitude of its discretionary accruals are more sen-
sitive to the CFO’s equity incentives than those of the CEO. This is a reasonable 
result, as the CFO’s main responsibility within the firm is financial reporting.  
The existing literature has documented that the CFOs may involve in earnings 
management in order to increase their own wealth. For example, the incumbent 
CFO may have incentives for more income-increasing earnings management in 
order to improve the firm’s reputation and to maximize her/his compensation, 
which may be tied to the firm’s financial performance (Kinney & Martin, 2004; 
Nelson,  Elliot  & Tarpley,  2002).  In  a  similar  vein,  the  retiring  or  leaving  CFOs 
may be prone to maximize the firm performance and their compensation prior the 
turnover (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Cheng, 2004).   
Interestingly, Geiger and North (2006) suggest that firms tend to have lower dis-
cretionary accruals following a CFO change. Moreover, they find that the new 
CFOs hired from outside the company cause the finding, thus indicating that the 
external CFOs tend to follow more conservative reporting strategies.  
Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) study the effects of executive 
gender on earnings management and suggest that firms with female CFOs tend to 
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use more income-decreasing earnings reporting. Interestingly, Peni and Vähämaa 
(2010) find that the CEO gender has no significant impact on the earnings man-
agement. The results of Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) are in 
line for example with Jiang et al. (2010) suggesting that the CFOs are the execu-
tives with most influence on earnings reporting within a firm.  
The literature on gender-based psychological differences suggests that men and 
women are different in many aspects, and that these characteristics may also in-
fluence their behavior in work life. For example, it has been reported that women 
tend to be more conservative and risk averse than men (see e.g., Powell and An-
sic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Byrnes et al., 1999). Moreover, the 
presented evidence indicates that women are less overconfident than men particu-
larly in masculine domains, which the business life has traditionally been (Bon-
ner, 2008). It has also been suggested that females may have higher ethical stand-
ards than males (Peterson et al., 2010; Pierce and Sweeney, 2010). Finally, as it 
has  been  difficult  for  the  females  to  get  a  foothold  in  the  door  of  the  male-
dominated executive suites, the women who have actually made it to the powerful 
position of a CFO are expected to be highly talented and hard-working (Eagly and 
Carli, 2003). 
The findings of Geiger and North (2006) suggest that CFO turnover reduces earn-
ings management. On the other hand, Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa 
(2010) find that female CFOs follow more conservative reporting strategies. 
Thus, given the gender-based differences for example in conservatism, risk aver-
sion, and moral standards, it is of interest to examine whether the relationship 
between the CFO changes and earnings management is influenced by the genders 
of the incoming and outgoing executives. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H1: CFO turnover decreases earnings management. 
H2: The earnings management decrease following a CFO turnover is great-
er when a female CFO replaces a male. 
In particular, it is examined whether the genders of the incoming and outgoing 
CFOs have an impact on the firm’s reported earnings. H1 is tested in order to con-
firm that the findings of earlier studies indicating that the CFO change leads to a 
decrease in discretionary accruals (Geiger & North, 2006) hold also in this sam-
ple. The results reported by indicate that, while Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and 
Vähämaa (2010) propose that female CFOs are associated with income-
decreasing earnings management. Consequently, H2 tests the prediction that, if 
the CFO changes from male to a female, the discretionary accruals in the firm’s 
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financial reporting would become more negative. Thus, H2 tests the main contri-
bution of this study. 
3 Methodology 
Following earlier studies, the level of earnings management employed in each 
firm is examined by using discretionary accruals in reported earnings (see e.g., 
Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper, 2005; Geiger and North, 2006; Meek, Rao, and Skousen, 2007; 
Barua et al., 2010). This practice is supported for example by Geiger and North 
(2006: 785), who argue that “examining signed discretionary accruals is the most 
appropriate measure of the intentional influence of management on financial re-
porting”. Further researchers (see e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003) suggest that the 
current accruals are where management has the most significant discretion to in-
fluence the firms earnings. Therefore, the level of earnings management is here 
estimated by signed discretionary accruals. 
In order to ensure that the results are not dependant on the chosen method of the 
accrual estimation, two alternative models are employed. The accrual models 
used are the ones proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) (DD model) and its 
modified version introduced by McNichols (2002) (modified DD model). The 
difference between the models is that in the modified version of the DD model, 
two additional variables are included in the model in order to increase its explana-
tory power.  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) propose that the quality of reported earnings is related 
to the estimation error in accruals and, thus, they derive a measure of earnings 
management by employing discretionary accruals as follows: 
 
(1) tjtjtjtjtj CFCFCFACC ,1,3,21,1, ????? ????? ??     
where ACCj,t equals total current accruals for firm j at time t, and is calculated as 
[ACC = ?current assets – ?current liabilities – ?cash + ?debt in current  liabili-
ties], ? is the change in a given accounting figure from year t–1 to year t, CF de-
notes operating cash flow for firm j at time t and is calculated as [CF =  net  in-
come before extraordinary items – total accruals], and total accruals is equal to 
total current accruals minus depreciation and amortization expenses. In this re-
gression, the residual term measures the difference between the estimated and 
realized amounts, and Dechow and Dichev (2002) define discretionary accruals as 
the magnitude of these estimation errors.  
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The modified DD model by McNichols (2002) adds the change in sales and the 
value of property, plant, and equipment into the model as additional variables. 
This modification of the model is justified by suggesting that the additional varia-
bles increase the explanatory power of the model significantly, which leads to a 
decrease in the measurement error of the discretionary accruals. The modified DD 
model is estimated as: 
 
(2) 
tjtjtj
tjtjtjtj
PPESALES
CFCFCFACC
,,5,4
1,3,21,1,
                 ???
????
????
???? ??
    
where the additional variables are ?SALES, which denotes the change in sales 
from year t–1 to year t, and PPE is the gross value of property, plant, and equip-
ment at the end of year t. Similar to the DD model, the residual terms of (2) are 
used to measure the extent of earnings management. Following Dechow and 
Dichev (2002), all the variables used in both accruals models are scaled by the 
average of total assets between year t–1 and t. Following earlier literature (De-
Fond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Geiger & North, 2006), the 
signed discretionary accruals are examined in this study. Signed accruals give 
more specific information than the absolute accruals, which only reveal the extent 
of used earnings management, but do not specify whether the firm managed their 
earnings up- or downwards. 
After quantifying the level of earnings management, its relation to the executive 
turnover is examined with the following cross-sectional panel regressions: 
 
(3) 
tj
y
y
jy
k
jtjtj
TJtjtjtjtj
YEARSICSIZESGROWTH
MBLOSSLEVCHANGEDA
,
1-n
1k
2006
2005
k,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
           
            
?
????
?????
?
????
?????
? ?
? ?    
 
where DAj,t denotes discretionary accruals for firm j in year t. The test variable in 
the regression specification is the binary variable CHANGEj,t, which varies in 
different model specifications: (i) CHANGE gets a value of one if the firm’s CFO 
was replaced during the fiscal year. In all the following model specifications an 
executive change takes place and, instead, the genders of outgoing and incoming 
executives are focused on: (ii) INCFOUTGM is assigned to one if the incoming 
CFO is female and the outgoing male, (iii) INCMOUTGF equals one if female 
CFO is replaced by male, (iv) INCMOUTGM is one if both the old and new CFOs 
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are male, and (v) INCFOUTGF gets a value of one if the incoming and outgoing 
CFOs are both female. 
Following prior studies, several control variables are included in the model. LEVj,t 
is the financial leverage for firm j in year t, measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. LOSSj,t is a binary variable which is assigned to one if the firm’s net 
income during the fiscal year is negative. LEV and LOSS are both proxies for the 
financial state of the firm, as the previous literature has indicated differences in 
the earnings management based on the firm’s financial success. For example, 
Reynolds and Francis (2000), and Menon and Williams (2004) find that the firm’s 
financial health is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Moreover, 
for example Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) suggest that the accrual models 
may overestimate the amount of discretionary accruals for firms with financial 
troubles. Based on these studies, a negative relation between the proxies for the 
financial condition of the firm and discretionary accruals is expected. 
Two controls for the firm growth are included in the model: MBj,t is the market-
to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity, and 
SGROWTHj,t is the one-year sales growth rate. Earlier studies (see e.g., Geiger 
and North, 2006; Meek et al., 2007) have reported a positive impact of firm 
growth on the discretionary accruals. This finding is supported by the view sug-
gesting that the high-growth firms have typically less transparent governance 
practices and, thus, they may have greater possibilities for using opportunistic 
earnings management. 
Previous studies have indicated that the firm size (SIZEj,t), measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, is negatively related to earnings management. The larger 
firms are typically under a more thorough surveillance by the auditors and finan-
cial analysts, which may decrease their possibilities of intensive earnings man-
agement (Meek et al., 2007). Moreover, the often stronger governance mecha-
nisms of larger firms may prevent them from reporting overly opportunistic earn-
ings. Finally, SIC variables included in the model are the binary variables control-
ling for the industry effects, while YEAR variables are dummies for fiscal years. 
The panel regressions are estimated with White cross-section robust covariances 
in order to account for contemporaneous correlation and different variances in the 
disturbances of the cross-sections. A two-way fixed effects specification is used 
throughout the panel regressions in order to control for the industry effects and 
possible changes in earnings management over time. 
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4 Data 
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of S&P 1500 firms in 2004–
2006. Some of these firms experience a CFO change in one sample year, while a 
majority of the sample firms do not have a CFO turnover during the sample peri-
od. Following for example Geiger and North (2006), the financial institutions 
(SIC codes 6000–6900, 253 observations) are excluded from the sample due to 
their special features. Also firms with multiple CFO changes during the sample 
period (202 observations) are left out of the sample, as in those cases it is impos-
sible to identify the impact of a specific change on earnings management. Fur-
thermore, also observations with insufficient data (69 observations) are excluded 
from the sample. Thus, the final sample consists of 976 firms and 2928 firm-year 
observations. In total, 182 firms experienced a CFO turnover during the sample 
period.  
The data on CFO changes are hand-collected from AuditAnalytics database for 
years from 2004 to 2006. The financial statement data used in the analyses are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Financial Worldscope. The sample of CFO 
changes is introduced by year, industry and the incoming and outgoing CFO gen-
ders in Table 1. 
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As Table 1 demonstrates, in a great majority of the CFO changes both the incom-
ing and outgoing executives were males (156 observations). In 14 cases, a male 
CFO was replaced by a female, and in 10 firms the incoming CFO was male and 
the outgoing female. In addition, in only two firms a female CFO was replaced by 
a female and, thus, changes of this type cannot be further examined based on the 
small sample size. 
The summary statistics for the sample of S&P 1500 firms used in the empirical 
analysis are reported in Table 2. The non-binary variables are winsorized at the 
0.5 % and 99.5 % levels to ensure that the findings are not caused by a few outly-
ing observations. The first part of the table introduces the descriptive statistics for 
all the sample firms, while panels B–E present the statistics for the different types 
of CFO changes based on the incoming and outgoing executive genders.  
As can be seen from the table, for the subsample with an incoming female and 
outgoing male CFO, the discretionary accruals are, on average, lower than for the 
other subsamples and for the total sample with the CFO changes. This finding is 
in line with Peni and Vähämaa (2010) suggesting that firms with female CFOs 
tend to use income-decreasing reporting practices.  
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics.  
Table reports the summary statistics for the sample firms during the fiscal years 
2004–2006. Financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–6900), firms with multiple 
CFO changes during the sample period, and firms with inadequate data are ex-
cluded  from  the  sample.  Only  two  of  the  sample  firms  reported  a  CFO  change  
with both incoming and outgoing executives being females. Thus, the descriptive 
statistics for these types of changes are not tabulated. Panel F of the table reports 
the results for t-tests for differences in means for the total sample (descriptives in 
Panel A of the table) and the subsample of firms with CFO changes (Panel B of 
the table).  
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Panel A. Summary statistics for all firms (n=2928 observations)       
Variable  Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
DD model 0.000 -0.002 0.040 0.264 -0.294 
Modified DD model 0.000 -0.001 0.039 0.262 -0.263 
Leverage 0.485 0.500 0.208 1.573 -0.322 
Loss 0.031 0.000 0.175 1.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 4.068 2.630 18.586 831.080 -79.540 
Sales growth 17.167 12.513 22.163 491.438 -59.893 
Size 7.455 7.307 1.551 13.528 3.316 
            
Panel B. Summary statistics for all firms with a CFO change (n=182 observations)    
Variable  Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
DD model -0.009 -0.007 0.047 0.109 -0.294 
Modified DD model -0.009 -0.006 0.047 0.113 -0.263 
Leverage 0.484 0.508 0.218 1.052 -0.022 
Loss 0.013 0.000 0.113 1.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.388 2.470 5.506 58.640 -19.760 
Sales growth 15.026 11.939 16.904 97.618 -39.223 
Size 7.368 7.443 1.523 11.943 3.755 
            
Panel C. Incoming female CFO, outgoing male CFO  (n=14 observations)     
Variable  Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
DD model -0.018 -0.014 0.045 0.036 -0.160 
Modified DD model -0.015 -0.009 0.043 0.041 -0.153 
Leverage 0.513 0.489 0.202 0.915 0.113 
Loss 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 2.359 2.025 1.104 5.010 1.210 
Sales growth 12.078 8.332 14.133 33.466 -10.966 
Size 7.646 7.572 1.607 11.296 5.341 
            
Panel D. Incoming male CFO, outgoing female CFO (n=10 observations)     
Variable  Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
DD model 0.002 -0.008 0.025 0.039 -0.025 
Modified DD model 0.001 -0.006 0.025 0.038 -0.029 
Leverage 0.477 0.578 0.292 0.781 0.081 
Loss 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.218 3.285 1.604 5.270 1.320 
Sales growth 21.570 21.723 14.037 39.817 -0.183 
Size 7.385 6.913 1.804 10.222 5.585 
            
Panel E. Incoming male CFO, outgoing male CFO (n=156 observations)     
Variable  Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
DD model -0.009 -0.005 0.049 0.109 -0.294 
Modified DD model -0.009 -0.005 0.049 0.113 -0.263 
Leverage 0.479 0.506 0.215 1.052 -0.022 
Loss 0.015 0.000 0.123 1.000 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.089 2.465 3.445 20.260 -19.760 
Sales growth 14.901 11.884 17.372 97.618 -39.223 
Size 7.338 7.449 1.512 11.943 3.755 
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Table 2. cont. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Panel F. t-test for differences in means t-stat. p-value 
H0: DA1AllFirms = DA1CFOChangeFirms 3.20 0.00 
H0: DA2AllFirms = DA2CFOChangeFirms 3.59 0.00 
H0: LeverageAllFirms = LeverageCFOChangeFirms -0.77 0.44 
H0: LossAllFirms = LossCFOChangeFirms  1.38 0.17 
H0: MBAllFirms = MBCFOChangeFirms 0.49 0.62 
H0: SGrowthAllFirms = SGrowthCFOChangeFirms  1.04 0.30 
H0: SizeAllFirms = SizeCFOChangeFirms 0.08 0.94 
 
Panel F of Table 2 tabulates the t-tests for difference in means for the total sample 
and the firms with a CFO change. Interestingly, the table depicts that the firms 
with a CFO change have more income-decreasing discretionary accruals than the 
total sample firms.  
Table 3 reports the pairwise Pearson correlations for the sample firms. As can be 
expected, the alternative accrual measures (DA1 and DA2) are strongly positively 
correlated. The control variables leverage and size correlate positively (0.435), 
which indicates that, on average, the larger firms in the sample are more heavily 
leveraged. Naturally, the variable controlling for the CFO change (CHANGE) 
correlates positively with the dummies that determine the incoming and outgoing 
CFO genders. 
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5 Results 
 5.1  Regression results 
The results of the panel regressions on the relation between the CFO change and 
earnings management are reported in Table 4. As the table shows, the adjusted 
R2s vary from 6.4 % to 13.1 % for the regression specifications based on the DD 
model,  and  from 6.4  % to  9.8  % for  the  regressions  based  on  the  modified  DD 
model. 
In Models 2–4 of Table 4, the subsample of firms with a CFO change during the 
sample period is examined. Model 2 suggests that in case a male CFO is replaced 
by a female, the firm’s discretionary accruals are negatively influenced. In case of 
an outgoing female and incoming male CFO, there is a positive and significant 
relation between the CFO change and earnings management (see Model 3 in Ta-
ble 4). Finally, as Model 4 depicts, the male-male CFO changes also have a posi-
tive impact on the discretionary accruals. As mentioned earlier, the low number of 
observations with female-female CFO changes restrains from examining this type 
of changes in more detail.   
Table 4.  Regression results.  
The table reports the alternative versions of the following regression model: 
tj
y
y
jy
k
jtjtj
TJtjtjtjtj
YEARSICSIZESGROWTH
MBLOSSLEVCHANGEDA
,
1-n
1k
2006
2005
k,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
           
            
?
????
?????
?
????
?????
? ?
? ?
 
where DAj,t denotes the residual term from the employed accruals model for firm j 
in year t, LEVj,t is financial leverage, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the net income of firm j during the fiscal year t is negative, MBj,t is market-to-
book ratio, SGROWTHj,t is the sales growth rate, SIZEj,t is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, kjSIC  is a dummy variable according to industry classification (SIC) 
codes, and kjYEAR  is a dummy variable that indicates fiscal years. The dummy 
variables for CFO change are defined as follows: CHANGE is  one  if  the  firm’s  
CFO changes during the fiscal year, INCFOUTGM equals  one  if  a  male  CFO is  
replaced by a female, INCMOUTGF is set to one if the incoming CFO is a male 
and the outgoing a female, and INCMOUTGM equals one if both the new and old 
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CFOs are male. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote sig-
nificance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Regression results, accruals based on the DD model. 
    All firms Firms with a CFO change 
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant   0.006 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 *** -0.030 *** 
    (4.41)   -(4.41)   -(5.65)   -(6.09)   
Change variables:           
CHANGE ? -0.009 ***             
    -(8.35)               
INCFOUTGM ?     -0.008 ***         
        -(32.41)           
INCMOUTGF ?         0.024 ***     
 
          (48.02)       
INCMOUTGM ?             0.009 *** 
                (27.48)   
Control variables:                  
LEV - -0.024 *** -0.045 *** -0.045 *** -0.045 *** 
    -(7.17)   -(5.71)   -(5.78)   -(5.61)   
LOSS - -0.035 *** -0.058 * -0.056   -0.059 * 
    -(18.05)   -(1.72)   -(1.56)   -(1.86)   
MB + 0.000 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
    (11.34)   (8.23)   (8.93)   (8.41)   
SGROWTH + 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
    (11.70)   (3.73)   (4.15)   (3.57)   
SIZE - -0.002 *** 0.002 * 0.002 ** 0.002 * 
    -(5.01)   (1.92)   (2.04)   (1.95)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.131   0.065   0.078   0.064   
F-stat.   33.680 *** 2.173 ** 2.437 *** 2.160 ** 
n   2928   182   182   182   
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Table 4. cont. Regression results. 
Panel B. Regression results, accruals based on the modified DD model. 
    All firms Firms with a CFO change 
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant   -0.003   -0.035 *** -0.037 *** -0.043 *** 
    -(1.59)   -(8.69)   -(10.86)   -(10.83)   
Change variables:               
CHANGE ? -0.008 ***             
    -(9.67)               
INCFOUTGM ?     -0.006 ***         
        -(11.54)           
INCMOUTGF ?         0.023 ***     
 
          (30.00)       
INCMOUTGM ?             0.009 *** 
                (34.24)   
Control variables:               
LEV - -0.021 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** 
    -(7.08)   -(4.50)   -(4.56)   -(4.44)   
LOSS - -0.036 *** -0.071 * -0.069   -0.072 * 
    -(13.34)   -(1.74)   -(1.59)   -(1.83)   
MB + 0.001 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
    (13.11)   (7.57)   (8.13)   (7.69)   
SGROWTH + 0.000 *** 0.000   0.000   0.000   
    (6.20)   (0.70)   (0.69)   (0.68)   
SIZE - -0.000   0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
    -(0.64)   (3.68)   (3.96)   (3.72)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.098   0.064   0.076   0.064   
F-stat.   24.399 *** 2.159 ** 2.382 *** 2.155 ** 
n   2928   182   182   182   
  
The impact of the CFO gender on earnings management is further examined by 
estimating regressions models that include both the change dummy and a variable 
controlling for the incoming and outgoing CFO genders. These results are report-
ed in Table 5 and, in general, they indicate that, controlling for the CFO change, 
the outgoing and incoming CFO genders are important. In particular, these results 
are in line with Table 4 in suggesting that if a female CFO replaces a male, the 
discretionary accruals are negatively influenced. In contrast, if a male CFO re-
places either a female or a male, the discretionary accruals tend to increase.  
As a whole, the research hypotheses are supported by the findings reported in 
Tables 4 and 5.  These results are well  in line with Geiger and North (2006) and 
Jiang et al. (2010) introducing a significant influence of CFOs on earnings man-
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agement, and Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) reporting that 
firms with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing discretionary ac-
cruals. Thus, the findings suggest that the female executives follow less aggres-
sive reporting strategies. The results are further supported by the literature on 
gender-based differences for example in risk-taking, ethics, and conservatism (see 
e.g., Johnson and Powell, 1994; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Schubert, 2006; 
Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
Table 5.  Regression results.  
The table reports the alternative versions of the following regression model: 
 
tj
y
y
jy
k
jtjtj
TJtjtjtjtj
YEARSICSIZESGROWTH
MBLOSSLEVCHANGEDA
,
1-n
1k
2006
2005
k,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
            
             
?
????
?????
?
????
?????
? ?
? ?
 
where DAj,t denotes the residual term from the employed accruals model for firm j 
in year t, LEVj,t is financial leverage, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the net income of firm j during the fiscal year t is negative, MBj,t is market-to-
book ratio, SGROWTHj,t is the sales growth rate, SIZEj,t is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, kjSIC  is a dummy variable according to industry classification (SIC) 
codes, and kjYEAR  is a dummy variable that indicates fiscal years. The dummy 
variables for CFO change are defined as follows: CHANGE is  one  if  the  firm’s  
CFO changes during the fiscal year, INCFOUTGM equals  one  if  a  male  CFO is  
replaced by a female, INCMOUTGF is set to one if the incoming CFO is a male 
and the outgoing a female, and INCMOUTGM equals one if both the new and old 
CFOs are male. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote sig-
nificance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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    Accruals based on the DD model   
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant   0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 
    (4.67)   (4.02)   -(4.68)   
Change variables:               
CHANGE ? -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.011 *** 
    -(70.13)   -(3.57)   -(17.30)   
INCFOUTGM ? -0.009 ***         
    -(17.07)           
INCMOUTGF ?     0.013 ***     
      (4.99)       
INCMOUTGM  ?         0.004 *** 
            (5.84)   
Control variables:               
LEV - -0.024 *** -0.238 *** -0.024 *** 
    -(7.14)   -(7.14)   -(7.14)   
LOSS - -0.035 *** -0.035 *** -0.035 *** 
    -(17.85)   -(17.85)   -(17.84)   
MB + 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
    (11.49)   (11.20)   (11.43)   
SGROWTH + 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
    (11.63)   (11.76)   (11.64)   
SIZE - -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
    -(4.99)   -(4.98)   -(4.98)   
                
Adjusted R2   0.131   0.131   0.131   
F-stat.   31.148 *** 31.241 *** 31.107 *** 
n   2928   2928   2928   
 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
The findings tabulated in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that, in general, if a CFO change 
takes place, the incoming and outgoing CFO genders have an influence on the 
firm’s future earnings management. These findings are supported by additional 
analyses. The regressions are re-examined with non-winsorized data, and these 
estimation results (not tabulated) are in line with the reported results, thus sug-
gesting that firms with female CFOs follow less aggressive financial reporting 
strategies. 
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Table 5 cont. Regression results. 
    Accruals based on the modified DD model 
Variable Exp. sign Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant   -0.003 * -0.003   -0.003 * 
    -(1.67)   -(1.45)   -(1.66)   
Change variables:               
CHANGE ? -0.008 *** -0.010 *** -0.011 *** 
    -(57.72)   -(3.94)   -(19.85)   
INCFOUTGM ? -0.007 ***         
    -(13.32)           
INCMOUTGF ?     0.013 ***     
      (5.01)       
INCMOUTGM ?         0.003 *** 
            (5.49)   
Control variables:               
LEV - -0.020 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** 
    -(7.05)   -(7.05)   -(7.05)   
LOSS - -0.036 *** -0.036 *** -0.036 *** 
    -(13.25)   -(13.22)   -(13.23)   
MB + 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
    (13.29)   (12.89)   (13.22)   
SGROWTH + 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
    (6.17)   (6.23)   (6.16)   
SIZE - 0.000   0.000   0.000   
    -(0.65)   -(0.64)   -(0.64)   
                
Adjusted R2   0.098   0.098   0.098   
F-stat.   22.565 *** 22.660 *** 22.538 *** 
n   2928   2928   2928   
 
 
Similar tests are also conducted by using the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
as a dependent variable. These results based on absolute abnormal accruals (not 
tabulated) indicate that the CFO change in general tends to increase the absolute 
level of earnings management. In contrast, as Model 2 indicates, if a female CFO 
replaces a male, the level of earnings management decreases. Similarly, if the 
CFO changes from a female to a male, the level of earnings management is nega-
tively influenced (not statistically significantly when the accruals are based on the 
modified DD model). Finally, in the case of male-male CFO changes, the level of 
earnings management tends to increase. 
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5.3 Limitations 
Before corroborated by future research, several limitations need to be considered 
when interpreting the results of this exploratory study. Perhaps most importantly, 
the number of female executives in the CFO change observations is very small. 
As the previous studies have shown, the share of females in the executive level is 
low to begin with, and as here only the CFO changes are focused on, the female 
observations are scarce. In addition, because the firms with multiple CFO changes 
were eliminated from the sample due to the difficulties they would introduce in 
interpreting the results, the total sample on changes is limited. As the CFO change 
data are hand-collected, and additionally due to the unavailability of the data on 
smaller firms, extending the sample to smaller firms is not conceivable.  
Moreover, adding the recent years of financial turmoil period to the sample would 
overly increase the amount of firms with multiple CFO changes and, thus, the 
sample period is ended to 2006 (data for year 2007 are used in the accrual estima-
tions). This is supported by Crist and Kolder Associates’ report (2011) which 
indicates that currently the average tenure of an S&P 500 firm’s CFO is about 
five years. Moreover, they also document that the CFO volatility was particularly 
high during the recent financial crisis (19.8 % turnover rate in 2007 and 19.4 % in 
2008).  Since the firms with multiple CFO changes during the sample period are 
excluded from the analyses, these high volatility figures indicate that, if sample 
years were to be added, the number of sample firms would decrease significantly. 
Therefore, since extending the data is not reasonable, the low number of female 
CFO observations may reduce the statistical power of the conducted tests. 
Since the sample consists of the S&P 1500 firms, the results may not be applica-
ble to smaller firms or to firms operating outside the U.S. Moreover,  during the 
sample period the U.S. economy was in a phase of strong growth and, thus,  the 
results may not be applicable to recessionary periods.  
Often in the studies that focus on examining the impact of the executive gender 
on various matters, the presence of endogeneity cannot be ruled out. Here, the 
endogeneity problem is detracted by focusing on examining the CFO changes 
instead of the CFO gender as a constant variable.  It  is,  however,  possible that a 
self-selection bias distorts these findings, as certain types of firms may be more 
prone to hire a female CFO. Thus, it is possible that some correlated variables are 
omitted from the analyses, or that certain firm-specific characteristics simultane-
ously influence the CFO nomination decision and firm’s earnings management.  
Finally, despite using two separate, rather recently developed models of accrual 
estimation, it is to be noted that the chosen models may not provide perfect esti-
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mates on the use of earnings management since, for example, they do not separate 
the accruals based on whether their level was unexpected or not. However, as this 
paper aims to extend the work of Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa 
(2010), the focus is kept on the abnormal accruals instead of other possible 
measures of earnings management. This is in line for example with Geiger and 
North (2006), who state that discretionary accruals is the most appropriate meas-
ure of earnings management. Due to these limitations the results should be con-
sidered as exploratory, until corroborated by future research. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper examines the relation between a CFO change and earnings manipula-
tion in the S&P 1500 firms. In particular, the genders of the incoming and out-
going executives are focused on in estimating the impact of a CFO change on 
firm’s financial reporting practices. The earlier literature has provided evidence 
on  both  the  CFO  change  and  the  female  CFOs  impact  on  earnings  quality  (see  
e.g., Geiger and North, 2006; Barua et al., 2010; Peni and Vähämaa, 2010). The 
purpose of this paper is to combine these reported findings and to examine 
whether the executive gender has an impact on earnings management in case of a 
CFO change. Moreover, the widely documented gender-based differences for 
example in risk tolerance, ethics, and conservatism support the view of executive 
gender having an impact on the executive’s work. Thus, it is hypothesized that, in 
the case of a CFO turnover, there exists a relationship between earnings manage-
ment and the incoming and outgoing CFO genders. 
The findings documented in this paper in general indicate that the incoming and 
outgoing CFO genders influence the firm’s earnings management. Based on the 
employed two-way fixed effects panel regressions, it is suggested that CFO 
change is negatively associated with the discretionary accruals of the firm. If only 
the firms with CFO changes during the sample period are focused on, it can be 
proposed that the firms with incoming female and outgoing male CFOs tend to 
follow less agressive reporting practices following the turnover. Contrarily, if a 
CFO of either gender is replaced by a male, the discretionary accruals of the firm 
are positively influenced.  
Thus, based on the reported findings it can be concluded that the CFO gender has 
an impact on earnings management and, consistently with Barua et al. (2010) and 
Peni and Vähämaa (2010), that firms with female CFOs tend to follow more con-
servative financial reporting strategies. Overall, the results are in line with the 
psychology literature on the gender-based differences for example in risk toler-
 Acta Wasaensia     119 
 
 
 
 
ance, conservatism, and ethics. Finally, the findings provide further support on 
gender-based differences in the executive performance and, thus, suggest that 
these well-documented differences between males and females may also have 
important implications in the executive level. 
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AUDITOR’S GENDER AND AUDIT FEES? 
 
This essay is joint work with Kim Ittonen and it has been accepted  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Documented behavioral differences between women and men suggest (see e.g. 
Davidson & Gist, 1996; Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; Schubert, 2006; Bonner, 2008) 
that the gender of the audit engagement partner may have implications for the 
price  setting  of  the  audit.  Thus,  this  paper  examines  the  effect  of  the  auditor’s  
gender on audit fees in an environment, where the responsible audit partners can 
be identified. Using a sample of public firms from the NASDAQ OMX exchang-
es in three Nordic countries, we find evidence indicating that firms with female 
audit engagement partners have significantly higher audit fees. Although this is an 
interesting finding, it should be interpreted with caution since there is no clear 
theoretical explanation to support it. Potential reasons are introduced, such as the 
gender differences in risk tolerance, which may affect the pricing decisions by 
increasing the audit investment and/or increasing the audit fee risk premium. Al-
ternatively, female auditors’ diligence, lower overconfidence, and higher level of 
preparation could also lead to an increase in audit investment, and thereby result 
in higher audit fees.  
 
Keywords: audit fees, gender-based differences, psychological characteristics 
 
Summary 
This  paper  examines  the  effect  of  the  audit  engagement  partner’s  gender  on  the  
audit fees in an environment, where the audit partner(s) responsible for the audit 
can be identified. Prior audit fee studies have focused on the effects of client 
characteristics, audit firm characteristics, and the engagement attributes on audit 
fees. Moreover, the audit fee literature concentrating on e.g. the Big-4 premiums 
and industry specialization has for long assumed that the pricing of an engage-
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ment is identical across the entire audit firm. However, in more recent literature 
the focus has increasingly been on examining how office level attributes affect 
audit fees. This study goes one step further by considering the individual audit 
engagement partner’s potential effect on the audit fees.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the gender of the auditor has an 
effect  on  the  fees  paid  by  the  client.  More  specifically,  it  is  of  interest  to  study  
whether the documented gender differences e.g. in cognitive functioning and risk 
preferences impact the audit engagement partner’s decisions on the audit invest-
ment and/or audit fee risk premium, and thereby affect audit fees.  
Using  a  sample  of  public  firms  from  the  NASDAQ  OMX  exchanges  in  three  
Nordic countries, namely Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, we find exploratory 
evidence indicating that firms with female audit engagement partners have signif-
icantly higher audit fees than firms with male auditors. Since the existing litera-
ture does not provide a clear theoretical explanation for this finding, the interpre-
tations should be made with caution. Our results may, however, suggest that gen-
der differences in risk tolerance influence the pricing decisions by causing either 
an increase in the audit investment and/or an increase in the risk premium of audit 
fees. Alternatively, female auditors’ diligence and higher level of preparation 
could also lead to an increase in the audit investment, and thereby result in higher 
audit fees. However, it should be noted that because the theoretical background of 
the study is drawn from management, psychology, and finance literature, the re-
ported findings are somewhat exploratory.  
1 Introduction 
The vast majority of previous studies on audit fees have focused on the effects of 
client characteristics, audit firm characteristics, and the engagement attributes on 
audit fees. The literature on audit fees assumes that the pricing of an engagement 
may be affected e.g. by the characteristics of the audit firm or office. Given that 
there may exist differences in individual auditors’ attributes that could have an 
effect on the pricing of the audit engagement, e.g. distinctions in engagement 
planning, negotiation skills, team management capabilities, and risk preferences, 
more research in this area is called for (e.g. DeFond & Francis, 2005).  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the gender of the auditor has an 
effect on the fees paid by the client. More specifically, we focus on studying 
whether and how the gender of the audit engagement partner affects the fees paid 
to the external auditors. If the audit partners can be associated with gender differ-
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ences e.g. in cognitive functioning, decision-making, leadership style, and risk 
preferences (Wood et al., 1985; Johnson & Powell, 1994; Eagly & Carli, 2003; 
Schubert, 2006) which may affect the decisions on the audit investment, the audit 
fees could be affected by the gender of the audit engagement partner.4  
The potential consequences of gender differences have been subject to an increas-
ing interest in the recent corporate finance literature. The findings indicate, for 
instance, that female directors have to demonstrate superior competence to reach 
top positions (Eagly & Carli, 2003), they have higher expectations regarding their 
responsibilities and, thus, prepare themselves for the tasks more thoroughly (Fon-
das & Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006), women tend to be less overconfi-
dent than men (Bonner, 2008) and, finally, women are more risk averse than men 
(Levin, et al., 1988; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Schubert, 2006). The possible 
gender-based differences in all of these areas could have an impact on the fees 
paid by the audit clients. As a consequence, it is important to empirically investi-
gate the relationship between auditor gender and audit fees to find evidence on 
whether and how the audit engagement partner characteristics affect the audit 
fees.  
We conduct this study by focusing on the listed firms in three Nordic countries: 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. In these countries, the responsible audit engage-
ment partners’ names, as well as the names of the audit firms they are represent-
ing are mandatory information on the audit reports. This is in contrast with many 
other  countries,  for  instance  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.,  where  only  the  name of  the  
audit firm is printed on the audit report.  
Using a sample of 715 firm-year observations from NASDAQ OMX listed firms, 
we find evidence suggesting that firms with female audit engagement partners 
have significantly higher audit fees. Thus, in general, our empirical findings indi-
cate that the auditor’s gender may have an impact on audit fees. The results are 
interesting, however, interpretations should be made keeping in mind that there is 
no clear theoretical background for this finding and, therefore, more research is 
needed. The findings are consistent with the existing studies suggesting that 
women are on average more risk averse than men. The previous audit fee studies 
indicate that the risk tolerance of the audit partner may affect the audit fees in two 
ways: it could affect the level of the audit investment (e.g. audit effort), or the risk 
premium of the engagement may be influenced (Houston et al. 1999, 2005; John-
                                               
 
4  It should be noted that we assume that the individual audit partners are able to influence the 
audit fees.  Nevertheless, the audit engagement partner effects may be mitigated due to the 
competition in the audit market. Consequently, the analysis is largely exploratory in nature.  
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stone & Bedard, 2001, 2003). Thus, in both cases, a higher level of risk aversion 
may lead to a higher level of audit fees. Due to the fact that our theoretical back-
ground is based on evidence from psychology, management, and finance litera-
ture, and this issue has not been addressed previously in audit research, the re-
ported empirical findings should be considered largely exploratory in nature.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and presents our research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data on the 
OMX listed firms and presents the methodology used in the analysis. The empiri-
cal findings on the effect of auditor gender on audit fees are reported in Section 4. 
Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
2 Related literature and hypothesis 
2.1 Audit partners, gender, and audit fees 
The existing literature suggests that audit fees are to a large extent a function of 
audit team labor hours, audit team labor costs per hour, and a risk component. 
Following Francis’ (2004) motivation concerning the shift from firm-level analy-
sis to office-level analysis, it may be warranted to go one level further and con-
sider how the characteristics of individual audit partners, such as the gender of the 
audit partner, can affect the audit investment component (i.e. the number of audit 
hours) and the risk component of the audit fees.  
The requirements for an adequate audit and the responsibilities of the engagement 
partner are regulated comprehensively. The International Standards of Auditing 
(ISA) (IAASB, 2009; ISA 220 and ISA 300) state that the audit partner is respon-
sible for the overall quality of each engagement s/he is assigned to. The responsi-
ble audit partner should plan the nature, timing, and extent of guidance and su-
pervision of team members, and to review their work. The audit partner also 
needs to be assured that the engagement team has the required capabilities, com-
petence, and time to perform the audit according to the professional standards and 
regulatory requirements. According to ISA requirements, the audit partner is re-
quired to use an appropriate consultation and include specialized experts to the 
team in the case of complicated or contentious matters.5 
                                               
 
5 We conducted an interview with two Finnish certified public accountants (CPA) from different 
Big-4 firms about the role of the engagement partners in audit team. These auditors are responsi-
ble for auditing multiple NASDAQ OMX listed firms. Our interviews indicate that, at least in the 
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Additionally, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (IESBA, 2009) 
states that the audit engagement partner is responsible for setting the audit fee at a 
level which allows a sufficient amount of resources to be invested in the engage-
ment. The Code emphasizes that there are no circumstances under which the 
amount of the audit fee can justify the lack of resources or time to properly per-
form the audit. As a consequence, individual behavioral attributes could have an 
effect on the engagement partner’s estimation of the required work amount. Thus, 
gender differences in risk aversion may lead female auditors to demand higher 
audit fees simply because they require a higher level of assurance, i.e. more work.  
The audit process consists of four major phases: 1) planning, 2) risk assessment, 
3) conducting the audit, and 4) evaluating the results and issuing the report. In 
defining the size of the audit fee, particularly the decisions and assessments made 
during the first two phases are important. According to the professional regula-
tion, the audit partner is responsible for the decisions related to the whole auditing 
process.  
The documented behavioral differences between women and men e.g. in plan-
ning, group decision-making, risk tolerance, or overconfidence may affect the 
formation of the audit fee. Davidson and Gist (1996) examine how audit planning 
can affect  the labor hour component of audit  fees.  They find that audit  planning 
reduces the total audit effort up to a certain level, and thereafter increases the au-
dit hours spent on an engagement. Additionally, they report that clients with high-
er assessed riskiness require more planning. According to the literature on gender 
differences, there may be features related to gender, which affect the planning of 
the audit engagement. First, Huse and Solberg (2006) argue that women in high 
positions, such as corporate boards, are better prepared for meetings than men. 
Second, women tend to have higher expectations regarding their responsibilities 
(Fondas & Sassalos, 2000), and they have to demonstrate extra competence to 
reach top positions (Eagly & Carli, 2003). Third, women have better communica-
tive skills and may, as a consequence, have a comparative advantage over men in 
tasks where communication within and among different groups is required (see 
e.g., Wood et al., 1985; Maznevski, 1994; Fondas, 1997; Schubert, 2006). Thus, 
                                                                                                                                
 
Finnish setting, the engagement partners are responsible for all the decisions that affect the price 
of the engagement. According to our interviewees, the responsible auditor determines, for exam-
ple, the amount of experienced members in the audit team, the total audit team effort, the need for 
using external experts, and the client risk margin. As the price of the audit consists of these ele-
ments, it seems reasonable to assume that the responsible audit partner has an impact on the audit 
fees.  
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women tend to perform better in group problem-solving and decision-making 
tasks (Wood et al., 1985, Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Dallas, 2002). Communica-
tion skills may also give female auditors a comparative advantage over men in 
client negotiations concerning the engagement and, thus, female auditors may be 
able to sell a higher level of assurance to the client. Consequently, gender differ-
ences among audit partners may have an effect on both the audit planning as well 
as the audit process and, therefore, the gender of the audit partner may affect the 
amount of hours the audit team spends on an engagement. If the female auditors 
use significantly more time in planning the task, it may increase the audit fees, 
whereas a reasonable investment in planning may reduce the audit effort and, 
thus, also the audit fees.  
Many studies propose that women are more conservative and risk averse than 
men (see e.g., Levin et al., 1988; Johnson & Powell, 1994; Powell & Ansic, 1997; 
Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Byrnes et al., 1999). Schubert (2006) suggests 
that women try to avoid losses and therefore tend to take less extreme risks. Plan-
ning an audit engagement includes the assessment of the inherent risk, control 
risk, and setting the detection risk, which are done by the engagement partner. 
The risk assessments are used for audit planning decisions concerning the nature, 
timing, and extent of audit evidence testing. Houston et al. (1999, 2005) and 
Johnstone and Bedard (2001, 2003) show that auditors address changes in differ-
ent aspects of risk by adapting the audit investment and/or the risk premium. Con-
sequently, if there are gender differences in the risk assessment process, risk tol-
erance, or assessment of the persuasiveness of evidence, female audit engagement 
partners could have higher audit fees because of the increased audit investment 
and/or the risk premium.  
Evidence from psychology research indicates that, in general, people tend to 
overestimate their knowledge and abilities (Fischhoff et al., 1977; Lichtenstein et 
al., 1982). Kennedy and Peecher (1997), Messier et al. (2008), and Owhoso and 
Weickgenannt (2009) find evidence of overconfidence at all levels of the audit 
team, namely partners, managers, seniors, and staff. Moreover, auditors seem to 
be overconfident in their own knowledge and abilities, as well as the abilities of 
other team members. Given that overconfidence exists also among the audit part-
ners, as reported by Kennedy and Peecher (1997), Bonner, (2008), Messier et al. 
(2008), and Owhoso and Weickgenannt (2009), it may affect the audit engage-
ment partner’s decisions on the audit investment during the audit procedures, or 
the audit fee risk premium. The earlier literature indicates that men are generally 
more overconfident than women, particularly in masculine domains (see Bonner, 
2008 for a review). Thus, the gender differences in overconfidence may also 
cause female audit partners to charge higher fees.   
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Despite  the  recent  gender  equality  development,  the  world  of  business  is  still  
mainly a world of men. Thus, because the literature has reported a tendency of 
executives to hire subordinates like him/herself (see e.g. Anderson-Gough et al., 
2005), it can be more difficult for female auditors to achieve high positions, such 
as partnerships (Fogarty, 1996; Collin et al., 2007). This may lead to the females 
having fewer possibilities to charge higher fees, and thus a negative relationship 
between female auditors and audit fees could exist. Finally, if the well-
documented gender wage gap also affects the audit fees, the female auditors could 
be associated with lower audit fees (e.g. Blau et al., 1992, 2000; Munasinghe et 
al., 2008). However, particularly in the engagements with large audit teams, the 
gender wage gap may not necessarily have any significant effect in the audit pric-
ing context, as the salary of the responsible audit partner is only a part of the total 
audit fees charged from the client. 
Finally, it should be noted that the audit market is highly competitive, and poten-
tial individual partner effects may be mitigated by the firm level competition and 
audit tenders. Thus, due to the market competition the individual auditors may not 
necessarily have any effect on audit fees. Also, the exploratory nature of the study 
may influence the interpretation of the results. 
2.2 Hypothesis 
The existing literature indicates that audit fees are a function of audit staff effort, 
audit staff labor costs, and client risk (see e.g. Niemi, 2002; Hackenbrack & Ho-
gan, 2005).  As the audit fee is preliminarily determined before the audit engage-
ment, it is calculated using budgeted hours of each grade of auditing personnel 
and budgeted unit prices. However, due to the nature of audit fee formation, plan-
ning and risk-assessment can significantly impact the final audit fee. 
Given the components affecting the audit fees and assuming that individual audit 
engagement partner characteristics may have an effect on decisions regarding the 
audit fees, it is of interest to examine the relationship between the gender of the 
audit engagement partner and audit fees. Thus, the hypothesis to be examined in 
this paper is: 
H1: There is a relation between the gender of the audit engagement partner 
and the audit fees.  
If there indeed exists an association between the gender of the audit engagement 
partner and the audit fees, it may be either positive or negative, as suggested by 
the gender-based differences reported in earlier studies. A positive relation is sup-
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ported by the literature suggesting that the diligence, more thorough preparation, 
lower level of overconfidence, and the higher risk aversion of females would im-
ply that women require a higher level of audit investment or risk premium, there-
by leading to an increase in the audit fees (Wood et al. 1985; Levin et al. 1988; 
Blau et al., 1992, 2000; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Huse et al., 2006; Schubert, 2006; 
Bonner, 2008; Munasinghe et al., 2008). Furthermore, the better communication 
skills of females (see e.g., Wood et al., 1985; Maznevski, 1994; Fondas, 1997; 
Schubert, 2006) may give them an advantage in the bidding phase, as they may be 
able to convince the client to accept a higher priced audit, or for example to reas-
sure the client that a more thorough and thus also more costly audit has to be per-
formed.  
 By contrast, however, also a negative relationship between female auditors and 
audit fees is supported by the earlier studies. Provided that the audit fees are a 
function of audit  team effort,  audit  team labor costs,  and client risk,  the existing 
literature on gender differences suggests that better communication and team 
work skills of women, together with the gender wage gap, may reduce the effort 
needed and, as a result, decrease the cost of the audit engagement (see e.g., Wood 
et al., 1985; Blau et al., 1992, 2000; Maznevski, 1994; Fondas, 1997; Schubert, 
2006). Thus, the proposed superior communication skills of females may cause 
differences in audit fees for either direction. Moreover, the tendency for homophi-
ly in the hiring process of audit partners may give women less opportunities for 
charging high audit fees and, thus, lead to a negative relationship between female 
auditors and audit fees (Anderson-Gough et al., 2005). Finally, the potential part-
ner effects may be cancelled out by the competition in the audit market. Thus, this 
empirical study is largely exploratory in nature. 
3 Data and methodology  
The initial sample used in the empirical analysis consists of 1210 firm-year ob-
servations from firms listed in the NASDAQ OMX exchanges in Denmark, Fin-
land, and Sweden as of the end of 2007. OMX Nordic Exchange is a part of the 
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc that operates in the Nordic and Baltic countries. The 
data used in the analysis cover the fiscal years 2005–2006. Following prior re-
search, we exclude financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–6900) from the sample 
due to their unique features (396 firm-year observations excluded). Next, we ex-
clude observations with insufficient data (99 observations excluded). This leaves 
us with a sample of 715 engagements from two years, which are classified by 
country and industry in Table 1.  
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We utilize data from these countries because of the regulatory feature they pro-
vide for studying how the characteristics of an audit engagement partner affect the 
charges of the audit services. In the Nordic countries, the auditors are required to 
personally sign the audit reports on behalf of the audit firm and, thus, we are able 
to identify the audit partner(s) responsible for each engagement. This is in con-
trast  with  the  regulation  in  many  other  countries,  e.g.  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.,  
where  only  the  name  of  the  audit  firm  responsible  for  the  audit  is  public  infor-
mation. Interestingly, the issue of publishing the audit engagement partner signa-
tures  is  on  the  agenda  of  the  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Board  
(PCAOB) and, as a consequence, the engagement partner signatures may become 
obligatory in the United States as well (PCAOB, 2009). 
The data on audit engagement partner gender are manually gathered from the 
firms’ audit reports. In the Nordic countries, the audit report must be signed by at 
least one auditor, even if an audit firm is appointed. The signing auditor(s) is (are) 
here defined as the engagement partner(s), and by reviewing the signatory audi-
tors’ names the gender of the engagement partner(s) can be identified. For some 
engagements,  the audit  report  is  signed by more than one auditor from the same 
firm and in some cases also from two separate firms. In the engagements with 
multiple auditors signing the audit report, the clients have voluntarily opted for 
more than one audit partner or for more than one audit firm for the engagement.  
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The legislation does not necessitate joint audits or multiple audit engagement 
partners in any of the three countries. The Danish legislation, however, required 
joint auditing (two audit firms) for the listed firms until the end of 2004 and, as a 
consequence, compared to the other two countries the Danish firms still have joint 
auditing more often. Opting for a joint audit may also be caused by financial mat-
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ters, as suggested by Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008). Their results indicate that 
joint audits, where both auditors are responsible for a significant part of the audit 
task, tend to reduce audit fees in larger firms, as compared to audits where one 
auditor is in charge of the audit. Additionally, it is worth noting that, consistent 
with most of the other markets around the world, a great majority of the firms in 
our sample are audited by Big-4 auditors. 
The legal environment, as well as the listing requirements concerning corporate 
governance, financial reporting, and auditing in the three sample countries (Den-
mark, Finland, and Sweden) are relatively homogenous and, thus, they can be 
analyzed as one group. La Porta et al. (1998) consider the Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to have similar laws to each other, but 
distinct from other countries. In contrast, Sinani et al. (2008) find significant dif-
ferences in the formal board and ownership structures between the Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). The main difference in ownership 
structure of the Nordic companies is that the Swedish firms have, on average, a 
higher proportion of family ownership, whereas the state ownership is higher in 
Denmark and Finland (La Porta et al. 1998; Sinani et al. 2008). Moreover, the 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Statistics from year 2007 reveal that based on 
the market capitalization, measured in the number of firms, as well as the total 
value of the yearly trades, the Swedish stock exchange alone is as big as the Finn-
ish  and  Danish  exchanges  together.  This  can  also  be  noted  from our  sample,  as  
over half of it consists of Swedish firms (NASDAQ OMX, 2008).  
 However, despite the observed differences in formal structures, Sinani et al. 
(2008) suggest that the corporate governance practices have strong similarities in 
these countries. The reason for this, according to Sinani et al. (2008), is the simi-
larity in key corporate governance characteristics, such as trust, quality of en-
forcement, absence of corruption, quality of government, and freedom of speech, 
which are all results of the countries’ equal small size and ethnical homogeneity. 
Our sample countries have close similarities in the requirements for becoming a 
CPA and, moreover, they comply with the Eight Directive of the European Un-
ion. In all of the three sample countries, before being certified the auditors need to 
have the required theoretical education, professional experience, and a passed 
practical examination.  
The relationship between audit fees and the gender of the responsible auditor is 
examined by employing cross-sectional panel regressions. Consistent with the 
literature on audit fees (see e.g. Simunic 1980; Abbot et al. 2003), our model in-
cludes firm-specific variables to control for the known factors affecting audit fees. 
Furthermore, we also control for the industry-, country-, and year-specific factors 
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by including corresponding control variable dummies in the equation. Thus, the 
following model is applied to examine the possible relation between auditor gen-
der and audit fees: 
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 where AFEEj,t denotes the natural logarithm of audit  fees for firm j at t, 
INVRECj,t is the receivable and inventory intensity, LEVj,t is the percentage of 
total debt to total assets, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable which equals one if the net 
income of firm j during year t is negative, SIZEj,t is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, ROAj,t is the percentage of  return on assets, FOROPj,t is the percentage of 
foreign assets (i.e. the assets owned by the firm abroad) to total assets, JOINTj,t is 
a dummy variable,  which gets a value of one if  at  least  two audit  partners from 
different audit firms signed the audit report and each is responsible for a mini-
mum of 20 % of the task, CHANGEj,t is a binary variable, which is one if the re-
sponsible audit firm(s) changed compared to the previous year, BIG4j,t is a dum-
my variable, which is assigned to one if the responsible audit firm is one of the 
Big-4 group and, thus, the variable is considered to control for the auditor reputa-
tion and quality6, NASj,t is the natural logarithm of non-audit service fees,  
YEAR2005 is a binary variable that indicates fiscal years, kjSIC   is a dummy varia-
ble according to industry classification (SIC) codes, and cjCOUNTRY   is a dummy 
variable indicating the company’s country of origin. The data on the financial 
control variables are obtained from Thomson Financial Worldscope, and the data 
on audit firm-specific factors are manually gathered from the firms’ annual re-
ports.  
The test variable in our equation is the female representation variable FEMj,t , 
which varies in different model specifications. We define four binary variables 
and a ratio to measure female audit engagement partner representation, and mod-
                                               
 
6  Several studies indicate that Big-4 firms provide a better quality audit, since their clients are 
documented to for example have a better earnings quality (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Wang, 2008). Big-4 auditors are suggested to be more sensi-
tive to the costs caused by client misreporting and its impact on auditor reputation, and are 
therefore suggested to enforce higher earnings quality (Francis & Wang, 2008). 
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els from 2 to 6 are organized in an order of decreasing  female representation: 
FGROUP equals one if only women are acting as responsible auditors, FRATIO 
measures the share of female auditors compared to the number of auditors signing 
the audit report, FDUM equals one if a female audit partner participates in or is 
responsible for signing the audit report alone or together with a male, MIXED is 
set to one if a female audit partner is engaged with a male audit partner, and 
MGROUP is set to one if only male auditors sign the audit report. Only one fe-
male representation variable is included in the equation at a time in order to avoid 
possible multicollinearity problems. Therefore, we estimate six different regres-
sion specifications, where female variables are as follows: (i) no female variable, 
(ii) FGROUP, (iii) FRATIO, (iv) FDUM, (v) MIXED, and (vi) MGROUP. The 
data on female representation are gathered from the annual reports of the firms. 
Throughout the panel regressions, a three-way fixed-effects specification is used, 
because it allows for a different intercept for each industry in the sample. The 
method also controls for the country-specific effects and for the possible change 
in audit fees from one year to another. Moreover, in order to account for contem-
poraneous correlation and different variances in the disturbances of each cross-
section, we employ the White cross-section robust covariances in the regression 
specifications. 
4 Results 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the female audit engagement partner variables, as 
well as for the control variables, are reported in Table 2. Panel A shows the statis-
tics for the entire sample of 715 observations. The statistics demonstrate that the 
observations are relatively heterogeneous in all respects. For example, the largest 
audit fees paid amounts up to 14.491 million Euros, whereas the smallest fee is 
only 0.004 million Euros. In terms of total assets the range is from 0.513 million 
to 41.528 billion Euros. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for four sub-samples of the 
observations, which are categorized by female audit engagement partner represen-
tation. Some interesting remarks can be made on this table. For example, in the 
three sub-samples with female audit partner representation the means and medi-
ans of audit fees, total fees, and total assets are in general smaller than in the sam-
ple as a whole. The median values of the mixed group are an exception to this, as 
the median values are larger for the mixed sub-sample than for the sample as a 
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whole. Furthermore, it can be noted that the firms in the sub-sample with only 
male auditors are larger in terms of both audit  fees and total  assets.  Finally,  one 
interesting remark is that in the sub-sample with female audit partners only, the 
mean of LOSS is significantly higher than in the sample as a whole or the other 
sub-samples. In Panel C, we tabulate the summary statistics by country. There are 
significant differences between countries in the amount of leverage and joint au-
diting. Furthermore, fewer of the Finnish firms have reported loss and they have a 
higher proportion of foreign operations than the sample in general (significance 
levels noted by *s).  
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the regressions. 
As expected, SIZE is strongly correlated with our dependent variable audit fees 
(and total fees). Additionally, SIZE is negatively correlated with LOSS. FOROP is 
positively correlated with audit fees and total fees, which is natural, as firms with 
significant international operations require a more time-consuming and, thus, a 
more expensive audit, which again increases the audit fees. Not surprisingly, our 
female representation variables are correlated with each other.  
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics.  
Panel A of the table contains the descriptive statistics for 715 firm-year observa-
tions for firms listed in OMX Nordic Exchange. Financial institutions (SIC codes 
6000-6900) are excluded. Panel B reports the statistics for sub-samples with dif-
ferent female audit engagement partner involvement. Panel C reports the statistics 
for three country specific samples. The statistically significant differences be-
tween total sample in Panel A and subsamples in Panels B and C are denoted by 
asterisks. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Swedish (SEK) and Danish Kronas (DKK) are converted into Euros 
using fiscal year end exchange rates. TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees 
charged by the auditor, AFEE denotes the natural log of audit fees, SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets, INVREC is the receivable and inventory intensity, LEV  
is the percentage of total debt to total assets, LOSS is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the net income of firm is negative, ROA is the percentage of  return 
on assets, FOROP is the percentage of foreign assets to total assets, JOINT is a 
dummy variable, which gets a value of one if at least two audit partners from dif-
ferent audit firms signed the audit report, CHANGE is a binary variable which is 
one if the responsible audit firm(s) changed compared to the previous year, BIG4 
is a dummy variable which is assigned to one if the responsible audit firm is one 
of the BIG4 group, and NAS is the natural log of non-audit service fees.   
 
Panel A. Summary statistics for all firms (n=715 observations)       
Variable Mean   Median  Max Min Std.dev. 
Total fees (in € millions, TOTFEE)  0.970 0.247 19.500 0.008 2.116 
Audit fees (in € millions, AFEE) 0.602   0.162 14.491 0.004 1.339 
Total assets (in € millions, SIZE) 998.335   82.172 41528.300 0.513 3415.356 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 
(INVREC) 0.372   0.373 0.888 0.002 0.197 
Leverage (LEV) 21.374   18.366 447.543 0.000 23.359 
Loss (LOSS) 0.213   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.409 
Return on assets (ROA) 3.285   7.048 125.015 -158.003 22.356 
Foreign assets (FOROP) 18.890   0.000 99.776 0.000 25.977 
Joint auditing (JOINT) 0.077   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.267 
Auditor change (CHANGE) 0.049   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.216 
Big-4 (BIG4) 0.918   1.000 1.000 0.000 0.274 
Non-audit services (NAS) 0.367   0.081 14.300 0.000 0.942 
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Table 2 cont. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel B. Summary statistics based on the female auditor representation        
Variable Mean    Median  Max  Min  St.dev.  
Female Dummy (n=92 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 0.714   0.171 7.800 0.018 1.285 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.432   0.137 4.900 0.015 0.750 
Total assets (in € millions) 563.733   80.977 15189.000 3.228 1721.620 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.357   0.353 0.772 0.010 0.200 
Leverage 20.855   18.256 78.274 0.000 18.171 
Loss 0.261   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.442 
Return on assets 6.745   8.274 106.821 -77.231 21.047 
Foreign assets 13.577   0.000 90.607 0.000 23.410 
Joint auditing 0.055   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.229 
Auditor change 0.033   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.180 
Big-4 0.956   1.000 1.000 0.000 0.206 
Non-audit services 0.282   0.058 3.200 0.000 0.560 
              
Female Group (n=34 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 0.572   0.105 7.800 0.018 1.672 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.339   0.061 4.900 0.015 0.969 
Total assets (in € millions) 509.797   15.286 15189.000 3.228 2596.655 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.259   0.218 0.723 0.010 0.176 
Leverage 21.307   19.329 55.196 0.000 16.620 
Loss 0.353   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.485 
Return on assets 5.278   7.134 106.821 -65.299 26.382 
Foreign assets 5.141   0.000 54.512 0.000 14.064 
Joint auditing 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Auditor change 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Big-4 0.882 *  1.000 1.000 0.000 0.327 
Non-audit services 0.233   0.033 3.200    0.000 0.723 
 
Firms with mixed (n= 58 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 0.797   0.278 4.560 0.035 0.999 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.487   0.185 2.414 0.023 0.588 
Total assets (in € millions) 595.351   183.274 3921.619 4.219 908.619 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.414   0.461 0.772 0.023 0.192 
Leverage 20.591   18.123 78.274 0.000 19.158 
Loss 0.207   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.409 
Return on assets 7.621   8.326 74.721 -77.231 17.311 
Foreign assets 18.522   0.000 90.607 0.000 26.326 
Joint auditing 0.086   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.283 
Auditor change 0.052   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.223 
Big-4 1.000 **  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Non-audit services 0.311   0.091 2.146 0.008 0.442 
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Table 2 cont. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel C. Summary statistics for firms by country           
Variable Mean   Median  Max Min Std.dev. 
Denmark (n= 154 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 1.006   0.305 10.053 0.008 1.693 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.540   0.192 4.560 0.007 0.853 
Total assets (in € millions) 1272.254   163.817 41528.300 0.644 4773.912 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.386   0.396 0.888 0.008 0.233 
Leverage 27.836  *** 23.187 447.543 0.000 38.911 
Loss 0.234   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.425 
Return on assets 2.433   6.034 74.721 -158.003 23.152 
Foreign assets 18.877   0.000 99.776 0.000 26.022 
Joint auditing 0.258  *** 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.439 
Auditor change 0.099  * 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.300 
Big-4 0.882   1.000 1.000 0.000 0.324 
Non-audit services 0.466   0.133 6.568 0.000 0.898 
Finland (n= 168 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 1.125   0.293 19.500 0.025 2.312 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.630   0.183 5.300 0.018 1.045 
Total assets (in € millions) 783.393   8.741 21606.000 2.552 2810.899 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.382   0.391 0.844 0.023 0.170 
Leverage 24.209   23.653 69.904 0.000 15.250 
Loss 0.131  ** 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.338 
Return on assets 4.617   7.718 125.015 -116.833 21.076 
Foreign assets 21.280  ** 13.351 84.777 0.000 23.861 
Joint auditing 0.012  *** 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.111 
Auditor change 0.037   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.189 
Big-4 0.946   1.000 1.000 0.000 0.226 
Non-audit services 0.495   0.095 14.300 0.000 1.400 
            
Sweden (n=  393 observations)             
Total fees (in € millions) 0.889   0.213 18.251 0.010 2.178 
Audit fees (in € millions) 0.615   0.142 14.491 0.004 1.586 
Total assets (in € millions) 982.881   86.331 27848.770 0.513 2989.247 
Inventory and receivables to total assets 0.361   0.362 0.861 0.002 0.192 
Leverage 17.631  *** 14.144 77.582 0.000 16.430 
Loss 0.239   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.427 
Return on assets 3.044   7.161 106.821 -150.929 22.605 
Foreign assets 17.874   0.000 98.625 0.000 26.811 
Joint auditing 0.032  *** 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.176 
Auditor change 0.034   0.000 1.000 0.000 0.183 
Big-4 0.921   1.000 1.000 0.000 0.271 
Non-audit services 0.274   0.056 6.497 0.000 0.669 
  
 
 
 
140      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
3.
   
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
.  
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
re
po
rts
 p
ai
rw
is
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
in
 re
gr
es
si
on
s. 
(i)
 T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
A
FE
E 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f a
ud
it 
fe
es
, a
nd
 T
O
TF
EE
 u
se
d 
in
 th
e 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 c
he
ck
s 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f 
to
ta
l f
ee
s. 
(ii
) 
Fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fic
 c
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
fo
l-
lo
w
s:
 IN
VR
EC
 is
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
an
d 
re
ce
iv
ab
le
s 
to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
LE
V 
is
 th
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f t
ot
al
 d
eb
t t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
LO
SS
 is
 a
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 e
qu
al
s o
ne
 if
 th
e 
fir
m
 h
as
 in
cu
rr
ed
 lo
ss
, S
IZ
E 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s, 
 R
O
A 
is
 th
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f r
et
ur
n 
on
 a
ss
et
s, 
FO
RO
P 
is
 
th
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n 
as
se
ts
 t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
JO
IN
T 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
si
gn
in
g 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
s 
fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
t 
au
di
t f
irm
s, 
CH
AN
G
E 
is
 a
 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 e
qu
al
s 
on
e 
if 
th
e 
fir
m
 h
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
 th
e 
au
di
to
r, 
BI
G
4 
is
 a
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 e
qu
al
s 
on
e 
if 
th
e 
fir
m
 h
as
 a
 B
ig
-4
 
au
di
to
r, 
NA
S 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f n
on
-a
ud
it 
fe
es
.  
(iv
) T
he
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
 fo
r f
em
al
e 
au
di
t e
ng
ag
em
en
t p
ar
tn
er
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
ar
e 
de
-
fin
ed
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 F
G
RO
U
P 
eq
ua
ls
 o
ne
 if
 o
nl
y 
fe
m
al
e 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
(s
) 
ar
e 
en
ga
ge
d,
 F
RA
TI
O
 is
 th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 fe
m
al
e 
au
di
t e
ng
ag
e-
m
en
t p
ar
tn
er
s 
of
 a
ll 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
s, 
FD
U
M
 e
qu
al
s 
on
e 
if 
th
e 
au
di
t e
ng
ag
em
en
t p
ar
tn
er
 (o
r o
ne
 o
f t
he
m
) i
s 
fe
m
al
e,
 M
IX
ED
 e
qu
al
s 
on
e 
if
 
th
e 
fe
m
al
e 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
 is
 a
cc
om
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
a 
m
al
e 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
, a
nd
 M
G
RO
U
P 
eq
ua
ls
 o
ne
 if
 o
nl
y 
m
al
e 
au
di
t p
ar
tn
er
(s
) a
re
 e
ng
ag
ed
. 
 
141      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
4.2 Regression results 
The estimation results of our alternative fixed-effects panel regressions are re-
ported in Table 4. We report regression results with six different model specifica-
tions, where our dependent variable audit fees is first regressed on our set of con-
trol variables and, then, in Models 2–6 we include one of our five different varia-
bles for female audit engagement partners to the equation. In Model 1, audit fees 
(AFEE) is regressed on firm-specific control variables (INVREC, LEV, LOSS, 
SIZE, ROA, FOROP, JOINT, CHANGE, BIG4, and NAS) and additional controls 
for industry, country, and year. As can be seen from the table, all our control vari-
ables  are  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  5  % level,  and  they  have  the  ex-
pected signs. Furthermore, our control variables have a good explanatory power 
for audit fees, since the adjusted R2 is 87.2 % and the F-statistic is significant at 
the 1% level. Consistent with most of the literature following Simunic (1980), the 
inherent risk, leverage, and firm size are all positively associated with audit fees. 
Interestingly, the findings of Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008) seem to hold also 
in our sample,  as opting for a joint  audit  seems to significantly reduce the audit  
fees. 
In Models 2–6, we examine the relationship between female audit engagement 
partners and audit fees by regressing the audit fees on a female audit engagement 
partner variable and the firm control variables. In Model 2 the female audit en-
gagement partner variable is FGROUP, which equals one if the responsible audi-
tor(s) is (are) female. The estimation results indicate that audit fees are higher 
when a female audit partner is engaged. The coefficient for FGROUP is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 % level. All the control variables appear as 
expected and are statistically significant, and the explanatory power of the model 
is 87.2 %. 
In Model 3, we use a ratio for female audit engagement partner representation 
(FRATIO) for each firm-year observation, and in Model 4 the female representa-
tion variable is FDUM, which equals one if the firm has at least one female audit 
engagement partner. Consistent with Model 2, the results for Models 3 and 4 pre-
sented in Table 4 also show that female audit engagement partner representation 
increases audit fees. Again, the results are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
In Model 5, we introduce the female representation variable MIXED, which 
equals one if the firm has appointed both female and male audit partner(s). Inter-
estingly, the estimation results concerning our test variable turn out to be insignif-
icant, thereby indicating that if both male and female partner(s) are assigned to 
the task the auditor gender does not have a statistically significant impact on audit 
fees.   
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Finally, Model 6 further confirms the results of our previous models by suggest-
ing that firms with male audit engagement partners (MGROUP) have statistically 
significantly lower audit fees. In all models, the F-statistics and adjusted R2’s in-
dicate a good fit of the specification and, moreover, the results for all the female 
variables, except for MIXED, are statistically significant at the 1 % level.  
Table 4.  Regression results. 
The table reports the estimates of alternative versions the following regression 
specification: 
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where AFEEj,t denotes  natural  log  of  audit   fees  for  firm j at t, INVRECj,t is the 
receivable and inventory intensity, LEVj,t is the percentage of total debt to total 
assets, LOSSj,t is a dummy variable which equals one if the net income of firm j 
during t is negative, SIZEj,t is the natural log of total assets, ROAj,t is the percent-
age of  return on assets, FOROPj,t is the percentage of foreign assets to total as-
sets, JOINTj,t is a dummy variable, which gets a value of one if at least two audit 
partners from different audit firms signed the audit report, CHANGEj,t is a binary 
variable which is one if the responsible audit firm(s) changed compared to the 
previous year, BIG4j,t is a dummy variable which is assigned to one if the respon-
sible audit firm is one of the BIG4 group, NASj,t is the natural log of non-audit 
service fees,  YEAR2005 is a binary variable that indicates fiscal years, kjSIC   is a 
dummy variable according to industry classification (SIC) codes, and cjCOUNTRY   
is a dummy variable indicating the company’s country of origin. The female rep-
resentation variable FEMj,t varies in different model specifications: FGROUP 
equals one if only female audit partners are acting as responsible auditors, FRA-
TIO measures the share of female auditors compared to the number of auditors 
signing the audit report, FDUM gets a value of one if a female audit partner par-
ticipates in or is responsible for signing the audit report, MIXED is one if at least 
one male and female is responsible for the engagement, and MGROUP is set at 
one if only male auditors sign the audit report. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Variable Exp. sign Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant   -4.669 *** -4.691 *** -4.702 *** -4.669 *** -4.622 *** -4.709 *** 
    -(39.00)   -(37.12)   -(39.44)   -(37.49)   -(44.23)   -(42.87)   
Control variables:                         
INVREC + 0.899 *** 0.902 *** 0.910 *** 0.899 *** 0.902 *** 0.923 *** 
    (16.11)   (16.37)   (16.34)   (14.44)   (16.37)   (15.32)   
LEV + 0.284 * 0.284 * 0.282 * 0.285 * 0.284 * 0.277 * 
    (1.93)   (1.89)   (1.87)   (1.89)   (1.89)   (1.81)   
LOSS + 0.285 *** 0.282 *** 0.282 *** 0.285 *** 0.282 *** 0.280 *** 
    (6.87)   (6.86)   (6.98)   (6.81)   (6.86)   (7.07)   
SIZE + 0.665 *** 0.666 *** 0.666 *** 0.665 *** 0.666 *** 0.667 *** 
    (187.84)   (206.60)   (195.26)   (174.83)   (206.60)   (161.11)   
ROA - -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
    -(3.80)   -(3.72)   -(3.97)   -(3.31)   -(3.72)   -(4.05)   
FOROP + 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
    (8.05)   (8.40)   (8.14)   (8.42)   (8.40)   (7.89)   
JOINT - -0.170 *** -0.165 *** -0.162 *** -0.170 *** -0.165 *** 0.163 *** 
    -(131.9)   -(242.0)   -(65.2)   -(239.2)   -(242.0)   -(74.30)   
CHANGE - -0.057 *** -0.053 *** -0.051 *** -0.057 *** -0.053 *** -0.048 ** 
    -(3.04)   -(3.17)   -(2.83)   -(3.13)   -(3.17)   -(2.33)   
BIG4 + 0.003   -0.004   -0.001   0.002 ** -0.004   0.005   
    (0.38)   -(0.76)   -(0.20)   (2.42)   -(0.76)   (0.74)   
NAS - -0.327 ** -0.322 ** -0.320 ** -0.326 ** -0.322 ** -0.322 ** 
    -(2.54)   -(2.49)   -(2.52)   -(2.49)   -(2.49)   -(2.55)   
SIC1 ? -0.562 *** -0.558 *** -0.558 *** -0.562 *** -0.558 *** -0.561 *** 
    -(8.43)   -(8.31)   -(8.38)   -(8.10)   -(8.31)   -(8.03)   
SIC2 ? -0.070   -0.062   -0.060   -0.069   -0.062   -0.060   
    -(1.16)   -(1.04)   -(1.04)   -(1.11)   -(1.04)   -(1.07)   
SIC3 ? -0.214 *** -0.210 *** -0.209 *** -0.214 *** -0.210 *** -0.209 *** 
    -(2.75)   -(2.71)   -(2.76)   -(2.71)   -(2.71)   -(2.86)   
SIC4 ? -0.158 ** -0.153 ** -0.151 ** -0.157 ** -0.153 ** -0.150 ** 
    -(2.02)   -(1.98)   -(2.00)   -(1.99)   -(1.98)   -(2.00)   
FIN ? -0.914 *** -0.906 *** -0.909 *** -0.914 *** -0.906 *** -0.917 *** 
    -(41.45)   -(36.70)   -(40.88)   -(30.75)   -(36.70)   -(41.27)   
SWE ? 0.201 *** 0.209 *** 0.206 *** 0.202 *** 0.209 *** 0.198 *** 
    (3.78)   (3.79)   (3.87)   (3.32)   (3.79)   (3.61)   
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Table 4 cont. Regression results. 
Variable Exp. sign Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Female representation variables:                     
FGROUP ?     0.165 ***                 
        (4.98)                   
FRATIO ?         0.116 ***             
            (56.85)               
FDUM ?             0.069 ***         
                (3.17)           
MIXED ?                 0.006       
                    (0.10)       
MGROUP ?                     -0.069 *** 
                        -(3.17)   
Adjusted R2 0.872   0.872   0.872   0.872   0.871   0.872   
F-stat.   272.022 *** 257.495 *** 257.154 *** 256.954 *** 256.524 *** 256.954 *** 
  
The results reported in Table 4 generally indicate that female audit engagement 
partners may have a positive effect on the audit fees. The coefficient estimates for 
our female auditor representation variables are positive and statistically highly 
significant, whereas the coefficient for male auditor representation variable is 
negative and statistically significant. The results for mixed group are not statisti-
cally significant. The female representation variables seem to be important in our 
regressions, as they have a high significance level in all the model specifications, 
except for MIXED. In fact, according to our results, the gender variables seem to 
be even more important than leverage in explaining the cross-sectional variation 
in audit fees. In all, our results may indicate that the female auditors charge higher 
audit fees than the male auditors. The observed phenomenon may be caused by 
several factors. After describing our additional tests, we discuss the possible al-
ternative explanations based on the literature on audit fees and gender differences. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
The regression results presented in Table 4 indicate that the gender of the respon-
sible auditor may have an effect on the size of the audit fees. In the following, we 
examine the robustness of our results by conducting several additional tests. First, 
we test  whether our results hold if  the dummies for industry and country are re-
moved from the models. The results of these regression specifications (not tabu-
lated) are very similar to those presented in Table 4, and again in Model 4 the 
female representation variable MIXED lacks significance.  The adjusted R2’s are 
still close to 80 % in all models, and the F-statistics are significant at the 1 % lev-
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el, suggesting that the model fits the purpose well even after removing the varia-
bles controlling for country and industry of the company. 
In order to test that the results are not caused by a few outlying observations, we 
winsorize the audit fees and the control variables at the 0.5 % and 99.5 % levels, 
and re-estimate the six alternative models presented in Table 4. Furthermore, we 
also winsorize the data at the 2.5 % and 97.5 % levels to confirm that the results 
are not based on the winsorizing percentage. The results (not tabulated) further 
confirm our previous findings on gender-based differences in audit fee pricing.  
We have divided our sample into small and big firms to see if the audit pricing 
differs between the two groups. The regression results for the two subgroups (not 
tabulated) are similar to those presented in the paper. However, they mainly lack 
significance, because the variances in female dummy variables become substan-
tially low. For this reason, we have also run our regression specifications includ-
ing an interaction term between the alternative gender variables and client size, 
e.g. FGROUP×SIZE. These tests provide rather similar results as those reported 
in Table 4, the main difference being that the coefficient for MIXED is here posi-
tive and significant at the 1 % level.  
Furthermore, we have also gathered data for auditor-specific factors, namely audi-
tor experience and tenure.7 Unfortunately, these data are available only for the 
Swedish firms, and thus we are unable to use the variables in the full sample re-
gressions. We have, however, run a regression including the variables experience 
and tenure for the Swedish firms. When considering only one country from our 
sample, the small amount of female observations becomes a problem. Therefore, 
we focus on testing these two additional variables in the model specification in-
cluding the female representation ratio (FRATIO). FRATIO is chosen for these 
analyses because it has more variance than the dummy variables and, thus, it may 
be more useful in a smaller sample. This regression gives similar results to those 
presented in Table 4, i.e. the coefficient for FRATIO is positive. The results, how-
ever, lack significance and no conclusions can be drawn based on them.  In gen-
eral, it seems that experience tends to decrease the audit fees, whereas tenure has 
no impact on the fees. The negative impact of experience on audit fees can be 
explained by the routine and knowledge of the more experienced partners. Fur-
                                               
 
7  We use the natural logarithm of the engagement partner’s age as a proxy for experience. The 
mean age of the engagement partners in the Swedish sample is about 52 years. As the measure 
of tenure we use the natural logarithm of the number of years the engagement partner has 
signed the audit report of the same client firm. The mean tenure in the Swedish sample is about 
six years. 
146      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
thermore, if there is a market segment where the price competition is higher or, 
alternatively,  if  there  are  clients  that  are  known  to  focus  only  on  the  price,  the  
more experienced engagement partners may be able to perform the audit at a low-
er cost due to improvements in the efficiency of the engagement and, thus, they 
may be able to gain or maintain clients.  
As explained above, we have chosen to use the White cross-section robust covari-
ances  and  to  hold  the  firm-specific  effects  fixed  in  our  models.  To  examine  
whether our results depend on the panel estimation specifications, we re-estimate 
the models presented in Table 4 with the ordinary coefficient covariance method, 
and with no fixed-effects specifications. These regressions (not tabulated) further 
indicate that the female audit engagement partners charge higher audit fees. These 
results, however, lack significance in the majority of the model specifications.  
We used the natural logarithm of the audit fees as our dependent variable 
throughout the regressions. In addition to audit fees, the companies often also pay 
their auditing companies other fees e.g. for consulting. Next, we re-estimate the 
models presented in Table 4, but this time using the natural logarithm of total fees 
as our dependent variable. Our regression results indicate that the firms with fe-
male auditors pay higher total fees than the firms with male auditors. The results, 
however, are insignificant in some of our model specifications (not tabulated). In 
all, the regression results with total fees as a dependent variable give results simi-
lar to those regressions with audit fees as a dependent variable.  
To complete our robustness checks, we re-estimate the models presented in Table 
4 by including an interaction between the female representation variables and 
different risk measures, added one at the time to the model. The risk measures 
used here are the return on assets (ROA) and two common bankruptcy prediction 
measures developed by Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984). All of these varia-
bles are considered to measure the financial viability of the client. These tests are 
fairly consistent in showing that even after controlling for the riskiness of the cli-
ent, the female audit engagement partners still have significantly higher fees. 
Summarizing the additional tests, we conclude that these robustness analyses 
generally provide support to the regression results reported in Table 4, as the es-
timated coefficient for the female variables appear positive and significant in 
most of our additional regressions. 
4.4 Interpretation of the results 
In general, our results suggest that female auditors are associated with higher au-
dit fees and, next, possible explanations for the findings are discussed. First, fol-
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lowing prior literature on audit planning (Davidson & Gist, 1996) and gender 
differences that may affect the amount of resources allocated on planning (Fondas 
& Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006), it may be argued that female audit en-
gagement partners may invest more in planning the engagements, which could 
increase the audit effort and, therefore, also the audit fees.  
The higher risk aversion of females documented in e.g. the behavioral finance 
literature (Johnson & Powell, 1994; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos & Ber-
nasek, 1998; Schubert, 2006) suggests that female auditors may assess some of 
the clients’ risk components higher than their male counterparts. Higher assessed 
level of risk may affect the composition of the audit fees by either increasing the 
audit investment or increasing the risk premium (Houston et al. 1999, 2005; John-
stone & Bedard, 2001, 2003). Given that the audit engagement partners’ assess-
ment of the client’s business risk affects the audit fees, our results may indicate 
that female auditors have a lower level of risk tolerance.  
Moreover, the gender differences in overconfidence (see Bonner, 2008 p. 104 for 
a review), may have an impact on the audit fees. Men are documented to be more 
overconfident than women, which can cause the female auditors to invest more 
time and effort in a task before being prepared to give the auditor’s opinion. Thus, 
the lower overconfidence level of females can result in higher audit fees in the 
audits with a female audit partner.  
These exploratory findings do raise many questions, which are left to be answered 
by future research. Most importantly, perhaps, from the demand side perspective 
it is of interest why would any firm hire a female auditor in a competitive audit 
market, if a male auditor is cheaper. First, this could be simply because of igno-
rance, as this kind of evidence has not, to the best of our knowledge, been dis-
cussed in the prior audit literature. Second, as the audit fees may also contain a 
flexible component, which is determined by the findings during the audit process, 
the prices may be difficult to estimate and compare beforehand. Third, if female 
audit partners are indeed more risk averse, they may increase audit testing more 
as a response to any risk component observed during the audit procedures. 
Finally, a female auditor can, however, also be hired because she is considered to 
provide actual or perceived benefits to the client. If, for example, female auditors 
are able to communicate in their tender that they are charging a higher audit fee 
because of more exhaustive audit testing, they may provide the quality-conscious 
clients benefits and, thus, justify accepting a more expensive audit engagement. In 
addition, females may, e.g. due to the well-documented gender-based differences, 
be perceived to produce a higher quality audit or to perform a more efficient audit 
of equal quality. Moreover, by hiring a female auditor the company may also at-
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tempt to gain social benefits comparable to those of e.g. nominating females to 
executive positions, such as boards of directors. Nevertheless, it should be kept in 
mind when interpreting our empirical findings, that the analysis is largely ex-
ploratory in nature. 
5 Conclusions and limitations 
This paper examines whether the gender of the audit engagement partner affects 
audit fees. Following earlier studies related to audit fees and gender-based behav-
ioral differences in communication, overconfidence, decision-making, and risk-
taking, we empirically examine the potential relationship between the gender of 
the audit  engagement partner and the audit  fees.  We use a sample of NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic Exchange listed firms to study the relationship between the gender 
of the audit engagement partner(s) and audit fees. This setting enables us to iden-
tify the audit engagement partners for each firm from their audit reports. The re-
sults provide exploratory insights to the question of how the audit engagement 
partner attributes, rather than audit firm- or office-level attributes, may affect au-
dit fees. 
Our empirical findings suggest that the gender of the audit engagement partner 
may have an effect on the audit fees. In particular, after controlling for the client 
attributes, the female audit partners are documented to have significantly higher 
audit fees. This is an interesting finding, however, interpretations should be made 
with caution due to the lack of evident and convincing theoretical explanations. 
Our general theoretical background is drawn from psychology, management, and 
corporate finance literatures. Thus, the reported empirical findings have to be re-
garded as somewhat exploratory and more work on the relationship between audi-
tor gender and audit fees is needed. Our findings may suggest that gender differ-
ences related to the planning, preparation, and diligence affect the engagement 
partner’s decisions concerning the audit investment. Alternatively, the auditor’s 
risk assessment of the client may be an important determinant in explaining the 
relationship between audit partner gender and audit fees. Previous studies suggest 
that the auditor assessed riskiness of the client may increase the audit investment 
(i.e. number of audit hours) or the risk premium included in the audit fees and, 
therefore, the gender differences in risk tolerance may be a significant factor af-
fecting the relationship between the auditor gender and audit fees.  
In interpreting the findings of this study, it is also necessary to consider the fol-
lowing limitations. First, an important assumption made in this study is that indi-
vidual audit engagement partners are able to influence the audit fees, at least to 
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some extent. Although the bidding process is obviously regulated to a certain ex-
tent by the headquarters, we find it reasonable to assume that the audit partner in 
charge of the engagement is integrated in the process and has an influence on the 
audit investment or the risk premium. This view is also supported by the ISA 
(IAASB, 2009), the auditor’s code of ethics (IESBA, 2009), and our interviews 
with Big-4 auditors. Second, our sample consists of NASDAQ OMX listed firms 
from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden and, therefore,  it  is  uncertain to which ex-
tent  our  results  apply  in  other  settings.  Finally,  our  analysis  may  suffer  from  a  
self-selection bias. We have controlled for a set of client attributes which, accord-
ing to the previous literature, affect the audit fees. However, it is possible that we 
have omitted some variables, or that some firm characteristics simultaneously 
affect the appointment of female audit engagement partners and audit fees. Espe-
cially, we acknowledge that auditor experience, specialization, and tenure may 
have an impact on the formation of the audit fees. These limitations should be 
considered when interpreting our findings, until corroborated by future research. 
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CEO AND CHAIRPERSON CHARACTERISTICS 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the relationship between executive characteristics and firm 
performance. Specifically, the study examines the association between the charac-
teristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairperson of the board 
and firm performance. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, the evidence found 
suggests that demographic and experience-related executive characteristics may 
be associated with the market valuation and financial performance of the firm. In 
particular, the reported results indicate a positive relationship between the pres-
ence of female executives and firm performance, thus suggesting that gender-
based differences may affect an executive’s success. Moreover, the findings con-
cerning the age of the executive are mixed, while the executive’s experience and 
quality appear positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, an executive 
holding multiple board seats is negatively associated with firm performance, 
whereas CEO duality has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and the return on 
assets (ROA) of the firm.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, executive characteristics, executive gender, 
firm performance  
 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between the characteristics 
of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairperson of the board and firm 
performance. Prior literature suggests that specific characteristics of an executive 
may have an impact on her/his behavior. For instance, widely reported gender-
based differences have been suggested to cause differences in the performance of 
firms led by men and women (see, e.g., Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008, 2010; 
Carter et al. 2003). In general, these studies indicate that female participation in 
management improves corporate governance and firm performance. 
                                               
 
?  I would like to thank Lee M. Dunham, Melissa Frye, Stanley D. Smith and the participants at 
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The great majority of studies examining the relationship between executives and 
firm performance concentrate on only one characteristic of the executive, namely, 
gender. However, a number of earlier studies have reported evidence indicating 
that executive features other than gender may affect firm performance. For exam-
ple, an executive’s age, experience, quality, and busyness have been indicated to 
influence her/his decision-making and the ability to perform her/his work (see, 
e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bhagat and Bol-
ton 2008; Davidson et al. 2007; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Jiraporn et al. 2008; 
Kim et al. 2009; Ryan and Wiggins 2001; Virtanen 2010). In general, executive 
experience and quality have been found to have a positive impact on firm perfor-
mance, whereas executive busyness tends to decrease firm performance.   
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that manager characteristics in general are 
important determinants of several corporate variables. Moreover, these research-
ers believe that several individual characteristics may be relevant to executives’ 
decision-making processes, but conducting these types of studies is challenging 
due to data constraints. The existing literature has yet to provide a covering study 
of the possible influence of executives’ characteristics on firm performance, and 
the role of the chairperson’s characteristics in particular is still unclear. Thus, this 
paper contributes to the existing literature by assessing whether, and if so how, 
individual executive characteristics namely, age, experience, busyness, quality, 
and gender influence firm performance. In addition, the impact of CEOs and 
chairs is compared. 
CEOs are natural research targets, as they are in many aspects the most powerful 
and visible executives of a firm. Chairpersons, however, were often ignored in 
earlier literature, or alternatively examined only as one of the board members 
(see, e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Adams and Flynn, 2005; Brammer et al., 
2007; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010). In fact, a chairperson of the board is 
often a very experienced, highly educated long-term member of the company’s 
administration and has authority within the firm. Hence, in examining the impact 
executives may have on firm performance, chairpersons should also be investi-
gated.  
The study is conducted by employing cross-sectional panel regressions on a five-
year sample of S&P 500 firms. The reported empirical results suggest that firms 
with female executives may outperform male-led firms. Moreover, the busyness 
of the executive seems to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and ROA, whereas 
results concerning executive age are mixed. Executive experience and quality and 
CEO duality are positively related to firm performance. These results are con-
sistent with earlier studies in suggesting that female-controlled firms outperform 
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male-controlled firms (see, e.g., Krishnan and Park 2005; Smith et al. 2006). Ad-
ditionally, the results are partly supported by previous literature on executive age, 
experience, quality, and busyness (see e.g., Ahn et al. 2010; Baysinger and Ho-
skisson 1990; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Kim et al. 
2009). In general, the empirical findings reported in this paper indicate that ex-
ecutive characteristics should be considered as being among the determinants of a 
firm’s success.  
2 Related literature 
2.1 Gender-based differences and their impact on firm performance 
Perhaps the single most examined executive feature is gender. A vast body of 
earlier corporate finance literature indicates that gender-based differences may 
affect a person’s success at work. For instance, Brennan and McCafferty (1997) 
suggest that female executives may have a better understanding of consumer be-
havior and customers’ needs, which may create a competitive advantage for fe-
male-controlled firms. Researchers have also proposed in the literature that wom-
en tend to have higher expectations of their responsibilities, and that women have 
to demonstrate extra competence in order to reach executive positions (Dunn 
2010; Eagly and Carli 2003; Fondas and Sassalos 2000).  
The psychology literature indicates that women have better communication skills, 
and that women tend to perform better in group problem-solving and decision-
making tasks, which are understandably important skills in management (see e.g., 
Dallas 2002; Fondas 1997; Maznevski 1994; Robinson and Dechant 1997; Schu-
bert 2006; Wood et al. 1985). Moreover, researchers have argued that in today’s 
business world, women’s more cooperative leadership style may be more produc-
tive than men’s competitive style (see e.g., Eagly and Carli 2003). 
The literature on gender differences provides evidence suggesting that women are 
more conservative and risk-averse than men (see, e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Johnson and Powell 1994; Levin et al. 1997; 
Snyder and Chapman 1988; Sunden and Surette 1998). Schubert (2006) argues 
that  women tend  to  avoid  losses  and  are  less  willing  to  take  extreme risks  than  
men are. Interestingly, Martin et al. (2009) suggest that the market is aware of the 
gender differences in risk aversion, as these researchers find that changes in risk 
following CEO appointments are significantly lower for female CEOs. Overall, 
gender-based differences in an executive’s risk tolerance may have a widespread 
impact on the financial performance and reporting of the firm.   
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Evidence from the psychology literature further indicates that people are prone to 
overestimating their talent and abilities (see, e.g., Fischhoff et al. 1977; Lichten-
stein et al. 1982). Bonner (2008) suggests that men are more prone to overconfi-
dence than women, and the phenomenon is found to be particularly significant in 
masculine domains, such as the business environment. Thus, the gender-based 
differences in levels of overconfidence can possibly be seen in the way the execu-
tives operate, which again can lead to differences in the performance of female- 
and male-controlled firms.    
Perhaps the most relevant to the current study are examinations of the effects that 
women have on firm performance, for example, by Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008, 2010), Carter et al. (2003), Dezsö and Ross (2008), and Francouer et al. 
(2008). Dezsö and Ross (2008) examine the relationship between female partici-
pation the management and firm performance, and document that female partici-
pation below the CEO level improves Tobin’s Q. In contrast, however, they find 
no relationship between female CEOs and firm performance. Finally, Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Carter et al. (2003) suggest that the gender diversi-
ty of the board has a positive impact on firm value.  
2.2 Executive age 
The possible impact of executive age on a firm’s success has gained attention in 
the literature, as it can be assumed that older executives have a competitive ad-
vantage compared to younger executives, who inevitably have less experience in 
business. In a seminal paper, Davis (1979) examines the relation between execu-
tive age and corporate performance, and finds no connection between the two. 
However, in a more recent study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest that older 
executives are more conservative in their work, which may have an impact on 
firm performance. The impact, however, can be either positive or negative. 
 Davidson et al. (2007) examine the impact of an executive’s career horizon on 
the firm’s earnings management, and interestingly, they find that firms with 
CEOs nearing retirement age have large discretionary accruals in the year before 
turnover. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that older CEOs are prone to 
choosing projects that pay off before their retirement. In a similar vein, Hirshleif-
er (1993) proposes that younger CEOs may also want to focus on the short-term 
goals, an effect driven by the desire to build their reputations. Thus, prior litera-
ture in general indicates that the age of the executive may influence firm perfor-
mance, but the empirical evidence is mixed. 
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2.3 Executive experience and quality 
Some studies have reported a positive relationship between executive experience 
and firm performance. For example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) suggest that 
as an executive’s tenure advances, the executive has more firm-specific 
knowledge and a better ability to monitor and provide valuable resources, which 
may improve the firm’s financial performance. In contrast, however, researchers 
have also documented that hiring a new executive may have a positive effect on 
firm  performance  (see,  e.g.,  Huson  et  al.  2004).  Moreover,  Ryan  and  Wiggins  
(2001) suggest that CEOs with long tenures may have entrenched positions, 
which would enable the CEOs to pursue personal interests, while possibly harm-
ing firm performance.  
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) propose that executive quality may have a positive im-
pact on firm performance. They use executive tenure divided by executive age as 
a measure of quality, as in their opinion an executive with a five-year tenure at the 
age of 50 is of a different quality and  the executive may have a different amount 
of equity than, for example, an executive having an equally long tenure at the age 
of 60. Empirical evidence on this is provided, for example, by Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1992), who argue that executives with the same tenure at different ages have 
different incentives, reputation, and career concerns, all of which may affect the 
executives’ work performance. 
2.4 Executive busyness 
Executive and director busyness and its impact on a firm have gained increasing 
attention in the literature during the past few years. Jiraporn et al. (2008) assert 
that director busyness is inversely related to the firm value, that is, firms where 
board members hold multiple board seats at other firms are negatively affected by 
board member busyness. Interestingly, the busyness of external and internal board 
members seems to have different impacts on firm performance. Sarkar and Sarkar 
(2009) report that an external board member holding multiple board seats corre-
lates positively with firm value, whereas a situation where multiple directorships 
are held by internal executives relates negatively to firm performance. In addition, 
executives with multiple board seats tend to miss more board meetings than exec-
utives with no external commitments (Jiraporn et al. 2009).  
Executive busyness within a firm can be measured through CEO duality, that is, 
the same person holds the CEO and chairperson positions. On one hand, duality 
leadership may cause agency conflicts and increase the need for an efficient cor-
porate governance system in order to ensure shareholder rights. Thus, CEO duali-
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ty may hurt firm performance (see, e.g., Chanine and Tohmé 2009; Elsayed 
2007). On the other hand, duality leadership may cause the executive to consider 
the firm’s success as a personal challenge, and serve the firm and its shareholders 
more effectively (see e.g., Davis et al. 1997). Moreover, CEO duality leadership 
has been documented as having a positive impact on the firm in terms of increas-
ing corporate diversification into unrelated industries (see, e.g., Kim et al. 2009). 
Overall, previous empirical studies have reported mixed results on the impact of 
CEO duality on the firm, as is also noted by Peng et al. (2007). 
2.5 Hypotheses 
The earlier literature suggests that executive characteristics may have important 
implications in many areas of business. In particular, the importance of executive 
gender has been highlighted in the literature. In this paper, it is assumed that ex-
ecutive gender, age, experience, quality, and busyness may have an effect on firm 
performance. Since the results reported by earlier studies on executive character-
istics and firm performance are rather mixed, the hypotheses of this study are pre-
sented as non-directional. Thus, the research hypotheses to be examined are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for other characteristic variables, firms with fe-
male CEOs are associated with better firm performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for other characteristic variables, firms with fe-
male board chairs are associated with better firm performance. 
The CEO is the highest ranking executive within a firm, and is responsible for 
supervising the organization. Therefore, CEOs are important research targets 
when firm performance is examined. In addition to CEOs, the paper also exam-
ines the impact the chairperson may have on firm performance. The chairperson 
of the board is usually considered a board member, and not a powerful and expe-
rienced long-term executive of a firm, which often is the case. For example, 
Brickley et al. (1999) report that about 16% of retiring CEOs continue to serve as 
the chairpersons of the board of their own companies. Thus, a large proportion of 
board chairs are in fact either current or past CEOs of the company. Since the 
chairs lead the board of directors, they may have a significant impact on board 
decision-making and, consequently, on firm performance. Finally, the earlier lit-
erature has documented that good governance leads to better firm performance 
(see, e.g., Bauer et al. 2004, 2008; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; 
Brown and Caylor 2006, 2009; Gompers et al. 2003; Renders et al. 2010). Thus, 
even if the chairperson is seen as performing more of a governance role, it is a 
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role that may have a significant impact on firm performance through corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
3 Methodology 
The relationship between executive characteristics and firm performance is exam-
ined with cross-sectional panel regressions. The measures of firm performance 
used  in  this  study  are  Tobin’s  Q (Tobin  1969)  and  return  on  assets  (ROA).  To-
bin’s  Q is  a  ratio  relating  the  market  value  of  the  firm to  its  book value,  and  is  
calculated as (market value of equity + book value of debt + book value of pre-
ferred stock) divided by the book value of total assets. ROA is calculated as the 
net income divided by the total assets of the firm. 
After estimating the performance of a firm using Tobin’s Q and ROA, the relation 
between the executive characteristics and firm performance is examined with the 
following cross-sectional panel regression:  
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where PERFj,t is either Tobin’s Q or ROA for firm j in year t. The characteristic 
variables employed in the alternative model specifications are defined as follows: 
FCEO and FCHAIR are binary variables, which are assigned to one if the exam-
ined executive (CEO or chair) is female, EXECAGE is the age of the executive in 
years, EXECEXP is the experience of the executive, which is measured by the 
years the executive has served in the same position, EXECQUAL is the executive 
quality, measured as a ratio of executive tenure to executive age, EXECBSEATS is 
the number of board seats the examined executive holds at firms other than their 
employer, and DUAL is a binary variable, which is assigned to one if the CEO 
and the chairperson of the board positions are held by the same person. The con-
trol variables are defined as follows: LEV is the financial leverage of the firm 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, RD is the ratio of research and 
development expenses (R&D) to sales, SGROWTH is the one-year sales growth 
rate, and SIZE is  the natural  logarithm of total  assets.  Finally,  SICjk is a dummy 
variable according to the standard industry classification codes (SIC) and YEARjk 
is a binary variable indicating the fiscal years. 
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To examine the possible impact of executive characteristics on firm performance, 
eight different model specifications are estimated. Thus, in addition to the non-
varying controls, the regression specifications include the following executive 
feature variables: (i) FCEO, CEOAGE, and CEOEXP, (ii) FCEO, CEOAGE, 
CEOEXP, CEOBSEATS, and DUAL, (iii) FCHAIR, CHAIRAGE, and CHAIREXP, 
(iv) FCHAIR, CHAIRAGE, CHAIREXP, CHAIRBSEATS, and DUAL, (v) FCEO 
and CEOQUAL, (vi) FCEO, CEOQUAL, CEOBSEATS, and DUAL, (vii) 
FCHAIR, and CHAIRQUAL, and (viii) FCHAIR, CHAIRQUAL, CHAIRBSEATS, 
and DUAL. Owing to the high correlation of the CEO and chair characteristic 
variables, they are not employed simultaneously. Moreover, the age and experi-
ence variables are employed in different models than the quality measure, as it is 
calculated based on these two variables. 
The chosen characteristic variables present demographics (gender and age) as 
well as educational factors (experience and quality). Following Davis (1979), the 
executive age is measured in years, and similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), 
the executive experience is defined as years served in the examined position. The 
employed quality measure is estimated following Bhagat and Bolton (2008), who 
demonstrate that the ratio of tenure to age is an estimate of executive quality. The 
included control variables are selected based on the earlier literature. Leverage is 
a proxy for the financial condition of the firm (Bhagat and Bolton 2008) and, 
thus, important when firm performance is estimated. The amount of research and 
development expenses is commonly reported to influence firm performance, and 
the association may vary from one period to another and between different per-
formance measures (Anderson and Reeb 2003). The sales growth rate is common-
ly positively related to firm performance (Rose 2007). Finally, firm size is report-
ed to have a significant impact on firm performance (Adams and Santos 2006). 
Moreover, Becker et al. (1998) suggest that firm size may also act as a surrogate 
for various omitted variables.  
In all of the regression specifications, a two-way fixed-effects method is used, 
because it permits a different intercept for each industry, and the method controls 
for the possible change in firm performance from one year to another. Moreover, 
the two-way fixed effects method allows each firm to have an individual effect, 
which cannot be explained by the control variables. In fact, the fixed effects mod-
el requires that there are unique effects of individual firms, which are not caused 
by random variation and are constant over time (Hsiao et al. 1999; Madalla 2001) 
and, thus, is an appropriate method in this research setting. White cross-section 
robust covariances are used in the regression specifications, because the method is 
robust to contemporaneous correlation and different error variances in each cross-
section. 
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4 Data 
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of S&P 500 firms. Following 
earlier studies, the financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–6900) are excluded 
from the sample due to their special features. Furthermore, observations with in-
sufficient data are also excluded from the analysis. The sample period extends 
from 2006 to 2010. The final sample consists of 388 firms and 1940 firm-year 
observations. The data on executive characteristics are hand-collected from the 
AuditAnalytics database. In the case of data availability problems, the executive 
data are completed by accessing the firms’ annual reports and press releases. The 
financial statement data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope.  
The descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Table 1. The variables are 
winsorized at the 0.5 % and 99.5 % levels to avoid the results being affected by a 
few underlying observations. As can be seen from Panel A of the the table, the 
CEO has a median age of 54 years, and typically has five years of experience. 
The chairpersons are on average a little more experienced (7 years) and slightly 
older than the CEOs (57 years). Both the CEO and chairperson typically hold one 
external board seat. Only 4.2 % of the examined CEOs and 3.7 % of the chairs are 
female. Finally, CEO duality is very common within the sample, as the dummy’s 
mean value is as high as 0.568. 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics.  
The table reports the summary statistics for the entire sample of 1940 yearly ob-
servations of 388 S&P 500 companies. Financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–
6900) and firms with inadequate data are excluded from the sample. The included 
variables are defined as follows: (i) The dependent variable measuring firm per-
formance is Q (Tobin’s Q) or return on assets (ROA). (ii) The characteristic varia-
bles are defined as follows: FCEO equals one if the chief director officer of the 
company is female, FCHAIR is set to one if the chairperson of the board is fe-
male, CEOAGE is the age of the CEO of the company in years, CEOEXP is the 
number of years the current CEO of the company has served in that position, 
CEOQUAL is CEOEXP/CEOAGE, CEOBSEATS is the number of board seats the 
CEO holds outside the firm of employment, CHAIRAGE is  the age of the chair-
person in years, CHAIREXP is the number of years the acting chairperson of the 
company has served in that position, CHAIRQUAL is the chairperson’s tenure 
divided by her/his age, CHAIRBSEATS is the number of board seats the corporate 
board chair holds in other firms, and DUAL is a binary variable, which is assigned 
to one if the CEO and chair positions are occupied by the same executive. (iii) 
Firm-specific control variables are defined as follows: LEV is total liabilities di-
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vided by total assets. RD is research and development expenses to sales. 
SGROWTH is  the  sales  growth  rate,  and  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
Panel A. Summary statistics for all firms (n=1940 observations)       
Variable Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
Q 1.683 1.425 1.047 8.264 0.149 
ROA 0.064 0.072 0.097 0.344 -0.906 
CEOAGE 54.304 54.000 6.208 82.000 36.000 
CEOEXP 6.784 5.000 7.489 47.000 0.000 
CEOQUAL 0.120 0.085 0.121 0.652 0.000 
CEOBSEATS 0.728 1.000 0.753 4.000 0.000 
CHAIRAGE 57.531 57.000 7.477 84.000 40.000 
CHAIREXP 10.083 7.000 9.771 47.000 0.000 
CHAIRQUAL 0.169 0.127 0.149 0.652 0.000 
CHAIRBSEATS 0.835 1.000 0.819 4.000 0.000 
LEV 0.233 0.217 0.164 1.420 0.000 
RD 5.481 2.283 7.318 41.300 0.000 
SGROWTH 6.291 6.281 17.430 157.051 -77.326 
SIZE 5.963 4.420 2.681 13.569 2.895 
            
Binary variables           
FCEO 0.042 0.000 0.201 1.000 0.000 
FCHAIR 0.037 0.000 0.188 1.000 0.000 
DUAL 0.568 1.000 0.460 1.000 0.000 
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Table 1 cont. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel B. Summary statistics based on executive gender.       
Variable Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
            
Firms with female CEO (n= 81)           
Q 1.759 1.459 0.995 4.310 0.464 
ROA 0.075 0.074 0.061 0.189 -0.146 
CEOAGE 52.634 52.000 3.367 62.000 47.000 
CEOEXP 3.415 2.000 3.317 12.000 0.000 
CEOQUAL 0.066 0.043 0.066 0.231 0.000 
CEOBSEATS 0.780 1.000 0.725 2.000 0.000 
CHAIRAGE 54.439 54.000 7.376 70.000 40.000 
CHAIREXP 6.707 6.000 5.255 20.000 0.000 
CHAIRQUAL 0.121 0.125 0.084 0.286 0.000 
CHAIRBSEATS 1.099 1.000 1.114 4.000 0.000 
LEV 0.278 0.273 0.127 0.519 0.003 
RD 2.965 0.729 4.542 18.732 0.000 
SGROWTH 4.608 3.918 16.484 58.608 -44.158 
SIZE 6.253 4.476 2.875 11.130 3.481 
            
Binary variables           
FCHAIR 0.634 1.000 0.488 1.000 0.000 
DUAL 0.585 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.000 
            
Firms with male CEO (n=1859)           
Q 1.679 1.425 1.049 8.264 0.149 
ROA 0.063 0.072 0.098 0.344 -0.906 
CEOAGE 54.377 55.000 6.294 82.000 36.000 
CEOEXP 6.932 5.000 7.586 47.000 0.000 
CEOQUAL 0.123 0.087 0.123 0.652 0.000 
CEOBSEATS 0.725 1.000 0.755 4.000 0.000 
CHAIRAGE 57.667 57.000 7.460 84.000 40.000 
CHAIREXP 10.231 7.000 9.898 47.000 0.000 
CHAIRQUAL 0.171 0.127 0.151 0.652 0.000 
CHAIRBSEATS 0.824 1.000 0.802 4.000 0.000 
LEV 0.231 0.211 0.166 1.420 0.000 
RD 5.592 2.312 7.398 41.300 0.000 
SGROWTH 6.365 6.327 17.475 157.051 -77.326 
SIZE 5.950 4.417 2.673 13.569 2.895 
            
Binary variables           
FCHAIR 0.007 0.000 0.103 1.000 0.000 
DUAL 0.702 1.000 0.458 1.000 0.000 
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Table 1 cont. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel B. Summary statistics based on executive gender.       
Variable Mean Median  Std.dev. Max Min 
            
Firms with female Chair (n=62)           
Q 1.559 1.247 0.923 3.651 0.464 
ROA 0.037 0.070 0.132 0.189 -0.427 
CEOAGE 51.694 51.500 4.374 60.000 43.000 
CEOEXP 4.111 3.000 3.412 12.000 0.000 
CEOQUAL 0.079 0.060 0.066 0.231 0.000 
CEOBSEATS 0.917 1.000 0.692 2.000 0.000 
CHAIRAGE 54.972 54.000 6.050 72.000 47.000 
CHAIREXP 7.611 7.500 5.531 18.000 0.000 
CHAIRQUAL 0.133 0.140 0.088 0.140 0.277 
CHAIRBSEATS 1.167 1.000 0.737 3.000 0.000 
LEV 0.261 0.260 0.131 0.461 0.000 
RD 3.385 0.705 5.759 19.553 0.000 
SGROWTH 4.633 3.050 19.302 58.608 -44.158 
SIZE 6.406 4.508 3.053 11.130 3.092 
            
Binary variables           
FCEO 0.722 1.000 0.454 1.000 0.000 
DUAL 0.667 1.000 0.478 1.000 0.000 
            
Firms with male Chair (n=1878)           
Q 1.688 1.427 1.051 8.264 0.149 
ROA 0.064 0.072 0.095 0.344 -0.906 
CEOAGE 54.404 54.000 6.247 82.000 36.000 
CEOEXP 6.886 5.000 7.584 47.000 0.000 
CEOQUAL 0.122 0.086 0.123 0.652 0.000 
CEOBSEATS 0.721 1.000 0.755 4.000 0.000 
CHAIRAGE 57.629 57.000 7.512 84.000 40.000 
CHAIREXP 10.177 7.000 9.887 47.000 0.000 
CHAIRQUAL 0.170 0.125 0.151 0.652 0.000 
CHAIRBSEATS 0.823 1.000 0.820 4.000 0.000 
LEV 0.232 0.213 0.166 1.420 0.000 
RD 5.562 2.317 7.362 41.230 0.000 
SGROWTH 6.354 6.302 17.363 157.051 -77.326 
SIZE 5.946 4.414 2.666 13.569 2.895 
            
Binary variables           
FCEO 0.019 0.000 0.125 1.000 0.000 
DUAL 0.698 1.000 0.459 1.000 0.000 
 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics based on executive gender. 
As can be noted from the table, female CEOs and chairs are on average younger 
than their male counterparts. Female executives are also less experienced than 
males. Interestingly, the firms with female CEOs often also have a female chair 
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(63.4% of the cases). This is mainly caused by the CEO duality, but it may also 
be that firms who hire a female CEO have female-friendly promoting practices 
and, thus, they may also be more likely to nominate females to other top positions 
within the firm. 
Table 2 reports the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the estimations. 
With the exception of some of the characteristics variables and the positive corre-
lation (0.431) between the performance variables Tobin’s Q and ROA, there are 
no strong correlations between the variables that could distort the regression re-
sults.  
The female executive dummies FCEO and FCHAIR are highly positively corre-
lated. This may be because the same executive often serves in both positions sim-
ultaneously. Alternatively, if a firm has a positive attitude toward hiring a woman 
for a managerial position, the firm may be more likely to maintain a similar hiring 
policy for other senior positions.  Thus,  due to the high correlation of the female 
dummies FCEO and FCHAIR, to avoid multicollinearity they are not used in the 
same regression specifications. Moreover, the age and experience of the executive 
are positively correlated in the cases of the CEOs and chairs, as can be expected. 
Naturally, the executive quality measures correlate positively with the age and 
experience variables, as the quality measure is calculated based on the two.  
If an executive is in demand as an outside board member, s/he is often considered 
highly competent. Interestingly, the chairwomen (FCHAIR) have a positive and 
significant correlation (0.079) with the board seat variable (CHAIRBSEATS). This 
relation may be caused by the shortage of females that are qualified to serve on 
corporate boards and, thus, the few experienced women may be on high demand. 
Finally, the variables measuring the number of board seats held by the CEO and 
chair are highly positively correlated (0.686), which may be due to the CEO and 
chair positions being held by the same person, which is the case in 1102 firm-year 
observations. Alternatively, if the employer has a positive attitude towards execu-
tives participating in other firms’ governance, the CEO and chairperson are likely 
to do so, which could be evident in a high positive correlation between the 
CEOBSEATS and CHAIRBSEATS variables. 
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5 Results 
The estimation results of the panel regressions are reported in Table 3. The table 
illustrates that the control variables are mainly statistically significant and have 
the signs that can be expected based on the previous performance measurement 
literature. SIZE has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q (in line, e.g., with Adams and 
Santos 2006) and a positive impact on ROA, whereas SGROWTH is positively 
associated with firm performance (Rose 2007). Leverage is mainly positively 
related to Tobin’s Q and negatively related to ROA, which is in line with the ear-
lier literature (Cui and Mak 2002). Moreover, the relation between R&D expenses 
and  Tobin’s  Q is  positive,  while  R&D and ROA are  negatively  associated.  The  
relation between firm performance and R&D expenses may vary from time to 
time and from one performance measure to another, as is also indicated by the 
previous literature (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003). This is because an im-
provement in the firm performance caused by investing in R&D can often be seen 
only over a long period of time. Moreover, the R&D expenses may affect the per-
formance differently depending on the chosen evaluation method.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of regression Models 1–4 based on Equa-
tion 1 that have Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance. In these model 
specifications, the F-statistic is significant at the 1 % level in all the regression 
specifications. Moreover, the adjusted R2 varies  from  29.2  %  to  31.6  %  in  the  
regressions. Panel B of Table 3 presents the results for the same model specifica-
tions with ROA as a dependent variable. Here, the explanatory power of the mod-
els varies from 13.8 % to 16.5 %. Overall, the results presented in Table 3 suggest 
that the characteristics of the CEO and chairperson of the board may account for 
differences in firm performance. These findings are mainly consistent with the 
prior literature concentrating on executive characteristics and their impact on firm 
performance (see, e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Davidson et al. 2007; 
Krishnan and Park 2005; Smith et al. 2006). 
5.1 Executive gender 
As  Panel  A  of  Table  3  depicts,  the  female  executive  dummies,  FCEO and 
FCHAIR, appear positive throughout the model specifications, and are statistical-
ly significant in three models out of four. With ROA as a dependent variable 
(Panel B of Table 3), the female CEOs have positive and highly significant coef-
ficients, whereas the female chairs have a negative impact on ROA in Model 3. In 
general, these results suggest that firms with female CEOs tend to outperform 
firms with male executives.  
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The previous literature on gender-based differences and corporate governance 
suggests that female executives may have superior leadership skills, as women are 
found to have better communication and listening skills (see e.g., Dallas 2002; 
Eagly and Carli 2003; Schubert 2006). Moreover, women are found to have a 
leadership style that is effective under contemporary conditions (Eagly and Carli 
2003). Thus, differences in these features may help female-controlled firms out-
perform male-controlled firms. Previous studies also indicate that as the business 
world is controlled by men, women striving to achieve managerial positions have 
to demonstrate special talent. Thus, women may have to work harder than men to 
be nominated as a CEO or chairperson of the board, and therefore, the women in 
these positions are more talented and devoted than the male executives, which 
may lead to an increase in firm performance (see, e.g., Eagly and Carli 2003; 
Fondas and Sassalos 2000). 
 
Table 3.  Regression results.  
The table reports the results of the alternative versions of the following regression 
model:  
?
?
?
?
?
??
????
2010
2007
,
1
1
0 )()(
y
tj
y
jy
n
k
k
jk
YEAR
SICCONTROLSSTICSCHARACTERIPERF
??
????
 
where PERFj.t  is Tobin’s Q or ROA for firm j in year t. The variables are defined 
in the caption of Table 1.  SICjk is a dummy variable according to industry classi-
fication codes (SIC), and YEARjk is a binary variable indicating the fiscal years. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Dependent variable Tobin’s Q. 
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant   2.509 *** 2.334 *** 3.358 *** 2.675 *** 
    (11.90)   (10.26)   (10.02)   (8.75)   
Characteristics 
variables:                   
FCEO ? 0.284 * 0.338 **         
    (1.79)   (2.06)           
FCHAIR ?         0.067   0.163 * 
            (1.09)   (1.87)   
CEOAGE ? -0.009 *** -0.003           
 
  (-6.26)   (-1.60)           
CEOEXP ? 0.012 *** 0.006 **         
    (3.86)   (2.07)           
CEOBSEATS ?     -0.159 ***         
        (-4.49)           
CHAIRAGE ?         -0.019 *** -0.008 *** 
            (-7.34)   (-3.12)   
CHAIREXP ?         0.009 *** 0.007 *** 
 
          (6.35)   (4.68)   
CHAIRBSEATS ?             -0.135 *** 
 
              (-4.95)   
DUAL ?     0.287 ***     0.268 *** 
 
      (7.05)       (4.72)   
Control variables:                   
LEV + -0.049   0.021   0.041   0.155   
    (-0.18)   (0.09)   (0.19)   (0.76)   
RD ? 0.004 *** 0.052 *** 0.043 *** 0.048 *** 
    (6.93)   (9.68)   (14.74)   (14.77)   
SGROWTH + 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 
    (5.12)   (4.86)   (5.10)   (5.53)   
SIZE - -0.119 *** -0.151 *** -0.154 *** -0.154 *** 
    (-2.83)   (-2.66)   (-3.57)   (-3.03)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.294   0.316   0.292   0.314   
F-stat.   28.287 *** 26.901 *** 28.696 *** 28.002 *** 
n 1940 1525 1905 1480 
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Table 3 cont. Regression results. 
Panel B. Dependent variable ROA. 
Variable Exp. sign Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant   -0.012   -0.018   0.086 *** 0.023   
    (-0.33)   (-0.59)   (5.04)   (0.73)   
Characteristics 
variables:                   
FCEO ? 0.020 *** 0.022 ***         
    (2.85)   (2.96)           
FCHAIR ?         -0.019 ** -0.013   
            (-2.23)   (-1.25)   
CEOAGE ? 0.001 *** 0.001 ***         
 
  (3.42)   (3.83)           
CEOEXP ? 0.001 *** 0.000           
    (3.82)   (1.54)           
CEOBSEATS ?     -0.003           
        (-1.01)           
CHAIRAGE ?         -0.001 ** 0.000   
            (-2.21)   (-0.02)   
CHAIREXP ?         0.000   0.000 * 
 
          (1.64)   (1.84)   
CHAIRBSEATS ?             -0.003   
 
              (-0.84)   
DUAL ?     0.020 ***     0.027 *** 
 
      (3.08)       (3.67)   
Control variables:                   
LEV - -0.155 *** -0.156 *** -0.153 *** -0.149 *** 
    (-7.49)   (-7.81)   (-6.82)   (-6.36)   
RD ? -0.001 * -0.001   -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 
    (-1.87)   (-1.50)   (-2.75)   (-2.15)   
SGROWTH + 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 
    (2.74)   (2.96)   (2.27)   (2.36)   
SIZE + 0.008 ** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 
    (2.54)   (2.89)   (2.79)   (3.10)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.159   0.165   0.138   0.153   
F-stat.   13.417 *** 12.108 *** 11.797 *** 11.704 *** 
n 1940 1525 1905 1480 
  
5.2 Executive age 
Model 1 in Panel A of Table 3 suggests that  CEO age has a negative impact on 
firm profitability, whereas in Model 2 CEO age seems to have no significant im-
pact on Tobin’s Q. Additionally,  Models 3 and 4 indicate that the chairperson’s 
age has a significant negative impact on the firm’s success. Interestingly, Models 
2 and 4 of Panel B in Table 3 indicate that the CEO age affects ROA positively, 
 Acta Wasaensia     173 
 
 
 
 
while the chair age has a negative impact on ROA in Model 3. Hence, overall 
these results indicate that as executives age, the Tobin’s Q of the firm tends to 
decrease, while ROA seems to increase.8 
The negative relationship between executive age and firm performance is partly 
supported by the previous literature (see, e.g., Davidson et al. 2007). Older execu-
tives may be more prone to advancing their own goals and “enjoying the quiet 
life” (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003), which may cause a lower per-
formance of firms with older executives. Alternatively, the difference may be 
caused by the age-based differences in risk aversion. For example, Bernasek and 
Shwiff (2001) and Cohn et al. (1975) report a negative relationship between age 
and risk aversion, which could create differences in firm performance based on 
the age of the executive. 
5.3 Executive experience 
The coefficients for the executive experience variables (CEOEXP and 
CHAIREXP) are positive and statistically significant in all of the estimated model 
specifications with Q as the dependent variable and in Models 1 and 4 with ROA 
as the dependent variable. Therefore, these results support the argument that ex-
ecutives with long experience tend to outperform less-experienced executives. As 
indicated by, for example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), experienced execu-
tives have more firm- and task-specific knowledge, and thus, they may help the 
firm improve its performance. Moreover, executives with longer tenures are likely 
to have vast networks of business contacts from which executives can benefit.  
                                               
 
8  As explained above, the age and experience of the executives are measured in years. The same 
regressions are also estimated by using the logarithmic values of the variables EXECAGE and 
EXECEXP (as suggested, e.g., by Coles et al. 2008). The results are statistically significant 
(not tabulated) and very similar to those reported in Table 3, indicating that the choice of using 
logarithmic or principal values of the age and experience measures has no impact on the re-
ported results. Moreover, as can be seen from the correlation matrix (see Table 3), the varia-
bles for executive age and experience are positively correlated (0.441 for the CEOs and 0.491 
for the Chairpersons). Therefore, to confirm that these correlations do not distort the results, 
the regressions are re-estimated by including only the age or experience variable in the regres-
sion specifications. The results of the modified regressions (not tabulated) are consistent with 
the results reported in Table 3, although not statistically significant in all the regression speci-
fications. Hence, these tests suggest that the age of the executive has a mixed relation to firm 
performance, whereas experience has a positive impact on the financial performance of the 
firm. Therefore, the estimation results presented in the paper are rather robust. 
 
174      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
Thus, the reported results suggest that it is not the overall experience of life as 
measured by age that creates a competitive advantage for an executive. Instead, 
the firms seem to benefit from having executives with long tenures in the same 
position. A long tenure may provide an executive with richer and more compre-
hensive knowledge and an improved understanding of the firm, thereby increas-
ing the executive’s expertise (Finkelstein 1992).  
5.4 Executive busyness 
The busyness of an executive is examined through CEO duality and the number 
of external board seats. The results indicate that the number of board seats 
(CEOBSEATS and CHAIRBSEATS) an executive holds in firms other than the one 
employing them is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. The coefficients are 
statistically significant at least at the 1 % level, thus indicating that busy execu-
tives hurt firm performance. There is no significant relation between the firm’s 
ROA and executive busyness measured as the number of board seats held. Inter-
estingly, however, CEO duality has a positive impact on firm performance, and 
the results are statistically significant at the 1 % level.   
Thus, the estimation results indicate that the executive’s external commitments 
may have a negative impact on firm performance. In contrast, commitments with-
in the firm of employment may improve firm performance, as CEO duality seems 
to boost the firm’s Tobin’s Q and ROA. This may be because holding external 
positions is likely to decrease the time and effort an executive invests in the em-
ploying firm, whereas holding both CEO and chair positions gives the executive 
immense opportunities to affect the firm’s development. In addition, an executive 
holding both of the executive positions examined, s/he may consider good firm 
performance as a personal challenge and accomplishment, and may therefore be 
willing to invest more into the roles. Similar results on the impact of CEO duality 
on the firm have also recently been reported by Ahn et al. (2010) and Kim et al. 
(2009) among others.  
5.5 Executive quality 
Panels C and D of Table 3 report the estimation results of the regression Models 
5–8. The F-statistics of the models presented in the table are significant at the 1 % 
level, and the R2s vary from 27.9 % to 31.8 % for the models with Q as the de-
pendent variable and from 13.6 % to 16.2 % for the model specifications with 
ROA as the dependent variable. As can be noted from the table, female executives 
again positively influence Tobin’s Q, even though in Model 7 the result is not 
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statistically significant. As Panel D of the table depicts, female CEOs have a posi-
tive impact on ROA, while the chairperson gender is negatively associated with 
ROA  in  Model  7.  Consistent  with  Panels  A  and  B  of  the  table,  the  number  of  
board seats held by the executive negatively influences firm performance, while 
the CEO duality seems to boost Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Table 3 cont. Regression results. 
Panel C. Dependent variable Tobin’s Q. 
Variable Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant   2.074 *** 2.178 *** 2.319 *** 2.193 *** 
    (9.60)   (7.21)   (8.54)   (7.17)   
Characteristics 
variables:                   
FCEO ? 0.300 * 0.345 **         
    (1.87)   (2.12)           
FCHAIR ?         0.092   0.184 ** 
            (1.36)   (2.03)   
CEOQUAL ? 0.666 *** 0.393 **         
 
  (3.82)   (2.38)           
CEOBSEATS ?     -0.163 ***         
        (-4.93)           
CHAIRQUAL ?         0.238 *** 0.393 *** 
            (2.78)   (3.90)   
CHAIRBSEATS ?             -0.144 *** 
 
              (-5.26)   
DUAL ?     0.278 ***     0.314 *** 
 
      (6.36)       (5.93)   
Control variables:                   
LEV + -0.062   0.026   0.031   0.164   
    (-0.23)   (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.81)   
RD ? 0.045 *** 0.052 *** 0.041 *** 0.048 *** 
    (6.97)   (9.72)   (14.15)   (14.83)   
SGROWTH + 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 
    (5.15)   (4.93)   (5.04)   (5.54)   
SIZE - -0.128 *** -0.154 *** -0.153 *** -0.154 *** 
    (-2.96)   (-2.78)   (-3.33)   (-2.93)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.295   0.318   0.279   0.314   
F-stat.   30.343 *** 28.703 *** 28.845 *** 29.607 *** 
n 
 
1940 
 
1525 
 
1905 
 
1480 
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Table 3 cont. Regression results. 
Panel D. Dependent variable ROA. 
Variable Exp. sign Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant   0.032   0.025   0.044 ** 0.025   
    (1.36)   (1.15)   (2.00)   (1.10)   
Characteristics 
variables:                   
FCEO ? 0.018 *** 0.020 ***         
    (2.77)   (2.85)           
FCHAIR ?         -0.018 ** -0.013   
            (-2.21)   (-1.44)   
CEOQUAL ? 0.052 *** 0.029 **         
 
  (3.76)   (2.46)           
CEOBSEATS ?     -0.002           
        (-0.52)           
CHAIRQUAL ?         0.004   0.023 ** 
            (0.43)   (2.20)   
CHAIRBSEATS ?             -0.003   
 
              (-0.92)   
DUAL ?     0.021 ***     0.027 *** 
 
      (3.15)       (4.79)   
Control variables:                   
LEV - -0.152 *** -0.154 *** -0.154 *** -0.150 *** 
    (-7.13)   (-7.57)   (-6.77)   (-6.34)   
RD ? -0.001 * -0.001   -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 
    (-1.90)   (-1.49)   (-2.99)   (-2.16)   
SGROWTH + 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 
    (2.27)   (2.89)   (2.31)   (2.35)   
SIZE + 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 
    (2.80)   (3.36)   (2.71)   (3.07)   
                    
Adjusted R2   0.155   0.162   0.136   0.154   
F-stat.   13.929 *** 12.546 *** 12.338 *** 12.396 *** 
n 
 
1940 
 
1525 
 
1905 
 
1480 
   
In general, the reported findings indicate a significant relationship between To-
bin’s Q or ROA and executive characteristics. Interestingly, as can be seen from 
Panels C and D of Table 3, executive quality may have a positive impact on firm 
performance. However, this result is not significant in Model 7 of Panel D. These 
results are consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2008), who report that executive 
quality influences firm performance. Relatively young executives with a long 
tenure in the position are likely to have different incentives and reputations than 
older executives with similar tenures, and thus, the younger executives’ talent and 
devotion work in favor of the firm.  
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5.6 Robustness checks 
Several additional tests are conducted in order to ascertain the robustness of the 
reported results. First, to ensure that the results are not caused by the data winso-
rization, the same regressions are examined based on the original data. The esti-
mation results of these regressions (not tabulated) are broadly consistent with the 
results reported in Table 3. To estimate whether the results are driven by an in-
dustry bias, the Barber Lyon adjustment (1996) is employed. The results based on 
these industry-adjusted ROAs as a dependent variable are in line with the results 
reported in Table 3. 
In addition to excluding the financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) from the ex-
amined sample, utilities (SIC codes 4000–4999) are excluded due to their unique 
regulation. The results of these tests (not tabulated) support the main findings 
reported in Table 3, thus indicating that the findings are not caused by the utility 
sector firms. 
CEO or  chair  succession  or  partial  promotion  to  a  dual  position  could  drive  the  
results. Thus, observations with CEO or chair changes and partial promotions are 
excluded from the sample. These test results (not tabulated) are consistent with 
the results tabulated in Table 3, thus indicating that changes in the CEO and chair 
positions do not distort the findings. 
5.7 Limitations 
Despite the additional tests for robustness, several limitations need to be consid-
ered in interpreting the results presented in this paper. First, the sample consists of 
S&P 500 firms, and thus, the results may not be applicable to smaller firms or to 
firms operating outside the U.S. Second, since the characteristics data are hand-
collected, the sample period is limited to five fiscal years, and thus, longer-term 
effects of executive characteristics on firm performance cannot be examined 
based on this data. 
In addition, other executive-specific characteristics may have an impact on firm 
performance. Due to data constraints, additional analyses with other characteristic 
variables cannot be conducted here, but future studies could examine, for exam-
ple, the effects of executive education, experience in other companies, career 
paths, whether the chair is the previous CEO of the firm, marital status, number of 
children, and wealth. 
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Finally, the characteristic variables could be endogenous. In particular, the choice 
of female CEOs or chairs may not be exogenous. Despite controlling for industry 
and size effects, some correlated variables may have been omitted, or certain 
firm-specific characteristics might simultaneously affect the choice of the execu-
tive and firm performance. Unfortunately, finding instruments for these types of 
tests is very problematic, especially in this case in which many characteristic var-
iables are included in the research. Earlier literature indicates many statistical 
problems and highly misleading parameter estimates associated with weak in-
struments (Hahn and Hausman 2003; Larcker and Rusticus 2010), and therefore, 
using possibly weak instruments to control for endogeneity may do more harm 
than good. Thus, endogeneity tests could not be conducted in this study, and con-
sequently, the reported results should be considered somewhat exploratory. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between CEO and chairperson characteris-
tics and firm performance. The study is motivated by earlier literature reporting 
that executives’ demographic and experience-related characteristics may be relat-
ed to firm performance. For instance, gender-based differences may have im-
portant implications for the working practices of an executive. Moreover, the ex-
isting literature suggests that other executive characteristics, such as age, experi-
ence, quality, and busyness, may have an impact on executives’ ability to manage 
their work. It is therefore hypothesized that, controlling for other characteristics, 
the gender of an executive may be associated with better firm performance.  
Based on a five-year sample of S&P 500 firms, the findings reported in this paper 
demonstrate that firms with female executives may outperform firms with male 
executives. The age of an executive is suggested to be negatively related to To-
bin’s  Q  and  to  have  a  positive  relationship  with  ROA.  Executive  experience  is  
positively associated with Tobin’s Q and ROA. In addition, an executive’s exter-
nal commitments seem to have a negative relationship with firm performance, 
while executive busyness in terms of CEO duality seems to increase Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. Finally, executive quality is reported to enhance firm performance.  
The empirical findings of the paper are broadly in line with the previous literature 
on gender-based differences and firm performance, as, for example results from 
Krishnan and Parker (2005) and Smith et al. (2006) indicate that female-
controlled firms may outperform firms with male executives. The results are fur-
ther supported by psychology and management literature reporting gender-based 
differences in, for example, risk-aversion, decision-making, and overconfidence. 
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Moreover, the regression results concerning the age and experience of an execu-
tive are supported by a stream of previous studies. In particular, older executives 
are suggested to have a negative impact on firm performance, perhaps due to ad-
vancing their own goals and “enjoying the quiet life” instead of constantly focus-
ing on developing the firm (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Davidson 
et al. 2007). The positive impact of more experienced executives on firm perfor-
mance is supported by them having more firm- and task-specific knowledge, 
which may help them in performing the work (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990). 
Executives with long tenures may also have extensive business contacts that they 
can benefit from.  
Moreover, executive quality is reported to be positively related to the firm’s suc-
cess, thus further indicating that the firm’s executive choices are highly im-
portant. Finally, holding multiple board seats is suggested to harm firm perfor-
mance (in line with, e.g., Ahn et al. 2010), while busyness within the firm in 
terms of CEO duality is proposed to boost the performance of the firm (Kim et al. 
2009). 
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